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Abstract
Electricity systems around the world are facing massive investments to replace aged and add new
generation capacity. Thereby, investments in power generation assets bear considerable financial
risks in view of the typically high capital investments and long-lasting asset lifetimes between 20
and 50 years. The regulatory frame set by policy makers and the investment decisions of companies
of today influence the socioeconomic costs of tomorrow in liberalized electricity markets. Thus,
both policy makers and investors should reflect costs (respectively return) and monetary risks
of their investment decisions carefully to build economical and long-term sustainable electricity
systems.
This thesis aims to contribute to the theory of decision making under uncertainty in the field
of electricity generation investments and to analyze efficient generation portfolios both from a
societal and from a company perspective. For that, the research proposed in this thesis combines
and extends concepts of capacity planning and peak load pricing on the one hand and Mean-
Variance Portfolio theory based on Markowitz on the other hand—which are well-discussed in
economic literature individually—in an integrated modelling approach. Thereby, the research in
this thesis is focused on financial risks induced by technology-specific fuel price uncertainties which
are inherent to all non-renewable generation technologies.
Having briefly recaped the fundamentals of decision theory under uncertainty, we propose a
model that captures the investment decision as a formal optimization problem. From the latter,
quantitative diversification criteria are derived and analytical solutions for cost-risk efficient gene-
ration portfolios are determined from a welfare perspective. The results show that diversification of
generation portfolios is—even under high societal risk aversion—not beneficial per-se. The techno-
logy mix in efficient portfolios depends rather on the specific risk of each technology. Consequently,
generation technologies with traditionally low fuel price fluctuations (e.g. nuclear or lignite plants)
are preferred compared with technologies with higher price fluctuations (e.g. gas) with increasing
societal risk aversion.
While commonly neglected in literature, the effect of reversal risks in the short-term order of
dispatch (“merit order”) is analytically studied and quantified in this thesis. It is shown that
this risk factor can impact the efficient technology mix substantially especially given long-term
investment horizons. While existing literature in the field of capacity planning and Mean-Variance
Theory relies predominantly on the key assumptions of perfect markets, we show how risk-averse
investor behavior may shift the technology structure in the market equilibrium significantly away
from the welfare optimum.
iv
Finally, we resume the focus on the investor perspective and empirically study the impact of the
fuel mix structure in power generation portfolios on expected stock returns for major European
power companies. It is shown that the generation fuel mix has a significant impact on the historical
stock returns of the investigated companies. Thus, these results provide theoretical and practical
benefit to determine adequate riskadjusted capital costs for typical generation technologies from
an investor perspective.
v
Zusammenfassung
Weltweit erfordern Erneuerungen und Erweiterungen der Stromversorgungssysteme hohe Investi-
tionen in neue Stromerzeugungsanlagen. Die hierfu¨r erforderlichen Kraftwerksinvestitionen bergen
aufgrund der hohen Baukosten und der langen Lebensdauern zwischen 20 und 50 Jahren er-
hebliche finanzielle Risiken sowohl fu¨r einzelne Investoren als auch fu¨r die Wettbewerbsfa¨higkeit
ganzer Volkswirtschaften; denn der von Energiepolitikern gesetzte regulatorische Marktrahmen und
im Markt getroffenen Investitionsentscheidungen von heute beeinflussen die volkswirtschaftlichen
Kosten fu¨r die Energieversorgung von morgen. Daher sollten Energiepolitiker bei der Fo¨rderung be-
stimmter Kraftwerkstechnologien und Investoren bei ihren Entscheidungen zu Kraftwerksneubauten
sowohl die Kosten (bzw. Renditen) als auch die finanziellen Risiken im Hinblick auf das Erzeu-
gungsportfolio im Markt beru¨cksichtigen.
Diese Arbeit zielt darauf ab, die Entscheidungstheorie unter Unsicherheit im Hinblick auf Kraft-
werksinvestitionen weiterzuentwickeln und effiziente Erzeugungsportfolios sowohl von einer volks-
wirtschaftlichen als auch von einer Investoren-Perspektive zu erforschen. Dazu setzt diese Arbeit
auf den in der Literatur bereits intensiv diskutierten Konzepten zur Kapazita¨tsplanung sowie des
“Peak-load Pricing” einerseits sowie der Markowitz’schen Portfoliotheorie andererseits auf und ent-
wickelt diese in einem integrierten Modellansatz weiter. Dabei stehen finanzielle Risiken aus den
spezifischen Brennstoffpreis-Unsicherheiten unterschiedlicher Erzeugungs-Technologien im Fokus
dieser Arbeit.
Nach einer kurzen Zusammenfassung elementarer Grundlagen zur Entscheidungstheorie wird die
Investitionsentscheidung als ein formales Optimierungsproblem modelliert. Hiervon werden quanti-
tative Kriterien zur Diversifikation des Erzeugungsportfolios in Abha¨ngigkeit von der Risikoaversion
abgeleitet und analytische Lo¨sungen fu¨r bezogen auf Kosten und Risiken effiziente Erzeugungsport-
folios aus einer Wohlfahrtperspektive bestimmt. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass Diversifikation per
se selbst bei hoher gesellschaftlicher Risikoaversion nicht zwingend vorteilhaft ist. Der effiziente
Technologiemix im Erzeugungsportfolio ist vielmehr durch die spezifischen Risiken der einzelnen
Technologien selbst bestimmt. Folglich werden mit steigender gesellschaftlicher Risikoaversion
jene Erzeugungstechnologien mit geringen Brennstoffpreisrisiken (beispielsweise Kernkraft oder
Braunkohle) gegenu¨ber Technologien mit hohen Preisschwankungen (beispielsweise Gas) bevorzugt.
Im Gegensatz zu bestehenden Forschungsarbeiten, in denen Vera¨nderungen der Grenzpreis ba-
sierten Angebotskurve (“Merit Order”) aufgrund von Schwankungen in den Brennstoffkosten nicht
betrachtet werden, wird dieses Risiko in der vorliegenden Arbeit explizit analysiert und quan-
tifiziert. Im Ergebnis wird gezeigt, dass Merit Order Risiken insbesondere bei langen Investi-
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tionszeitra¨umen den Technologiemix in effizienten Erzeugungsportfolios erheblich beeinflussen.
Wa¨hrend bestehende Literatur zum Thema Kapazita¨tsplanung und Portfoliotheorie gemeinhin
die Annahme vollkommener Ma¨rkte voraussetzt, wird in dieser Arbeit analytisch gezeigt, wie
Risikoaversion von Investoren die sich im Marktgleichgewicht einstellende Struktur des Erzeu-
gungsportfolios beeinflussen und zu erheblichen Abweichungen vom wohlfahrtsoptimalen Tech-
nologiemix fu¨hren kann.
Schließlich wird wieder aus der Investorenperspekive empirisch der Einfluss des Technologiemixes
im Erzeugungsportfolio auf die erwartete Rendite von großen europa¨ischen Energieversorgern un-
tersucht. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass die Erzeugungsstruktur einen signifikanten Einfluss auf
die historischen Aktienrenditen der untersuchten Unternehmen hat. Die Ergebnisse liefern einen
theoretischen und praktischen Beitrag zur Ermittlung risikoadjustierter Kapitalkosten fu¨r typische
Erzeugungstechnologien aus einer Investorenperspektive.
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Introduction
1.1 Objectives and academic relevance
The global electricity generation sector faces an immense need for investments in the next 25 years.
The IEA (2010) estimates that “total capacity additions, to replace obsolete capacity and to meet
demand growth, amount to more than 5900 GW globally in the period 2009–2035; over 40% of this
is installed by 2020.” The cumulative global investment required solely for new generation plants is
about US$ 9.6 trillion (in year-2009 dollars) over 2010–2035. Determining and ensuring an optimal
capital and capacity allocation with respect to the generation technology mix thus represents a
crucial problem faced both by investors on liberalized markets but also by governments and policy
makers.
Thereby, energy policy has to reflect three main criteria with respect to an efficient generation
technology mix: Security of supply, sustainability, and competitiveness of supply. Many European
electricity markets have undergone a transition with respect to the relevance of these three criteria
in the last decades. Taking Germany as an example, security of supply was implicitly the primary
objective before market liberalization until the late 1990s. The following decade of market libera-
lization changed the focus in favor of competitiveness. Starting with the Renewable Energy Act
from 2000, the German energy policy turned increasingly towards a sustainable development of the
electricity sector. Nevertheless, cost competitiveness remains in the long-run a necessary condition
for affordable power prices and therewith for public acceptance of the generation fuel mix.
Since generation investments bear considerable risks in particular in view of the high capital re-
quirements and the long-lasting commitment periods with life cycles of power plants of 30–50 years,
competitiveness of supply is also driven by the specific financial risks incurred. Both investors and
society as a whole should reflect the technological and financial risks of different generation tech-
nologies. Thereby, a risk-averse behavior will typically by applied and influence the investment
decision. As in financial markets, financial risk management has become an important prerequisite
to succeed in liberalized electricity markets. Hence, optimal generation capacity allocation under
cost and risk targets represents a key problem from an energy policy view. Companies face the
1
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analogue problem of efficient fuel mix selection under risk and return objectives with investment
decisions in electricity generation assets.
This thesis aims to analyze the economics of investments in power plant portfolios under uncer-
tainty. Thereby, the primary objective is to improve the understanding of how specific generation
technologies affect the trade-off between long-term risks1 and expected benefits (respectively ex-
pected costs) in power generation portfolios. To serve this goal, this thesis includes four research
papers on long-term risk management and related decision problems with respect to investments
in power generation portfolios in electricity markets.
Although the topic itself is not new in academia and a substantial number of studies has been
published in recent years on optimal capacity allocation in risk-return frameworks, the majority of
this literature applies numerical methods. In contrast, this dissertation aims to contribute to the
topic with a special emphasis on analytically derived insights which enable a better understanding
of interdependencies of parameters and results in efficient portfolios.
As a second goal of this work, the proposed models aim to be applicable for analytical decision
support for both electricity market investors and political decision makers to determine the efficient
fuel mix in power generation portfolios with respect to financial risk and return. Thereby, the exact
numbers in the applications presented within this thesis have primarily illustrative character and
are to be considered as exemplary case studies. However, the models are sufficiently generic to be
easily transferred to other electricity markets and investment decisions.
This thesis is based on and integrates the work of four separate research papers which analyze
capacity allocation and investment problems under uncertainty focusing on power generation assets
in electricity markets. Thereby, mean-variance efficient investment strategies in electricity markets
are analyzed from the perspective of a representative societal decision maker and individual investor
as well as a market equilibrium problem.
By reviewing existing work and developing novel theory and applications based on a broad
methodological spectrum with respect to specific aspects of investment and portfolio optimization
problems, the papers in this thesis contribute to different areas of research within the field of
energy economics. Thereby, the connecting element between all papers is the central question of
the efficient power generation fuel mix from a societal and investors’ perspective.
1.2 Summary and structure of this thesis
The overall introduction to the research topic of this thesis is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2
reviews elementary cornerstones and concepts of decision theory under uncertainty and by that aims
to serve as a useful foundation of the following research papers. Chapters 3-6 provide the research
1Denton et al. (2003) distinguish risks of asset operators in electricity markets by three different time horizons:
Firstly operational/earnings risks over the short term (less than one month), secondly trading and operational
risks over the intermediate term (one month to one year), and asset valuation/equity risks over a long (more
than one year) time-frame.
2
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papers which deal with different aspects and methodologies of long-term portfolio management in
electricity markets.
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on mean-variance optimization of power generation portfolios and con-
tribute methodologically to applied operations research. Both papers consider the impact of
technology-specific fuel price risks on welfare-optimal investments and derive quantitative diversifi-
cation criteria for efficient generation portfolios. Chapter 3 has been published as Sunderko¨tter and
Weber (2012) and presents a novel analytical approach combining conceptual elements of peak-load
pricing and MVP theory to derive optimal portfolios consisting of an arbitrary number of plant
technologies given uncertain fuel prices.
Building on the modeling principles of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 (corresponding to Sunderko¨tter and
Weber, 2011) relaxes one of the core assumptions and no longer excludes uncertainty in the short-
term order of variable operating costs (merit order). This relaxation is of particular importance if
competing technologies face operating costs with only a small difference in mean, but high variances
and imperfect correlation. The extended model framework results in a non-convex optimization
model. Both article conclude with an examination of the proposed frameworks and the results for
the German electricity market.
Chapter 5 (corresponding to Sunderko¨tter et al., 2013) compares market imperfections in form
of risk-averse company behavior in investment decisions with the market outcome under perfect
competition. Implications on the market investment equilibrium are analyzed in a partial equi-
librium model. It is shown that risk-averse company behavior applying mean-variance portfolio
optimization does typically not coincide with market equilibrium in perfectly competitive markets.
It can be shown that the mean variance based decision models discussed in Chapters 3-5 are un-
der weak conditions consistent with the well-known postulations of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). Hence it arises the question from an investor perspective whether there are significant dif-
ferences in the systematic risk of different power generation technologies. To answer this question,
Chapter 6 empirically investigates interdependencies between the power generation fuel mix and
the systematic risk of power companies. The analysis is based on historical evaluations of expected
stock returns for 22 European power generation companies. Differences in the debt-adjusted mar-
ket betas can be found between the sample companies that own and operate generation portfolios
consisting of different technologies. Based on these observations, technology-specific beta factors
are identified and tested for significance in differences for coal, natural gas, nuclear, and renewable
generation technologies.
1.2.1 Paper I: Mean-Variance optimization of power generation portfolios
Deterministic capacity planning problems in electricity systems can be solved by comparing tech-
nology specific long-term and short-term marginal costs. In an uncertain market environment,
Mean-Variance Portfolio (MVP) theory provides a consistent framework to balance risk and re-
turn in power generation portfolios. Focusing on fuel price risks, MVP theory can be adopted to
determine the welfare efficient system generation technology mix.
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Existing literature on MVP applications in electricity generation markets uses predominantly
numerical methods to characterize portfolio risks. In contrast, this article presents a novel analyti-
cal approach combining conceptual elements of classical capacity planning models and MVP theory
to derive the efficient portfolio structure consisting of an arbitrary number of plant technologies
given uncertain fuel prices. For this purpose, we provide a static optimization model which allows
to fully capture fuel price risks in a mean variance portfolio framework. The analytically derived
optimality conditions contribute to a better understanding of the optimal investment policy and
its risk characteristics compared to existing numerical methods. Furthermore, we demonstrate an
application of the proposed framework and provide results for the German electricity market which
has been hardly treated in MVP literature on electricity markets.
This article provides easily interpretable analytical optimality conditions for efficient generation
portfolios from a societal point of view and therewith contributes to a better understanding of
MVP in electricity applications.
In the following paper, the discussion of risk-cost efficient capacity allocation is deepened by
relaxing one of the core assumption, i.e. a stable merit order:
1.2.2 Paper II: Optimization of power portfolios under uncertainty in the
merit order
In this article we discuss welfare-optimal capacity allocation of different electricity generation
technologies available for serving system demand. While the classical peak load pricing theory
derives the efficient portfolio structure from a deterministic marginal production cost curve (“merit
order”), we investigate in particular the implications of possible reversals in the merit order—so-
called merit order risks or fuel switch risks—induced by uncertain operating costs.
We propose a static, non-convex optimization model combining the classic peak load pricing
model with elements of mean-variance portfolio (MVP) theory and analytically discuss possible
solution cases and important optimality properties. We examine the approach in a case study on
the efficient structure of generation portfolios consisting of CCGT and hard coal technologies in
Germany. With special emphasis, we study the emergence of overcapacities (exceeding maximal de-
mand) in efficient portfolios and show that diversification is not beneficial per-se. The results show
that the efficient technology mix may be significantly impacted by the merit order risk, especially
given a difference time series of operating costs without mean-revering behavior. Therefore, our
findings support the importance of considering this risk factor especially with long-term investment
horizons.
The model is applicable to various investment problems related to production of non-storable
goods under price uncertainty of input factors. Similar problems can e.g. be found in transportation
systems or in the process industry.
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1.2.3 Paper III: Perfect competition versus riskaverse agents: Technology
portfolio choice in electricity markets
Investments in power generation assets are risky due to high construction costs and long asset
lifetimes. Technology diversification in generation portfolios represents one option to reduce long-
term investment risks for risk-averse decision makers. In this article, we analyze the impact of
market imperfections induced by risk-aversion on the long-term investment portfolio structure in
the market. We show that risk-averse electricity market agents who receive a managerial profit
share may shift the technology structure in the market significantly away from the welfare opti-
mum. A numerical example provides estimates on the potential scale of this effect and discusses
sensitivities of key parameters.
In contrast to the previous papers, the following article focuses on the investor perspective:
1.2.4 Paper IV: Fuel mix characteristics and expected stock returns of
European power companies
This article investigates the impact of the fuel mix structure in power generation portfolios on ex-
pected stock returns for major European power companies. The 22 largest publicly listed European
power producers are examined between January 2005 and December 2010. Based on the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) and multi-factor market models, the systematic risk of the power
companies relative to the overall market performance and other typical energy and macroeconomic
risk factors is analyzed. The full-information approach is used to determine technology-specific
betas and risk factor sensitivities from the sample. Although most companies are not exclusively
in the power producing business, it is shown that the generation fuel mix has a significant impact
on the historical stock returns of the investigated companies. In particular, the sample compa-
nies exhibit significant differences in the systematic risk of gas and nuclear generation technologies
compared with renewable technologies measured by technology-specific, delevered beta factors.
This study extends existing literature and contributes new insights in two ways: Firstly, this
is to our knowledge the first empirical analysis comparing the financial risk of different electricity
generation technologies. Secondly, the results provide practical benefit to determine adequate risk-
adjusted capital costs for typical generation technologies. Therewith, this study is relevant for
evaluating all kinds of power plant investments.
5

C
h
a
p
te
r
2
Decisions under uncertainty: A brief review of theory
Before addressing any specific decision and portfolio problems, it seems helpful to approach the
topic with some more general reflections on how risk may influence the satisfaction of a decision
maker who bears the risk. Hence, this chapter aims to provide a brief introduction to decision
theory under uncertainty and therewith sets the basis for the following chapters in which we
discuss specific decision problems.
2.1 Risk and utility
The economic literature provides many different definitions of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity.
On the basis of Knight (1921), modern economic textbooks commonly distinguish the following
three different categories of unknowns (e.g. Stirling, 1994, Domschke and Scholl, 2003, Trautmann,
2006): Risk describes situations in which the decision maker has full information on all decision
alternatives, on all possible outcomes, and the probability for the realization of each outcome. In
contrast, there is no information about the distribution of probabilities under uncertainty (in a
narrower sense). This definition typically corresponds also to ambiguity. Last, ignorance describes
situations in which individuals are not able to form beliefs of probabilities, for instance if there is
no knowledge about the possible outcomes at all.
In the following, we will focus our considerations to decision situations under risk. These are
based on the assumption that the decision maker has full information on all decision alternatives,
on all possible outcomes, and the probability for the realization of each outcome. Classic economic
theory characterizes decisions in risk situations by four attributes (cf. e.g. Gollier, 1999):
 The space of possible lotteries or actions L = {L1, . . . , LI} describes the set of mutually
exclusive decision alternatives, the decision maker has at a certain point in time.
 The state space Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωS} which characterizes a set of potential states of the envi-
ronment that may exogenously influence the decision or action. For simplicity reasons, we
assume a finite set of possible states.
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 The information structure over the state space Ω : P = (p1, . . . pS) which contains the
probabilities for the realization of each state of the environment.
 The space of possible outcomes X = {x11, . . . , xIS}, where each outcome xij is defined
by a function f(Li, ωj) with (Li, ωj) 7→ xij = f(Li, ωj). The element xij represents the
consequence of the lottery Li given the environment state ωj . The latter is realized at a
likelihood of pj = p(ωj).
We can characterize a simple lottery Li by the vector (xi1, pi1;xi2, pi2; . . . ;xiS , piS). A com-
pound or multi-stage lottery is a lottery whose outcomes are again lotteries. Consider a com-
pound lottery L which yields lottery La = (xa1, pa1; . . . ;xaS , paS) with probability α and lottery
Lb = (xb1, pb1; . . . ;xbS , pbS) with probability (1−α), i.e. L = αLa⊕(1−α)Lb. The probability that
the outcome of lottery L is x1 equals p1 = αpa1 + (1−α)pb1. For all decision situations considered
in this thesis, we assume that L,Ω, P,X are known.
To analyze which lottery yields in a decision situation an optimal outcome, it is necessary to
define a decision principle that allows to evaluate the outcomes with respect to a specified set of
characteristics. This is performed by a preference relation “” which allows to rank the outcomes
of different decision alternatives or the decision alternatives itself based on the decision makers’
preferences. For instance, Li  Lj means that decision alternative Li is strictly preferred to Lj .
While a preference relation allows to compare and rank alternatives only on an ordinal scale, it is
desirable in stochastic settings to quantify the utility of different alternatives on a cardinal scale
to derive utility maximizing decision strategies (see e.g. Trautmann, 2006).
The utility from decision alternative Lj can be expressed by a real number u, the utility index.
A function U assigning a utility index to every combination of outcomes, U : X(L,Ω) → R is
called utility function. With the natural order of the real numbers, the utility function enables to
rank and—even more—to quantitatively value the investor’s utility from all combinations of goods.
Utility functions can be based on different underlying criteria which reflect the individual benefits
of the decision maker. Most common in microeconomic theory are utility functions which reflect
the expected value and the risk incurred with a decision alternative. These utility functions are
also called risk utility functions.
Utility functions characterize and represent different risk attitudes. Risk-neutral individuals are
characterized by linear utility functions (cf. U0(x) in Fig. 2.1): These persons would accept a
certain payment equal to the expected value of the outcome—regardless of the risk incurred. A
risk-averse person is represented by a concave utility function (U1(x) in Fig. 2.1): The decision
maker would accept a certain payment (certainty equivalent) of less than the expected value, rather
than taking the gamble and possibly receiving nothing. Conversely, a convex utility function applies
for risk-affine individuals (U2(x) in Fig. 2.1).
In economic theory, individuals are typically assumed to behave risk-averse which is equivalent
to a concave utility function. Thereby, the degree of risk aversion is characterized by the second
derivative of the utility function. Since the risk attitude characterized by a utility function is
invariant with respect to affine-linear transformations of the utility function, however not the
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Fig. 2.1: Utility functions corresponding to different risk attitudes: U0(x) represents a utility function of a risk-
neutral decision maker, U1(x) the utility function of a risk-averse (risk-avoiding) individual, and U2(x)
the utility function of a risk-affine (risk-seeking) person.
second derivative of the utility function, a suitable normalization is necessary. The normalization
can be done with the first derivative, yielding to the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion
(ARA) as described by Arrow (1971), Pratt (1964):
ARA(x) := −U
′′(x)
U ′(x)
(2.1)
The coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) is defined as
RRA(x) := −x · U
′′(x)
U ′(x)
= x ·ARA(x) (2.2)
The interpretation of (2.1) and (2.2) is straightforward: An investor with decreasing (increasing)
absolute risk aversion would agree a larger (smaller) absolute potential loss for increasing capital
invested. Hence a decreasing ARA seems plausible. An investor with decreasing (increasing)
relative risk aversion would agree a larger (smaller) potential loss as a percentage of his capital
invested for increasing capital invested. Here, the assumption of a constant relative risk aversion
seems most intuitive.
The most common examples for utility functions representing risk aversion in microeconomic
theory are characterized by different absolute and relative risk aversions:
 Quadratic utility function
U(x) = ax− 1
2
bx2 (2.3)
with a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0. For all quadratic utilities, ARA(x) and RRA(x) are increasing in x. The
main problem with quadratic utility is that it has the odd behavior that for a sufficiently
large return the utility function leads to a situation where a smaller return is preferred, i.e.
U ′(x) < 0 for all x > ab . Thus it is advisable to restrict the domain to x <
a
b or extend it
with a constant U(x) = a
2
2b2 for x >
a
b .
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 Exponential utility function
U(x) = − exp(−ax) (2.4)
with a > 0. Here, ARA(x) is constant whereas RRA(x) is increasing in x. Thereby, the
utility function exhibits the upper limit limx→∞ U(x) = 0.
 Power utility function
U(x) =
x1−γ − 1
1− γ (2.5)
with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. ARA(x) decreases in x while RRA(x) is constant with RRA(x) = γ.
2.2 Fundamental decision principles
2.2.1 Expected utility
The probably most fundamental principle for rational decisions under uncertainty going back to
Cramer (1728) and Bernoulli (1938) comprises maximization of expected utility. The work of von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) was the first important application of this principle in modern
economic theory. Today’s axiomatic foundation of utility theory is furthermore built on the work
of Savage (1954).
The theory of expected utility is based on four axioms about agents’ preferences for rational
decision making in uncertain environments. We consider again an agent in the following decision
situation: Lj ∈ L denotes the set of possible strategies or decision alternatives with risky outcomes
(lotteries). Each lottery has a finite number i of uncertain outcomes xij , where for each outcome
the agent knows its probability pij . Let  be a complete and transitive binary relation defined on
L×L, representing the agent’s preference ordering over the lotteries. As usual, (strict) preference
of L1 over L2 is denoted as L1  L2 (L1 ≺ L2). Indifference between lotteries L1 and L2 is denoted
by L1 ∼ L2.
Based on the original axioms developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) which describe
the properties of the preference structure over all alternatives, different refined formulations have
been discussed in literature (see e.g. Gollier, 1999):
(A1) Completeness: There is a complete weak order over all alternatives, i.e. for any two
alternatives L1, L2, either L1  L2 or L1  L2 holds.
(A2) Transitivity: If L1  L2 and L2  L3 than also L1  L3 is true. Together, (A1) and (A2)
are often referred to as the “weak order” axioms.
(A3) Convexity/continuity:1 For all alternatives with L1  L2  L3, there is a p, q ∈ (0, 1)
such that pL1 ⊕ (1− p)L3  L2  qL1 ⊕ (1− q)L3.
This axiom can be interpreted as the indifference between a pair of lotteries and a simple one-
stage lottery. In this case, pL1⊕(1−p)L2 is a two stage lottery which yields either alternative
1This axiom is in literature sometimes also called Archimedean property.
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L1 with probability p and alternative L3 with probability (1−p) in the first stage. (A3) states
that given any three alternatives preferred to each other, then there exists a two-stage lottery
with p ∈ (0, 1) combining the most and least preferred alternative in a way such that the
compound of L1 and L3 is preferred to the middling alternative L2. Furthermore, there
exists another two-stage lottery with q ∈ (0, 1) so that the middling alternative L2 is strictly
preferred to the compound of L1 and L3.
(A4) Independence: For all alternatives L1, L2, L3 and p ∈ [0, 1], L1  L3 if and only if pL1 ⊕
(1− p)L2  pL3 ⊕ (1− p)L2.
The Independence axiom (A4) claims that the preference between two alternatives L1, L3 is
unaffected if they are both combined in the same way with a third alternative L2. Again, this
can be envisaged as a choice between a pair of two-stage lotteries. pL1 ⊕ (1− p)L2 is a two
stage lottery which yields either lottery L1 with probability p or lottery L2 with probability
(1− p) in the first stage. Using the same interpretation for pL3⊕ (1− p)L2, then preferences
between the two-stage lotteries ought to depend entirely on the agent’s preferences between
the alternative lotteries in the second-stage, L1 and L3, since both combinations lead to L2
with the same probability (1− p) in the first stage so that the agent is indifferent if this case
occurs.
So far we have always assumed a finite state space Ω and therewith a finite set of possible
outcomes X. For the following part of this chapter, we extend this assumption to a continuous
notation: The random variable x˜i defined on the probability space (Ωi,A(R),Pi) with x˜i : Ωi 7→ R
defines the set of continuous outcomes of lottery Li ∈ L. Fi(x˜i) : R 7→ [0, 1] is the cumulative
density function of lottery Li with the associated probability density ϕi(x˜i).
The above-mentioned axioms represent the basis for the characterization of the expected utility
function by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944):
Theorem 2.2.1. (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) Let “” be a binary preference relation
on L. Then “” satisfies axioms (A1)-(A4) if and only if there is a real-valued function U : L 7→ R
such that:
a) U represents “”, i.e. ∀L1, L2 ∈ L, it holds L1  L2 ⇔ U(L1) ≤ U(L2).
b) U is affine, i.e. ∀L1, L2 ∈ L, and ∀ p ∈ (0, 1) it is
U(pL1 ⊕ (1− p)L2) = pU(L1) + (1− p)U(L2).
Moreover, if there is another preference representing utility function V : L → R, then ∃ a, b ∈ R
with a > 0 such that V = aU + b, i.e. U is unique up to a positive linear transformation. This
implies a cardinal
In literature, U is frequently called von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Going beyond
an ordinal preference order, the utility function implies a cardinal preference which is especially
desirable for applications in stochastic settings.
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von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) have proven that the obtained utility function U has a
expected utility representation of the form
U(Li) = E
[
U(x˜i)
]
=
∑
j
pijUij =
∑
j
pijU(xij). (2.6)
where U : x→ R is an (elementary) utility function on the underlying outcomes Li. The expected
utility of lottery Li equals the probability-weighted sum of the utilities of all possible outcomes of
Li. The expected utility can thus be considered as an ex-ante utility function while the utility of
the possible outcomes is an ex-post utility function. We conclude this section with
Corollary 2.2.1 (Expected utility principle). Let “” be a binary preference relation on L satis-
fying axioms (A1)-(A4). A rational agent will prefer lottery 2 compared to lottery 1, if the expected
utility from the uncertain outcomes x˜2 of lottery 2 is greater then the expected utility from outcomes
x˜1 of lottery 1, i.e.
L1  L2 ⇔ E[U(x˜1)] ≤ E[U(x˜2)] (2.7)
Notably, this decision principle may be very different from the maximization of the expected
outcome itself. Since its axiomatic foundation, the expected utility principle2 is regarded as one
of the most fundamental principle for rational decisions under uncertainty. There are no limiting
requirements on the utility function, i.e. a rational preference structure induced by the expected
utility principle is rational regardless of the assumed utility function provided that it exists any
utility function with expectation on this preference structure.
2.2.2 Mean-variance utilities
The classic mean variance portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959) as well as the CAPM (Sharpe,
1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin, 1966) are based on the assumption that investors are comparing
investments solely based on the expected value and its variance:
Definition 2.2.2 (Mean variance principle). Let “” be a binary preference relation on L. An
investor prefers lottery 2 compared to 1 if its uncertain future payoffs x˜2 are greater than or equal
in expectation at a smaller variance, or if they are greater in expectation at a smaller than or equal
variance compared to the payoffs x˜1 of alternative 1, i.e.
L1  L2 ⇔
(
E[x˜1] ≤ E[x˜2] ∧ Var[x˜1] > Var[x˜2]
)
∨
(
E[x˜1] < E[x˜2] ∧ Var[x˜1] ≥ Var[x˜2]
)
(2.8)
For more than two decision alternatives, the mean variance decision principle (2.8) will in general
not result in a complete ordering of alternatives, i.e. there may be alternatives L1 and L2 for which
neither L1  L2 nor L2  L1 holds. An unambiguous order among these can only be obtained
with additional information about the risk attitude of the investors and/or about the distribution
of payoffs. Furthermore, decisions according to the mean variance principle are not necessarily
2The expected utility principle is alternatively frequently denoted as Bernoulli’s principle.
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consistent with the expected utility principle (Corollary 2.2.1). The interrelation of both decision
principles will be discussed in the following.
Note that the mean variance principle implies the investors’ utilities being of the form U(x˜) =
f(µ, σ2), with µ = E[x˜] denoting the expected value and σ2 = Var[x˜] the variance of x˜. Levy and
Markowitz (1979) studied several approximations to the expected utility where the approximation
depends only on the mean and the variance of the distribution. The authors have shown that
for the most common utility functions the expected utility can be reasonably well approximated
by a function of only mean and standard deviation using a truncated Taylor series approximation
around the mean:
E[U(x˜)] ≈ f(µ, σ) = U(µ) + 1
2
U ′′(µ)σ2 (2.9)
For example, with a quadratic utility function of the form U(x˜) = x− α2 (x− x0)2 it is
f(µ, σ) = µ− α
2
(
σ2 + (µ− x0)2
)
(2.10)
As it can be seen, a quadratic utility function corresponds to the first three terms of the Taylor series
expansion of any utility function and represents in many cases a reasonable well approximation.
Tsiang (1972, p. 356) states in this context: “If the convergence of the series is sufficiently fast,
so that, for fairly close approximation, the terms beyond the second moments can be neglected,
then indeed the expected utility can be approximately determined by the first two moments,
mean and variance, even if the utility function is not quadratic, and the uncertain outcomes not
normally distributed.” However, the negation of third and higher moments is only acceptable for
sufficiently small standard deviations (Tsiang, 1972, p. 356): “Since risk (variance) is assumed to
be infinitesimally small, higher order central moments are assumed to be of even smaller orders
and thus all omitted.”
Theorem 2.2.3 (Consistency with expected utility principle). Rule 2.2.2 is consistent with the
expected utility principle (Corrolary 2.2.1) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of rational
preferences under uncertainty either
a) for investors with quadratic utility functions, or
b) (multivariate) normal distributed payoffs and any concave utility function
The proof is given in Tobin (1958).
Note that Tobin (1958) has shown sufficient criteria for the mean variance principle to be con-
sistent with the expected utility principle. However, he could not show (or allege) these conditions
as being also necessary.
2.3 Mean-variance preference functionals
The difficulty of the risk-utility functions discussed above is that they allow to determine the utility
for single outcomes (or even a utility distribution with respect to the distribution of the outcomes),
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but they do not capture aggregate metrics or risk measures. Preference functionals allow to directly
evaluate the level of satisfaction of the decision maker by incorporating certain (quantitative) risk
measures. An alternative decision principle related to definition 2.2.2 is based on the maximization
of a mean variance preference functional. In contrast to the mean variance decision principle, it
ensures a complete ordering of alternatives.
Definition 2.3.1 (Mean variance preference functional). Let “” be a binary preference relation
on L. An investor prefers lottery 2 compared to 1 if its preference value is greater, i.e.
L1  L2 ⇔ Ψ(L1) ≤ Ψ(L2) (2.11)
with Ψ(Li) := E[x˜i]− A2 Var[x˜i].
The parameter A denotes the investor’s risk attitude and reflects for A = 0 risk neutrality, A > 0
risk aversion and A < 0 risk proclivity. This preference functional allows to combine mean and
variance in one objective which is technically very convenient in optimization problems.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Consistency with expected utility principle). Rule 2.3.1 is consistent with the
expected utility principle (Corrolary 2.2.1) and the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of rational
preferences under uncertainty for investors with exponential utility functions of the form U(x) =
− exp(−Ax), A > 0, and normal distributed payoffs.
Proof. Theorem 2.3.2 can bee seen as follows:
E[U(x˜)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
U(x)f(x)dx =
1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
− exp(Ax) exp
(
−1
2
(µ− x)2
σ2
)
dx
= − 1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
x2 − 2xµ+ µ2 + 2Axσ2
σ2
)
dx
= − 1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
(x− (µ−Aσ2))2
σ2
)
exp
(
−1
2
−(µ−Aσ2)2 + µ2
σ2
)
dx
Applying the transformation y := x−(µ−Aσ
2)
σ , we obtain
E[U(x˜)] = − 1√
2piσ
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
(x− (µ−Aσ2))2
σ2
)
exp
(
−1
2
y2
)
σdx
= − exp
(
−1
2
(x− (µ−Aσ2))2
σ2
)
= − exp
(
−A
(
µ− A
2
σ2
))
Thus, the expected utility increases monotone with the preference functional Ψ(Li) := E[x˜i] −
A
2 Var[x˜i].
Note, that the condition stated in Theorem 2.3.2 is sufficient for consistency of maximiza-
tion of the mean variance preference functional and expected utility maximization. Furthermore,
Schneeweiss (1965) has shown that for normal distributed payoffs, exponential utilities are neces-
sarily required for consistency of preference functions of the form Ψ(Li) := E[x˜i]− A2 Var[x˜i] with
expected utility maximization.
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Inadvertently, theorems 2.2.3 and 2.3.2 can be found frequently mixed up in literature in a way
that quadratic utilities are treated as sufficient condition for consistency of maximization of a
preference functional Ψ with the expected utility principle. The falsity of the general conclusion
can, however, is important to see: Under the assumption of a quadratic utility function, the
expected utility in an uncertain investment environment can be stated as
E[U(x˜)] = E[ax˜− 1
2
bx˜2]
= aE[x˜]− 1
2
bE[x˜2]
= aE[x˜]− 1
2
b
(
Var[x˜] + E[x˜]2
)
(2.12)
It can be easily seen that only for zero expected payoffs f = E[x˜]− A2 Var[x˜] represents a reason-
able approximation of the expected utility. This, however, limits the application of the considered
mean variance preference functionals with quadratic utilities to very few cases.
Due to its simplicity, mean variance preference functionals represent one commonly used ap-
proach to model risk return trade-offs, e.g. in decision support models. Overall, it can be seen
that this approach is reasonable if the precondition of normally distributed payoffs and exponential
utilities are satisfied. The following chapters will hence build on this decision principle to derive
efficient portfolios properties.
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Mean-variance optimization of power generation port-
folios
3.1 Introduction
In the next two decades, the European power industry will face an increasing need for investments
to renew and extend its aging power plant fleet (cf. e.g. IEA, 2008). In parallel, EU and several
national governments have implemented different development schemes which politically influence
investment decisions and thereby the fuel mix of the respective country. For an economic evaluation
of power plant investments from a welfare perspective, it is crucial to take into account both the
expected total life-cycle costs and the economic risks conveyed with investment and operation of
the plant fleet. With fuel prices fluctuating considerably, cost volatility becomes a severe risk over
a plant’s lifetime that influences the return of an investment and therewith the system optimal fuel
mix.
Mean-Variance Portfolio (MVP) theory has been established as a clear framework to capture
the two aspects of risk and return in a single decision support model since the work of Markowitz
(1952, 1959) has set the stage for MVP theory in financial markets. Markowitz’ theory builds on
the premise that a compound portfolio of assets shows reduced variance characteristics in case each
pair of assets shows only imperfect correlation. Similarly, portfolio cost risks can be reduced in a
portfolio of well-chosen generation technology options as a result of less than perfect correlations
between their cost characteristics. This approach can also be applied to derive efficient electricity
generation portfolios from a risk-cost perspective.
Standard MVP models on electricity portfolios use numerical simulation or quadratic optimiza-
tion techniques to derive efficient power generation portfolios. This methodology makes it possible
to solve even very complex optimization problems with numerous plants and technologies, but it
naturally complicates the understanding for the exact interplay of the different input parameters.
This article provides easily interpretable analytical optimality conditions for efficient generation
portfolios from a societal point of view and therewith contributes to a better understanding of
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MVP in electricity applications. Moreover, we analyze the sensitivities of the optimal solution on
different parameters. Our findings include the at a first sight counterintuitive result that higher risk
aversion can yield to less diversified generation portfolios. The proposed model is finally applied
to the German electricity market. The model is generic enough to be easily transfered to other
electricity systems in order to support policy makers in their decisions and strategy adoptions with
respect to the generation mix.
This paper is structured as follows: We begin by reviewing relevant literature and briefly dis-
cussing the selection of adequate risk and return measures in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 contains the
formulation and proposes a general solution approach of the portfolio optimization problem. For a
simplified case with two technologies, optimality conditions are analytically derived and discussed.
The insights from the theoretical model are demonstrated and interpreted in a case study on the
German generation portfolio in Section 3.4. Section 3.4.3 provides an in-depth discussion of the
two-technology case with CCGT and coal technologies. The article concludes in Section 3.5 with
a summary of key results and an outlook of related interesting areas for future research.
3.2 Relevant literature
Capacity planning problems in energy systems face the particularity of (nearly) non-storability of
electricity for serving demand. Classical generation capacity planning models go back to the work
of Steiner (1957), Hirshleifer (1958), Boiteux (1960) on peak load pricing and capacity planning.
Various expansions as linear, non-linear and dynamic programming models have been proposed
later (see e.g. Anderson, 1972).
To incorporate risk in the planning problems, portfolio optimization techniques have emerged
by adopting Mean-Variance Portfolio (MVP) theory based on the work of Markowitz (1952, 1959).
As one of the first who adopted a MVP approach to long-term portfolio optimization in electricity
markets, Bar-Lev and Katz (1976) discuss the problem of fuel-cost optimization of fossil plants in
the U.S. utility industry. The topic re-appeared widely on the academic agenda after the millennium
with the emergence of numerical simulation techniques in economic research:
Intending to provide decision support to energy policy makers, one major group of studies
analyses total system costs and risks to derive the efficient power generation mix with varying
focus on the considered regional/national markets and the specific risk factors. Thereby, early
studies (such as e.g. Awerbuch and Berger, 2003, Awerbuch, 2004, 2006, Jansen et al., 2008) share
however the major drawback of using unit costs (total generation cost per MWh, including average
fixed costs) as input parameters. Yet this would only be valid if full load hours of all considered
technologies were not influenced by the portfolio composition. In energy policy considerations,
however, effective operating hours and unit cost cannot be assumed as being independent from the
optimal technology mix. Instead, fixed and variable costs should be treated separately to reflect
varying operating times due to changes in the fuel mix structure.
A second group of studies focuses on the efficient generation mix from an investor’s perspective
(Roques et al., 2006a,b, 2008). As the major drawback here, these studies assume a stable electricity
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price distribution derived from historical data. This consequently implies a net present value (NPV)
distribution that neglects the fact that portfolio choices will also influence electricity prices in the
long run. To avoid the problem of modeling technology-specific adjustments of full load hours and
implications on the electricity price distribution, Roques et al. (2008) explicitly restrict their model
to base-load portfolios in which all technologies are assumed to operate at the same full load hours.
Although this assumption avoids inconsistencies in the modeling results, it however prevents to
derive conclusions on the system optimum.
To avoid the inaccuracy from exogenous operating times, a correct long-term model framework
aiming to allow conclusions on the optimal generation technology mix for an electricity market as
a whole should therefore reflect the actual operating ours. Correspondingly, unit costs need to be
separated into operating and investment costs. Based on this modeling principle, Gotham et al.
(2009) suggest a single-period cost-based model for optimal capacity allocation in a mean-variance
framework with different load segments to be served. Delarue et al. (2011) have proposed more
recently a numerically solved optimization model capturing endogenous dispatch hours as well as
uncertain availability of renewable technologies such as wind.
This article builds on the work of the latter-mentioned authors and differentiates between (cost
of) installed capacity and (costs of) produced electricity to discuss the value of technology diver-
sification in efficient portfolios. Going beyond, we extend the model to allow not only for different
load segments but for a continuous load duration curve being served. In contrast to all other stu-
dies on MVP optimization of electricity portfolios we know of being published, this article proposes
an analytical study of optimality conditions instead of using simulation techniques or numerical
methods to characterize the efficient generation fuel mix. We believe that the analytical approach
is not only more exact but allows also a better understanding of the functional impact of the
different model parameters on the efficient generation portfolio mix.
3.3 Model formulation
3.3.1 Deterministic capacity planning problem
The classical lowest-cost capacity planning can be formulated as a two-stage optimization problem
building as shown in Eqs. (3.1) to (3.4): We consider an electricity system with u ∈ {1, . . . , n}
generation technologies available. From a societal perspective, the objective is to minimize the
sum of total operating costs, Cop,u, plus annualized capacity investment costs, Cinv,u, summed
over the available technologies u and over the total planning period [0;T ] (e.g. a year). Let
the latter be broken down into time steps of equal length t ∈ [0;T ] (e.g. hours). Eqn. (3.4)
represents the demand constraint. Without loss of generality, total system demand is assumed
to be given in a decreasing order (i.e. rearranged in form of the load duration curve) by the
function D : [0;T ] → R+, t 7→ D(t) which we assume to be strictly monotone with D(0) = Dmax.
Furthermore, demand is assumed to be price inelastic which can be considered as a simplifying but
within a wide range of operating costs fairly realistic assumption. The capacity constraint which
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assures that the output of each plant, yu,t, is less than or equal its capacity, Ku, is given in Eqn.
(3.3):
C∗ = min
yu,t,Ku
C(yu,t,Ku) (3.1)
s.t. C =
∫ T
0
∑
u
Cop,udt+
∑
u
Cinv,u =
∫ T
0
∑
u
yu,t · cop,u,tdt+
∑
u
Ku · cinv,u (3.2)
yu,t −Ku ≤ 0 ∀ t, u (3.3)∑
u
yu,t ≥ D(t) ∀ t (3.4)
Operating costs at time t are a function Cop,u(cop,u,t, yu,t) of specific operating costs cop,u,t
(e/MWh) and the instantaneous output level yu,t (MW). In addition, we will write the investment
costs in the following sections as Cinv,u(Ku, cinv,u), indicating the dependency on the installed
capacity Ku and the specific investment costs cinv,u (e/MWel). Therefore, the plant capacities
Ku and the corresponding output levels yu,t are the decision variables to be optimized.
To allow a better understanding of the results, we assume in this model formulation full capital
flexibility which can realistically only be assumed over a very long planning horizon.1 Further-
more, we neglect plant indivisibilities and other technology-specific constraints not reflected in the
average operating costs such as ramp-up costs and times. However, these assumptions can easily
be implemented in any numerical large-scale model setup and are not in focus of this analysis.
3.3.2 Risk-adjusted investment optimum with uncertain fuel prices
To derive efficient frontiers of asset combinations, classic MVP theory assumes that investors’
portfolio preferences depend solely on mean and variance of the expected return. The portfolio
with the smaller variance of return at the same level of expected return or the portfolio with the
higher expected return at the same level of return variance will be preferred. Thereby, consistency
of the (µ, σ2) decision principle with maximization of expected utility2 requires either investors
to act based on quadratic utility functions or returns to be normally distributed and investors to
behave risk aversely.3
Frequently used in optimization literature are preference functions of the form Ψ(a) := E[X(a)]−
A
2 Var[X(a)], where a denotes a decision alternative and X the corresponding random payoff.
Schneeweiss (1965) has shown that for normally distributed payoffs, exponential utilities with con-
stant absolute risk aversion are necessary and sufficient for consistency of the preference Ψ(µ, σ2, a)
with the rational principle of expected utility maximization. Furthermore, Meyer (1987) proposes
with the location and scale condition a more general condition to test two-moment decision rules
1In a differentiated modeling of the capacity planning problem regarding new and historic investments as e.g. done
by Gotham et al. (2009), historic (sunk) investment costs are neglected. This enables the model to capture the
optimal transition from an existing plan fleet the future long-term optimum, which is however not the main
purpose of our analysis.
2In economic textbooks frequently referred to as “Bernoulli’s principle”.
3See e.g. Tobin (1958).
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for consistency with expected utility maximization which is widely fulfilled by well-diversified port-
folios regardless of a specific utility function.
The proposed approach can be straightforwardly transferred to model generation portfolio risks
induced by fuel price uncertainty by using the preference function as the objective function of the
capacity planning model. We assume societal preferences being described by the preferences of a
representative consumer with an exponential utility function of the form U(x) = − 1A exp(−Ax).
Then the expected dis-utility can then be approximated by the following (µ, σ2) preference as a
function of the expected generation costs and the corresponding variance:
L = E[C] +
1
2
A ·Var[C], (3.5)
The parameter A denotes the society’s risk attitude and reflects for A = 0 risk neutrality, A > 0
risk aversion and A < 0 risk proclivity.
The proposed model focuses on input price risks of electricity generation. Most important, fuel
price fluctuations can financially affect generation costs in principle both in the long-term and in
the short-term. Unlike short-term risks, which can be hedged on energy forward markets, long-
term fuel price uncertainties remain as a major risk factor. Therefore, we conceive the optimal
generation portfolio selection problem as a two-stage problem: At the first stage, investment is
carried out, i.e. capacities are selected based on known investment cost and uncertain fuel cost.
The second stage covers the power plant operation over a representative period, i.e. typically a
year. At this stage, the actual fuel prices are revealed. Fuel price fluctuations within the operating
period are disregarded in this article, assuming that those may be eliminated through hedging.
Non-market risks, e.g. operational or technical risk factors such as availability or construction cost
risks, are not considered in the model either.
To capture the long-term fuel price fluctuations, specific operating costs of each technology c˜op,u
are modeled as random variables4 with obtained realizations being taken as constant throughout
the operating period [0;T ].5 In line with other MVP studies (see e.g. Roques et al. (2008))
we assume that levels of fuel prices—and therewith operating costs—are normally distributed.
This assumption can be justified by the fact that independently and identically distributed price
increments—even if not normally distributed—result in price levels that follow a normal limiting
distribution. Expected operating costs are denoted by c¯op,u := E[c˜op,u]. The covariance in specific
operation costs of plants u and v is denoted by σuv, i.e. c˜op,u are n-variate jointly distributed. For
a shorter notation, we denote Qu the energy produced by technology u in the period [0;T ], i.e.
Qu :=
∑
t yu,t. Thereby, Qu is determined as a result of the fixed investment and the deterministic
merit order. Then, as shown in A.2.1, the expected dis-utility capturing expected total generation
costs and (fuel) cost risk can be specified as
L =
∑
u
Quc¯op,u +
∑
u
Cinv,u +
A
2
(∑
u
∑
v
σuvQuQv
)
. (3.6)
4Throughout this article, random variables are indicated by a “˜”, whereas their realizations are written as plain
letters.
5Because operating costs are constant within the planning period, we write cop,u instead of cop,u,t.
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Without loss of generality, the n technologies are ordered by increasing operating costs, i.e.
∀u, v ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (c¯op,u < c¯op,v). We exclude the possibility of reversals in the merit order such
that no realization of operating costs with cop,u ≥ cop,v can occur.6 To solve the second-stage
of the optimization problem, the optimal technology dispatch can now be determined based on
the merit order of expected generation costs. For the technology with the lowest operating costs,
i.e. technology 1, the upper bound of operating duration is always t0 = T . The lower bound
is given through D(t1) = K1, since technology one will run at full capacity as soon as demand
exceeds capacity K1. Similarly for technology two, the upper bound for operation hours is given
by D(t1) = K1, and the lower by D(t2) = K1 + K2 and so forth (see Figure 3.1). Finally, it can
be seen that the lower bound of the operating time of the n-th technology is zero, i.e. tn = 0.
By introducing the cumulative capacity Kcu =
∑u
j=1Kj , and defining R(K) as the inverse of
the monotonously decreasing function D(t), we may write tu = R(K
c
u). Now, solving the first-
stage portfolio selection problem is equivalent to determining the cumulative capacities Kcu. We
additionally define the integral to the inverse demand function
QI(Kcu) =
∫ Kcu
0
R(κ)dκ, (3.7)
hence Qu(K
c
u,K
c
u−1) = Q
I(Kcu)−QI(Kcu−1). The optimization problem may now be reformulated,
using only Kcu as decision variables. In time-continuous notation, this yields
L∗ = min
Kcu
L (3.8)
s.t. L =
n∑
u=1
cinv,u
(
Kcu −Kcu−1
)
+ c¯op,uQu +
A
2
(
n∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
σuvQuQv
)
(3.9)
Kcu −Kcu−1 ≥ 0 (1 ≤ u ≤ n, Kc0 = 0) (3.10)
Qu = Q
I(Kcu)−QI(Kcu−1) (1 ≤ u ≤ n) (3.11)
QE ≤ QI(Kcn) (3.12)
where QE denotes total energy demand over the considered period, i.e. QE =
∫ T
0
D(t)dt. To
properly reflect a limited willingness-to-pay of power customers, the last technology n may also be
interpreted as an accepted load shedding with the corresponding generation costs representing the
value of lost load. The corresponding Lagrangian writes:
Ln =
n∑
u=1
cinv,u
(
Kcu −Kcu−1
)
+ c¯op,uQu +
A
2
(
n∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
σuvQuQv
)
+
+
n∑
u=1
µu
(
Kcu−1 −Kcu
)
+ λ
(
QE −QI(Kcn)
) (3.13)
6This simplification can be justified because the empirically estimated year-to-year risk for reversals in the merit
order is less than 1% for all considered technologies and hence extremely low (cf. Section 3.4).
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t∗1
T
Tt
∗
2
Q1
Q2
Q3
C
Kc∗1
Kc∗2
Kc∗3
D(t)
c3
c2
c1
ci = cinv,i + t · cop,i
Fig. 3.1: Graphical solution of the deterministic capacity planning problem from load duration curve and full-cost
curves
Before exploring this general optimization problem in more detail, two specific configurations
are investigated, contained as extremes in the general portfolio problem: One limiting case obvi-
ously embedded in the general formulation is the purely cost-minimal capacity planning problem,
corresponding to A = 0. The other case to be looked at is the purely variance-minimizing problem,
to which the general problem converges as A→ +∞.
3.3.3 Standard solution for purely cost efficient portfolios with n technologies
As discussed in Crew and Kleindorfer (1986) for the deterministic capacity planning problem, the
purely cost-minimal problem with A = 0 and n technologies may also be solved graphically using
the load duration curve and the full-cost curves of the respective technologies (see Figure 3.1).
Formally, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions corresponding to the Lagrangian (3.6) are
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here:
∂Ln
∂Kcu
= cinv,u − cinv,u+1 + (c¯op,u − c¯op,u+1) tu − µu + µu+1 ≥ 0, ⊥ Kcu ≥ 0, (1 ≤ u ≤ n− 1)
(3.14)
∂Ln
∂Kcn
= cinv,n + c¯op,utn − µn − λtn ≥ 0, ⊥ Kcn ≥ 0, (3.15)
∂Ln
∂µu
=Kcu−1 −Kcu ≤ 0, ⊥ µu ≥ 0, (1 ≤ u ≤ n)
(3.16)
∂Ln
∂λ
=QE −QI(Kcn) ≤ 0, ⊥ λ ≥ 0. (3.17)
Obviously, the last set of conditions pushes Kcn to be at least equal to D(0), so that all energy is
provided by the total capacity installed and consequently even the peak-load demand is covered.
Given that tn = R(K
c
n) = 0 follows from K
c
n = D(0), (3.15) simultaneously then implies that
µn = cinv,n. This result reflects the finding from classical peak-load-pricing theory stating that the
shadow price in the (here infinitesimal) peak-load moment covers the full investment costs of the
peak technology. From (3.14) optimal lower bounds of operating hours may be written
tu =
cinv,u − cinv,u+1 − µu + µu+1
cop,u+1 − cop,u , (1 ≤ u < n), (3.18)
If Ku > 0 is assumed throughout, (3.16) implies that all µu are equal to zero. Consequently (3.18)
may be directly used to compute capacities based on the following propositions.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let be
tou :=
cinv,u − cinv,u+1
cop,u+1 − cop,u , (1 ≤ u < n) (3.19)
If tou < t
o
u−1 for all 1 ≤ u < n, then the cost-minimal portfolio consists of all technologies, i.e.
K∗u > 0 for all 1 ≤ u < n.
Optimal capacities can then be obtained by K∗u = K
c∗
u −Kc∗u−1, (1 ≤ u ≤ n) with Kc∗u = D(tou).
In fact the tou may be used generally to check the validity of the assumption Ku > 0:
Proposition 3.3.2. Technology u is part of the cost-minimal portfolio, i.e. K∗u > 0, only if
tou < t
o
u−1.
Stated in other words, tou ≥ tou−1 implies that technology u is not included in the cost-efficient
portfolio, i.e. K∗u = 0. The proofs and further interpretation of Propositions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 are
provided in A.2.2.
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3.3.4 Standard solution for purely variance efficient portfolios with n
technologies
For the second limiting case with A→ +∞, the Lagrangian (3.6) may be rewritten as:
Ln =
n∑
u=1
n∑
v=1
σuvQuQv −
n∑
u=1
µQuQu + λ
Q
(
QE −
n∑
u=1
Qu
)
(3.20)
Thereby the Qu are directly used as decision variables, since this allows a more convenient
treatment. Yet through Qu = Q
I(Kcu)−QI(Kcu−1) a unique mapping between the Qu ’s and Kcu
’s is established, which may be later used to transform results. The KKT-conditions are here:
∂Ln
∂Qu
=
n∑
v=1
σuvQv − µQu − λQ ≥ 0, ⊥ Qu ≥ 0, (1 ≤ u ≤ n) (3.21)
∂Ln
∂µQu
= −Qu ≤ 0, ⊥ µQu ≥ 0, (1 ≤ u ≤ n) (3.22)
∂Ln
∂λQ
= QE −
n∑
u=1
Qu ≤ 0 ⊥ λQ ≥ 0 (3.23)
A matrix notation is advantageous for the further treatment, hence the key conditions are rewrit-
ten with i = (1, . . . , 1)T denoting the n-dimensional one vector and Σ the covariance matrix of
operating costs:
ΣQ− µQ − λQi = 0 (3.24)
QE − iTQ = 0 (3.25)
In fact the case Qu = 0 does not immediately lead to a determinate value for µ
Q
u since each µ
Q
u
only appears in one inequality (3.21). Therefore we assume without loss of generality the left part
of (3.21) to be fulfilled with equality. The left part of condition (3.23) holds also with equality, since
the opposite would imply that in a cost minimization framework excess quantities were available
for free.7
Obviously two cases have to be distinguished for the determination of the variance-minimal
portfolio: (i) The assets in the portfolio are linearly independent. (ii) The assets are linearly
dependent. In the latter case, at least the stochastic variation of one asset may be replicated by
a combination of the others. Then obviously the variance minimizing portfolio may also be not
unique and without further restrictions also a non-trivial risk free portfolio may be constructed.
This case is therefore not further considered here. For the first case, we continue with the following
propositions:
Proposition 3.3.3. Let be a portfolio with n generation technologies with linearly independent
operating costs cop,u, 1 ≤ u ≤ n. Then the covariance matrix Σ is positive definite and hence
7Alternatively, equality could be required in the left part of condition (3.21) from the beginning. The chosen
formulation has the advantage that λQi is known to be positive.
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invertible and the central optimality condition of the variance minimal portfolio is given by
Q = Σ−1
(
λQi + µQ
)
with (3.26)
λQ =
1
iTΣ−1i
(
QE − iTΣ−1µQ
)
(3.27)
See A.2.3 for the proof. Given strict convexity of the optimization problem, a straight-forward
procedure may be used to check whether all technologies u are included in the risk-minimal port-
folio.
Proposition 3.3.4. The pure variance-minimal portfolio problem is convex in Q. If and only if
Σ is positive definite, then the optimization problem is strictly convex in Q.
Proposition 3.3.5. Let be
Qo =
QE
iTΣ−1i
Σ−1i (3.28)
with i = (1, . . . , 1)T . The variance-minimal portfolio consists of all available technologies, i.e.
Qu > 0 for all 1 ≤ u ≤ n, if and only if Qou > 0 for all 1 ≤ u ≤ n. Then, Q∗ = Qo is a solution
to the variance minimal optimization problem. The solution is unique if Σ is positive definite.
Note that the element Qou from Eqn. (3.28) corresponds to:
Qou =
QE
iTΣ−1i
n∑
v=1
{
Σ−1
}
uv
Only if the row-sums of the inverse covariance matrix Σ−1 are all positive, it is Qou and thus
all available technologies are part of the variance-minimal portfolio. Then, the optimal amount
of energy produced by technology u is obtained as weighted share of the total energy produced,
where the u-th row sum of the inverted covariance matrix Σ−1 is used as weighting factor. Remark
that for instance Σ−1 being strictly diagonally dominant with positive diagonal entries can thus
guarantee that all technologies are part of the risk-minimal portfolio.8 Furthermore it can be shown
that the variance minimization problem has a unique solution if Σ is positive definite (cf. A.2.3).
3.3.5 Standard solutions to the combined portfolio problem with n
technologies
The optimal portfolio in the general case of combined cost-risk optimization may in principle be
derived using a combination of the two previously shown approaches. This is however complicated
by differences in notation and differences in solution logics between the two cases. The risk-
minimization case requires matrix-inversion, therefore introducing matrix-notation is also necessary
8A Hermitian, strictly diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal entries is also positive definite (cf. Horn
and Johnson, 1985, Corollary 7.2.3). However, the converse cannot be concluded in general.
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for the cost-minimization part. This can be achieved by introducing the lag-operator in matrix
form L through:
L =

0 0 · · · 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 0

With I denoting the n-dimensional identity matrix and Kc = (Kc1, . . . ,K
c
n)
T the vector of
cumulated capacities, the Lagrangian may be written
Ln =cinvT (I− L) Kc + c¯Top(I− L)QI (Kc) +
A
2
(
(I− L)QI(Kc))T Σ(I− L)QI(Kc)
+ µT (I− L) Kc + λ (QE −QI(Kcn)) (3.29)
Denoting ∂Ln∂Kc =
(
∂Ln
∂Kc1
, . . . , ∂Ln∂Kcn
)T
and ∂Ln∂µ =
(
∂Ln
∂µ1
, . . . , ∂Ln∂µn
)T
, the corresponding KKT con-
ditions can be derived using matrix calculus:
∂Ln
∂Kc
= (I− L)T cinv + diag
(
t(Kc)
)
(I− L)T cop + (I− L)T µ
+ λ(in)
T t(Kc) +Adiag
(
(I− L)t(Kc))Σ(I− L)QI(Kc) ≥ 0, ⊥ Kc ≥ 0, (3.30)
∂Ln
∂µ
= (I− L) Kc ≤ 0, ⊥ µ ≥ 0, (3.31)
∂Ln
∂λ
= QE −QI(Kcn) ≤ 0, ⊥ λ ≥ 0. (3.32)
Similar to the previous problem, we can again assume QE = Q
I(Kcn) and condition (3.30) to be
fulfilled with equality. Hence, ∂Ln∂Kc = 0 is the remaining optimality condition to be solved. From
Kcn = D(0), it is however clear that tn = 0 and consequently λ is eliminated from the optimality
condition and we end up with the following:
Proposition 3.3.6. The central optimality condition for the combined portfolio problem is given
by
−AΣQ(Kc,LKc) = diag((I− L)t(Kc))−1((I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop.)
(3.33)
The proof is proved in A.2.4. Focusing on solutions which include all technologies, we assume
again µ = 0. At a closer look, optimality condition (3.33) represents an n-dimensional equation
system consisting of two functional terms l, r of the form
l1(Q1(K
c
1), . . . , Qn(K
c
n,K
c
n−1))
l2(Q1(K
c
1), . . . , Qn(K
c
n,K
c
n−1))
...
ln(Q1(K
c
1), . . . , Qn(K
c
n,K
c
n−1))
 =

r1(t1(K
c
1))
r2(t2(K
c
2), t1(K
c
1))
...
rn(tn(K
c
n), tn−1(K
c
n−1))
 (3.34)
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Assuming cinv,u > cinv,u+1 for all u = 1, . . . , n − 1, the existence of a Kc satisfying optimality
condition (3.34) is clearly given, because row u of r is monotone decreasing in tu, while row u of l
is monotone increasing in tu (respectively in K
c
u). Furthermore it holds the following proposition
as shown in A.2.4:
Proposition 3.3.7. Let be A > 0 and cinv,u > cinv,u+1 for all (u = 1, . . . , n − 1). Then the
combined portfolio problem (3.8)-(3.12) is convex in Q. If and only if Σ is positive definite, then
the optimization problem is strictly convex in Q and hence has a unique solution.
Therewith, we have shown that it exists a unique solution to the risk-adjusted capacity planning
problem under a deterministic and strictly monotone load duration function with uncertain fuel
prices.9 Deeper insights may be gathered from the solution in the two-technology case. Therefore
the following paragraph is devoted to this special case.
3.3.6 Results in the two-technology case
In this example we consider two competitive generation technologies (i.e. u = {1, 2}) with (cinv,1 >
cinv,2) ∧ (cop,1 < cop,2) being available to meet demand. For this case with n = 2, the central
condition to be satisfied for an interior solution with K1,K2 > 0 can be obtained from KKT
condition dL2dK1 = 0 by applying the equality Q1 = QE −Q2 as
A
(
(σ21 − σ12)QE − (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)
=
cinv,2 − cinv,1
t1
− c¯op,1 + c¯op,2, (3.35)
with Q2 =
∫ t1
0
(
D(t)−D(t1)
)
dt. As shown in A.2.5, it holds:
Proposition 3.3.8. The combined portfolio problem (3.8)-(3.12) with two technologies u = {1, 2}
has a unique solution if
AQE(σ
2
2 − σ12) ≥
1
T
(cinv,1 − cinv,2) + c¯op,1 − c¯op,2. (3.36)
As a first optimality property, two limiting parameter configurations can be observed from Eqn.
(3.35) for the case of purely variance-efficient portfolios (i.e. A→ +∞):
Proposition 3.3.9. Let ρ := σ12σ1σ2 denote the coefficient of correlation of operating costs. The
variance-efficient portfolio does not include technology 2 for σ1σ2 < ρ, while it includes only techno-
logy 2 for σ2σ1 < ρ, i.e.
Q2 =
0 for
σ1
σ2
≤ ρ,
QE for
σ2
σ1
≤ ρ
9Note that the solutions obtained for Qu may be unambiguously transformed into tu given the assumed load
duration function D(tu)”
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Note that the parameter ranges derived in Proposition 3.3.9 are consistent with those derived in
Section 3.3.4 for the variance-minimal portfolio.10 Since per definition 0 ≤ |ρ| ≤ 1, we can further
conclude the following
Corollary 3.3.1. Technology 2 will always be included in variance-efficient portfolios for σ1 ≥ σ2
while technology 1 will be included in any variance-efficient portfolio for σ2 > σ1 and arbitrary
levels of correlation.
For a better understanding of efficient portfolio characteristics, we next discuss sensitivity prop-
erties of the efficient fuel mix with respect to variations of the covariance matrix and the risk
aversion parameter A.
Proposition 3.3.10. For a risk-cost-efficient portfolio, the sensitivity of optimal operating hours
(and respectively capacities) of the considered technologies with respect to the risk-aversion param-
eter A is only dependent on the covariance of operating costs with
dt∗1
dA
Q 0, for σ1
σ2
Q ρ. (3.38)
The proof is provided in A.2.6. Note that risk-cost-efficient operating hours (respectively capac-
ities) of technology 1 and consequently also of technology 2 are independent from the risk-aversion
parameter A if (and only if) σ1σ2 = ρ. This parameter configuration at the same time implies that
the purely cost-efficient portfolio equals the purely variance-efficient portfolio. Only if σ1σ2 > ρ,
the efficient run time of the technology 2 increases with increasing risk aversion and vice versa.
For σ1σ2 < ρ, which is in general satisfied as the operating costs of the peak technology are much
higher than those of the base technology (see Section 3.4), an increasing risk aversion leads ceteris
paribus to a shorter optimal run time and therewith to smaller optimal capacities of technology
2. Thus, increasing risk aversion leads in the latter case to a decline of fuel mix diversification in
the considered portfolio. This is due to the fact that the total risk contribution of technology 2 is
higher than of technology 1.
Proposition 3.3.11. Alternatively, a comparison of optimal operating times for the purely cost-
efficient portfolio, tc∗1 , and for the purely risk-efficient portfolio, t
r∗
1 , can provide evidence on the
sensitivity. As shown in A.2.6, it equivalently holds
dt∗1
dA
Q 0, for tc∗1 R tr∗1 . (3.39)
10To show that, we first compute the inverted covariance matrix Σ−1 for the case with two technologies from its
adjoint (cf. Horn and Johnson, 1985, p. 21) as:
Σ−1 =
1
det(Σ)
adj(Σ) =
1
σ21σ
2
2 − σ212
 σ22 −σ12
−σ12 σ21
 (3.37)
Then, Qou can be computed from Eqn. (3.28) as Q
o
1 = QE
σ22−σ12
σ21+σ
2
2−2σ12
, Qo2 = QE
σ21−σ12
σ21+σ
2
2−2σ12
. It can be seen
that Qo1, Q
o
2 to be greater than zero requires
σ2
σ1
> ρ and σ1
σ2
> ρ, respectively. If satisfied, both technologies are
part of the variance-minimal portfolio.
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This is an interesting finding, since it implies by taking into account Properties 3.3.9 and 3.3.10,
that the case tc∗1 < t
r∗
1 cannot occur if both technologies are part of the variance-efficient portfolio.
For the following sensitivity properties of the solution to the two-technology problem correspond-
ing to Eqs. (3.8) to (3.12) with n = 2, we will hence concentrate on the more interesting case where
both technologies are part of the variance-efficient portfolio, i.e. σ1σ2 > ρ and
σ2
σ1
> ρ as shown in
A.2.6.
Proposition 3.3.12. Given technologies 1 and 2 being part of the cost-efficient and the variance-
efficient portfolio, the following parameter conditions are sufficient for the stated sensitivity prop-
erties of optimal operating hours (respectively capacities) of technology 2:
dt∗1
dσ1
≥ 0 for all σ1, σ2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (3.40)
dt∗1
dσ2
≤ 0 for all σ1, σ2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (3.41)
dt∗1
dρ
≤ 0 for all σ1, σ2,≥ 0, −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (3.42)
Reciprocal sensitivity properties are obtained for optimal operating hours (respectively capaci-
ties) of technology 1.
3.4 Case study: Exemplary model application to the German
electricity market
In the following section, we will deepen the insights gained from the analyses on risk-efficient
generation portfolios in a case study. We use the German electricity market as an exemplary
application for three reasons: For the first, there will be a considerable need for new investments in
generation assets in Germany in the next decades due to the age of the existing plant fleet and to
fulfill the ambitious climate protection targets. Secondly, the obtained results can be transferred
easily to other countries with comparable cost parameters and demand patterns. In particular, the
key structural findings apply to Continental Europe as a whole as we use market prices for the key
cost input parameters. Thirdly, a comprehensive MVP analysis of the German electricity market
has not yet been published before to our best knowledge.11
3.4.1 Parameter estimates
Estimation of plant costs and fuel prices
The technical and economic key parameters for five typical generation technologies are based on
2007 values derived from Konstantin (2009) as summarized in Table 3.1. Annualized specific
investment costs per kW are quoted with respect to the gross installed capacity including plant
consumption of auxiliaries. For all technologies, capital costs are calculated based on the annuity
method with a uniform interest rate of 10% after tax and the quoted economic lifetimes.
11Westner and Madlener (2009) consider the German context, yet they focus on CHP plants.
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Tab. 3.1: Key parameters for typical coal, gas and nuclear plants (source: Konstantin, 2009, own analysis).
Parameter Unit Coal Lignite CCGT OCGT Nuclear
Technology index u 3 2 4 5 1
Thermal efficiency MWhe/MWht 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.34 0.37
Carbon emission rate tCO2/MWht 0.34 0.41 0.20 0.20 0.0
Total net investment costs e/KW 1419 1934 608 456 3225
Technical lifetime a 45 45 30 25 50
Fixed O&M, overhead e/KW a 36.06 43.26 13.97 9.69 74.06
Variable O&M, transport e/KWhe 2.9 1.7 5.5 20.0 0.0
Tab. 3.2: Distribution parameters for fuel costs 1986–2008 (Germany), EUA costs included from 2005 on (source:
BAFA, 2009, UxC, 2009, ECX, 2009, StaBu, 2009, own analysis).
Coefficient of correlation Std.-dev. Mean 2006-08
Gas Coal Lignite Nuclear e/MWht e/MWht
Gas 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.77 7.48 28.73
Hard coal 0.92 1.00 0.94 0.67 4.32 15.83
Lignite 0.88 0.94 1.00 0.62 3.33 11.41
Nuclear EPR 0.77 0.67 0.62 1.00 0.30 2.66
To account for fuel price risks, total operating costs cop,u are modeled as normal random vari-
ables calculated as the sum of the respective fuel prices plus the emission factor weighted price
of CO2 emission rights divided by the technology specific efficiency rate, i.e. cop,u =
pf,u+eupco2
ηu
.
Since valuing the influence of fuel price fluctuations on the long-term investment optimum in a
MVP approach requires a reliable long-term estimate of the covariance matrix which captures all
underlying price risks, we estimate variance and covariance for (pairs of) total fuel prices includ-
ing CO2 for the considered generation technologies over the sample period 1986–2008. Relevant
sources and results are provided in Table 3.2. As fuel prices are expected to possess the martingale
property12, we use 2006-2008 average fuel prices instead of long-term means to compute expected
generation costs as depicted in Table 3.2.
Under the assumption of normal distributed fuel price levels, it can be seen that the probability
for reversals in the merit order, P(c˜op,1 > c˜op,2), is negligibly small: Applying the transformation
z˜ = c˜op,1 − c˜op,2, where z˜ ∼ N (c¯op,1 − c¯op,2, σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)13, the year-to-year likelihood for a
12Weber (2005) points out that “as for any storable equity, arbitrage opportunities would arise if the (discounted and
risk-adjusted) product price would not follow a martingale process, i.e. a stochastic process where the observed
value today corresponds to the risk adjusted expected value for tomorrow.”
13It is well-known that the sum of n jointly normal distributed random variables Xi, with Xi ∼ N (µi, σ2i ) is also
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Fig. 3.2: Historical load duration curve (red) and fitted spline function (source: ENTSO-E (2009); own analysis).
reversal in the merit order is given by
P(c˜op,1 > c˜op,2) = Pz(z˜ > 0) = 1−
∫ 0
−∞
φz(z)dz = 1− Φz(0). (3.43)
where Φz denotes the cumulated distribution function of z˜. With the empirical data from Table
3.2 we obtain for the pairwise reversal likelihoods of coal and gas P(c˜op,3 ≥ c˜op,4) = 0.06%, lignite
and coal P(c˜op,2 ≥ c˜op,3) = 0.47%, and nuclear and lignite technologies P(c˜op,1 ≥ c˜op,2) = 0.13%.
In case of very high carbon or coal prices, however, the gas technology would displace coal and
could even lead to a reversal in the merit order. A detailed discussion of the risk of reversal in the
merit order and its impact on the efficient technology mix is provided in Sunderko¨tter and Weber
(2011). For a better tracability of the solution, we thus exclude this case in the following.
We use historical load data for Germany provided in an hourly resolution by ENTSO-E (2009)
for the years 2006–2008. A historical reference load duration curve can then be generated from the
hourly means of the historic data. To accomplish the further analysis with a continuous function
D˜(t), a spline function is fitted to the historical data as shown in Fig. 3.2
Determination of the risk aversion level
The optimal selection of a specific portfolio combination from the efficient frontier depends on the
risk aversion parameter, A. This parameter determines the willingness in an economy to bear risk or
normal distributed with mean and variance
µ =
n∑
i=1
µi, σ
2 =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σij =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρ, with ρ =
σij
σiσj
.
For a proof see e.g. Elishakoff (1999).
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equivalently the willingness to accept extra costs to reduce the risk of the plant portfolio. Although
A is scale-variant and therefore in general unknown, the price of risk can easily be observed on
capital markets and can be used to determine the corresponding risk aversion parameter A as
shown in Sunderko¨tter et al. (2013).
3.4.2 Results: Efficient fuel mix characteristics
We characterize the cost-risk efficient generation fuel mix in a “green-field” analysis, i.e. regardless
to the existing fuel mix, limited availabilities and other possible constraints. This intentionally
over-idealizing study allows to first identify long-term technology equilibria before looking in more
detail to a narrowed-down path of more realistic investment options in the mid-term.
With respect to fuel price risks, we investigate open and combined cycle gas turbine (OCGT,
CCGT), lignite, coal and nuclear (EPR) plants as risky technologies. In addition, an enforced share
of base-load serving technologies are incorporated as indicator for existing renewable technologies
(mainly wind, water) which can be considered as nearly risk-free in terms of operating costs.14
OCGTs are in all cases the technology with the highest, nuclear with the lowest operating costs.
The efficient fuel mix for varying risk aversion in the first scenario with nuclear technologies is
shown in Figure 3.3: Based on the historically estimated covariance characteristics of total fuels
prices including EUAs, higher risk aversion leads always to an increase of nuclear generation in
efficient portfolios. In contrast, lignite dominates the efficient portfolio in the second scenario
calculation without nuclear technologies with increasing risk aversion (Figure 3.4). This result
is mainly driven by the fact that lignite generation costs have been very stable compared to
other commodities even when taking into account volatile EUA markets.15 Vice versa, gas-fired
generation decreases in all cases with increasing risk aversion. Surprisingly, hard coal does not
represent a substantial share of generation in any considered case as it cannot compete with the
low operating costs and low variance characteristics of nuclear and lignite generation for base load
generation nor with the low investment costs for gas technologies tailored to mid and peak load
generation.
A standard representation of efficient portfolios for varying risk aversion A is shown in Figure
3.5. For all portfolio combinations on the efficient frontier, the expected generation costs can be
reduced only by increasing the portfolio risk. The risk-return profile of the generation mix including
nuclear technologies is clearly more favorable compared to the one without nuclear generation.
These last analyses show that nuclear and lignite technologies play an important role in cost-risk
efficient generation portfolios. Although geologically feasible, the mid-term potential for lignite
14We are aware that a solid valuation of renewable technologies in electricity generation systems would require a
much deeper treatment of specific technology characteristics as for instance reflected in the work of Vogel and
Weber (2009) on MVP optimization and wind power. Since this empirical application aims to demonstrate in a
traceable manner the analytical results discussed before, we kindly refer readers with special interest in renewable
technologies to this and other dedicated existing publications.
15The low volatility of lignite prices is caused by predominantly long-term contract based sourcing of lignite from
local mines. In contrast to other fuel commodities, very high transportation costs prevent the development of a
liquid world market for lignite.
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Fig. 3.3: Efficient fuel mix of OCGT, CCGT, lignite, coal, nuclear technologies (in GW) for varying risk aversion
A.
Efficient net plant capacities (scenario without nuclear)
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coefficient A.
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generation capacity extensions in Germany is realistically very limited as the exploitation of new
open-cast mines seems unrealistic due to little public and political acceptance. With the German
parliament’s decision on the nuclear phase-out from July 2011 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2011), new
nuclear plants are however an option in Germany any longer. Therefore, we will focus in the
following paragraphs on the comparison of hard coal and CCGT technologies in optimal portfolios
in more detail.
3.4.3 Trade-off between coal and gas fired technologies
To analyze the trade-off between the two technologies, we now consider that only CCGT and hard
coal technologies are available to serve the load function. Optimal CCGT plant capacities and
corresponding generation costs for varying risk aversion coefficient A and fuel price correlation ρ
are shown in Figure 3.6. In addition to the technology cost characteristics and the form of the
load duration curve, the optimal portfolio selection is directly determined by the society’s risk
attitude, A. Since risk proclivity can be considered as abnormal for power plant investments, we
will concentrate on the case A ≥ 0.
Consistent with the results of section 3.3.6, we observe that with increasing risk aversion the
optimal combination of capacities in the portfolio moves in general away from the risk-free optimum
with A = 0. As already discussed in Property 3.3.10, the portfolio selection is equal to the risk-free
case if σ1σ2 = ρ. Hence at a correlation coefficient of 0.6 the variance-minimal portfolio corresponds
to the cost-minimal portfolio. Consequently at this particular level of correlation, the portfolio
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Optimal peak capacity K*CCGT for varying risk aversion and fuel price correlation
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Fig. 3.6: Optimal CCGT peak plant capacities, K∗4 (in MW) in the two technology-case for varying risk aversion
A and fuel price correlation ρ.
Expected generation costs for varying risk aversion and fuel price correlation
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composition is independent of the risk aversion. At higher correlations, as indicated in section 3.3.6,
higher risk aversion reduces the share of the gas peak technology, since the diversification effect is
lower than the addition in variance due to the higher price volatility of gas. If correlations were
however below 0.6, risk aversion would induce an increase in the proportion of the gas technology.
These results clearly emphasize the need for appropriate correlation estimates. Given that the
portfolio components have lifetimes of 30 years and more, long term correlations as those used
here, estimated based on price levels, are certainly more adequate than (typically lower) short
term correlations of price changes. With increasing correlation between total fuel prices of the two
technologies, the optimal selection becomes additionally more and more a binary decision. Total
expected generation costs increase as expected with increasing risk aversion as shown in Figure
3.7. However, the effect of increasing risk aversion is diminishing. When an increase in A leads to
a complete elimination of the more risky asset in the portfolio, a further increase of A does not
lead to a different portfolio selection.
3.5 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the impact of fuel mix diversification on the long-term optimum of elec-
tricity generation portfolios. By combining Mean-Variance Portfolio theory and peak-load pricing
theory, we have formulated a convex optimization problem to derive cost-risk efficient generation
portfolios. Sufficient conditions have been formulated for the existence of a unique solution of the
optimization problem. Optimality conditions for cost-minimal, risk-minimal and cost-risk efficient
portfolios have been derived and analyzed based on a continuous load duration curve. Thereby, we
have shown that the degree of diversification in the efficient portfolio depends on the covariance
matrix of operating costs of the technologies and on the societal risk-aversion. A comparison of
the cost-minimal and of the risk-minimal portfolios may be used to determine the sensitivity of the
cost-risk efficient portfolio structure on the risk aversion.
The proposed model has been used to demonstrate quantitatively the derivation of efficient gene-
ration fuel mixes for Germany. The calculations show that fuel mix diversification can considerably
influence the total standard deviation of generation costs.
With respect to the current debate on security of supply, the results indicate that increasing risk
aversion implies a higher share of lignite and nuclear generation in efficient portfolios and conversely
to a decrease of gas-fired generation. Consistent with the results of Fan et al. (2010), the optimal
fuel mix shows independently from the risk attitude a high sensitivity to the price and/or the
allocation method of CO2 emission rights. The results indicate that with full auctioning of CO2,
efficient portfolios at historically observed CO2 price levels consist of more nuclear and lignite and
less coal-fired generation compared to the current fuel mix. If nuclear and lignite capacities are
reduced or fixed at the current level, hard coal is the most economical technology instead.
The case study demonstrates in consistency with previous studies (see e.g. Roques et al., 2008,
Delarue et al., 2011, Gotham et al., 2009) that fuel-mix diversification does not provide reduced
risk characteristics per se. Blind diversification without consideration of technology costs and price
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risks as well as the correlation risks may even be counterproductive.
Some simplifying assumptions within the MVP based model framework proposed in this article
open the stage for potential future research directions: Firstly, this article relies on a central
planner perspective, but the derived efficient portfolio structure is not necessarily congruent with
the market equilibrium on liberalized markets. Since risk aversion represents one kind of market
imperfection, a comparison of welfare optimum, investor optimum, and market equilibrium would
be desirable (see Ziegler et al., 2010, for further discussions). Secondly, this article uses variance as
a risk measure for the benefit of the clarity of the MVP framework. A comparison of variance with
more sophisticated and coherent risk measures (e.g. lower partial moments, conditional value-at-
risk) in electricity portfolio applications could be an interesting and yet missing building block in
this area of research. Thirdly, the capacity investment problem is reduced in this article for the
sake of simplicity to a static decision problem and neglects dynamic constraints (e.g. existing plant
structure, retirements over time, optionality to postpone projects). Within the proposed MVP
framework, the model could be expanded straightforwardly to capture existing plant structures
(see e.g. Gotham et al., 2009, for a similar approach). Furthermore, the portfolio analysis can be
carried out for multiple discrete points in time to allow for conclusions on the efficient trajectory
of the efficient technology mix. Including recursive decisions coherently in the MVP framework is
however a challenging further research task.
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Optimization of power generation portfolios under un-
certainty in the merit order
4.1 Introduction
In the next decades, the European power industry will face an immense need for investments
to renew and extend its power plant fleet. The challenge is massively increased by the required
transformation to reach emission reduction targets and reduce the carbon-intensity of the power
system: For a 25% reduction in greenhouse-gas emissions by 2020 compared with 1990, the IEA
(2010) estimates required generation capacity additions in European OECD countries of 337GW
between 2010 and 2020 and another 498GW between 2021 and 2035. The more ambitious reduction
target of 80% by 2050 (respectively 40% by 2020) as agreed by the European representants
during the G8 meeting in L’Aquila in July 2009 would require consequently a much more drastic
change of the generation system. To reach the reduction targets, the EU and national states
have implemented several measures and development schemes which aim to politically influence
investment decisions in new generation capacities directly or through monetary incentives.
For quantifying the costs and effects of these measures and subsidies on the long-term optimal
system fuel mix from a welfare perspective, it is not only crucial to valuate expected total life-
cycle costs, but also the economic risks conveyed with investment and operation of the plant fleet.
With fuel prices fluctuating considerably, cost volatility becomes a severe risk that influences the
investment economics and therewith the optimal fuel mix within the system. Thereby, short-term
fuel price shocks as well as longer-term structural changes in the commodity markets can lead
to changes in the merit order represented by the marginal costs of production of the generation
technologies. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to derive an unambiguous merit order
as assumed in the classic peak-load capacity planning literature. In the analytical literature on
generation investments, the risk of reversals in the merit order (in the following denoted as merit
order risk) through fuel price fluctuations is commonly neglected. Although simulation-based
investment optimization approaches (as e.g. discussed in Weber, 2005, Fleten et al., 2007) may
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capture this type of uncertainty, analytical solutions of peak-load pricing based frameworks limit
fuel price risk—if captured at all—to the extent that unambiguity of the merit order is still satisfied
(cf. Sunderko¨tter and Weber, 2012). However, long-term investment decisions such as for power
plants with lifetimes of several decades may be heavily impacted by possible reversals in the short-
term order of dispatch.
The optimization problem and the solutions proposed in this paper can be easily transferred to
investment decisions in several other industries besides power generation where similar problem
characteristics can be found. Thereby, three main properties characterize the considered type of
investment problems: (a) Availability of alternative production technologies, (b) non-storability of
produced good, and (c) price uncertainty of input factors. Potential areas of application in other
industries are
 Transportation systems: Vehicle fleet operators as e.g. taxi companies or logistics providers
face a trade-off between investment costs and operating costs of different engine types when
deciding on new investments. Thereby, the investment decision is typically subject to an
expected or pre-scheduled annual transportation performance. While retail prices for diesel
fuels were traditionally lower compared to gasoline in past decades, the picture changed in
many European countries in 2008 due to changes in demand and refinery capacities (Eurostat,
2009). In the U.S., the order of retail diesel and gasoline fuel prices changed several times
between 2007 and 2009 (EIA, 2009). Moreover, the expected further emergence of hybrid and
electric technologies may lead to significant changes in the order of operating costs among
all vehicle technologies.
 Process industry: Many industrial production processes, e.g. in chemical industry, show
similar trade-offs between investment costs and uncertain costs of required input factors.
Replacement of a certain chemical in case of price shocks is usually only a mid-term option,
since process changes usually cause investment costs.1
This paper is structured as follows: After a brief recall of the deterministic peak load pricing
concept in Section 4.2.1, the risk-extended optimization problem is proposed in Section 4.2.2. The
analytical solution and its properties are discussed starting in Section 4.2.3 for the simplified case
without merit order risk, before the general portfolio problem is treated. Thereby, the two special
cases of purely cost-efficient and purely risk-efficient portfolios are elucidated in Sections 4.2.4 and
4.2.5, before the combined problem is discussed in Section 4.2.6. Section 4.3 treats determining
the likelihood for reversals in the merit order, at first for one period and then in a multi-period
quantification over a plant’s lifetime. In Section 4.4, we examine the model in a case study on the
1Recently, severe delivery shortages of a chemical mass product caught particular attention (cf. e.g. Bonilla, 2010):
Acetonitrile, a by-product of acrylnitrile which is widely used in the plastics and textile industry, is a frequently
used solvent in laboratories and industrial processes. Due to the world-wide demand drop of plastic products
combined with temporarily decommissioned production capacities, the price of acetonitrile exploded in 2008/2009
from few euro per liter up to a hundred. The “Great Acetonitrile Shortage”, as it has come to be known in the
industry, forces chemists to reduce the required solvent consumption or switch to other solvents. However, these
alternatives are usually conveyed with additional investment costs.
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cost-risk efficient structure of generation portfolios consisting of CCGT and hard coal technologies
in Germany. The paper concludes in Section 4.5 with a summary and critical acclaim of our key
findings.
4.2 Modelling optimal investment policies in electricity markets
given uncertainty in the merit order
4.2.1 Deterministic peak-load pricing problem
Our investment model for the electricity system is based on a two-stage decision problem following
the classic peak load pricing literature (see e.g. Crew et al., 1995): On the first stage, the decision
to invest in a portfolio of different available plant technologies u ∈ {1, . . . , n} with capacity Ku
is made. At this point in time, investors are assumed to have full information about investment
costs Cinv,u of each technology and about the distribution of the uncertain fuel prices c˜u. However,
actual fuel price realizations are not revealed until the second stage. Then, the optimal deployment
decision of each plant within the portfolio selected on the first stage is made for the total planning
period [0;T ] (e.g. a year), which we assume to be broken down into time steps of equal length
t ∈ [0;T ] (e.g. hours). Price inelastic system demand is deterministically given by the demand
function D : [0;T ] → R+, t 7→ D(t), which is assumed to be continuous and (at least) two-times
differentiable.
The objective is to minimize the total system cost of electricity production, C, consisting of
total operating costs, Cop,u, plus annualized capacity investment costs, Cinv,u, summed over the
available technologies u. In fact, operating costs at time t are a function Cop,u(yu,t) = yu,t · cu,t
of the instantaneous output level yu,t (MW) times the specific operating costs cu,t (e/MWh).
Furthermore, total investment costs are determined by the installed capacity Ku and the specific
investment costs cinv,u (e/MWel) and can be expressed by Cinv,u(Ku) = Ku ·cinv,u. Therefore, the
plant capacities Ku and the corresponding output levels yu,t are the decision variables to be opti-
mized. Taking into account that demand must never exceed available capacities, the deterministic
optimization problem may be written as
C∗ = min
yu,t,Ku
C(yu,t,Ku) (4.1)
s.t. C =
∫ T
0
∑
u
yu,t · cu,tdt+
∑
u
Ku · cinv,u (4.2)
yu,t −Ku ≤ 0 ∀ t, u (4.3)∑
u
yu,t ≥ D(t) ∀ t (4.4)
In the following paragraph, we well extend this problem to reflect not only the expected costs
but also cost risks in the optimization.
41
Chapter 4 Optimization of power generation portfolios under uncertainty in the merit order
4.2.2 The risk-adjusted portfolio problem
In classic portfolio theory, investors are assumed to select efficient portfolios solely based on the
expected return and risk (in the form of variance of return) of the available assets. We adopt this
decision principle also for the cost based investment decision of generation assets in the system
portfolio. Following Jansen et al. (2008) and Gotham et al. (2009), we thus use total system costs
instead of “return” and variance of total costs as the relevant risk measure.
As frequently used in investment literature, we assume that society’s preferences are represented
by a function of the form
L = E[C] +
1
2
A ·Var[C], (4.5)
where A denotes the investors’ risk attitude (see e.g. Trautmann, 2006, Sunderko¨tter and Weber,
2012). For normally distributed payoffs, this preference function is induced by exponential utilities
with constant absolute risk aversion and shows in maximization problems consistency with the
rationale of expected utility maximization.
To allow for a better traceability of the solution, we confine in the following to the case with only
two technologies, i.e. n = 2.2 Given uncertain fuel prices which lead to fluctuating operating costs
c˜1 and c˜2, two possible scenarios are to be distinguished on the second stage for the merit order.
These states of the merit order are indicated by the state variable s˜ with realizations si, i ∈ {1; 2}
defined as
s˜ :=
 s0, for c1 ≤ c2 (“default order”)s1, for c1 > c2 (“reverse order”) (4.6)
Let periodic operating costs c˜u, u ∈ {1; 2} be represented by bivariate jointly distributed random
variables with joint probability density function ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ) and mean c¯u.
3 For each technology
u, c˜u is a (univariately) distributed random variable on the probability space (Ω,A(R),P) with
c˜u : Ω→ R with marginal probability density function ϕu(cu) and marginal cumulative distribution
Φu(cu) and corresponding mean c¯u, variance σ
2
u, and correlation ρ. Then, s˜(c˜1, c˜2) is itself a
(discrete) random variable generated by c˜1, c˜2 on the probability space (Ω
′,B(R2),P′), with s˜ :
Ω′ → {s0; s1},Ω′ = Ω1 × Ω2.
The likelihood for a reversal in the merit order is denoted by P(s˜ = s1) := P(c1 > c2). By
definition, P(s˜ = s0) := P(c1 ≤ c2) = 1 − P(s˜ = s1) is thus the probability that no reversals of
annual operating costs in the merit order occur. Intuitively, the merit order risk depends on the
assumed time series model for the operating costs c1 and c2. We will come back to the computation
of the merit order risk in Section 4.3. Taking into account unambiguity of the plant merit order, the
classic peak load pricing framework to model total system costs has to be extended. Considering
two generation technologies with the resulting possible fuel price orders according to definition
(4.6), the following states of the plant output variable yt have to be distinguished:
2The solution to the extended portfolio problem with n technologies given the case of a deterministic merit order
is discussed in Sunderko¨tter and Weber (2012).
3Throughout this article, random variables are indicated by a “˜”, whereas their realizations are written as plain
letters.
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y˜1,t =

D(t), for s˜ = s0 ∧ D(t) < K1
K1, for s˜ = s0 ∧ D(t) ≥ K1
0, for s˜ = s1 ∧ D(t) < K2
D(t)−K2, for s˜ = s1 ∧ D(t) ≥ K2
y˜2,t =

0, for s˜ = s0 ∧ D(t) < K1
D(t)−K1, for s˜ = s0 ∧ D(t) ≥ K1
D(t), for s˜ = s1 ∧ D(t) < K2
K2, for s˜ = s1 ∧ D(t) ≥ K2
(4.7)
We assume without limitation of generality D(t) to represent demand in a decreasing order and
thus to be strictly monotone decreasing in t with D(0) = Dmax. This allows to simplify problem
(4.1)-(4.4) by using the minimum4 operating duration Ou as decision variables instead of yu,t.
Given the strict monotony of the load duration curve, there is a unique mapping between capac-
ities and operating times for each merit order state. Obviously, the upper bound of the optimal
operating time of technology 1 equals T in case of the default order where technology 1 repre-
sents the base load technology. By defining R(K) as the inverse of the demand function D(t), the
minimum operating duration of the base technology 1 in the default merit order is determined by
O1 = t1 = R(K1). Equivalently, t1 determines the upper bound of the operating time of the respec-
tive peak technology. For the latter, the minimum operating duration equals zero. The minimum
operating duration of technology one is reduced to a value O1 = 0 in the reverse case in favor of
technology 2, which then becomes the new base load technology running at least during O2 = tu.
The lower bound of the ex-ante optimal operation time of technology 1 reduces with increasing
merit order risk. Therefore, both t∗1 (lower bound of the optimal operating time of technology 1
given the default order) and t∗2 (lower bound of the optimal operating time of technology 2 given
the reverse order) have to be determined endogenously in the optimization problem. Recapitulat-
ing the optimal plant dispatch, the minimum operating times O1, O2 of technology 1 and 2 over
the two considered merit order states can be formulated as:
O1 =
t1 for s˜ = s00 for s˜ = s1 O2 =
0 for s˜ = s0t2 for s˜ = s1 (4.8)
Note that through the invertible function D(t), we can use tu and Ku interchangeably as decision
variables. Finally, we introduce for the operating costs of technology u the conditional expectation
E[c˜u|s˜] ≡ c¯u|s˜ and the conditional variance V ar[c˜u|s˜] ≡ σ2u|s˜. The computation of these conditional
parameters from a bivariate density ϕ1,2(c1, c2) is derived in B.2.1.
Based on these pre-considerations, the extended portfolio optimization problem with uncertain
merit order can now be rewritten taking into account that the total variance is the sum of inter-
4Analogously, the problem could be formulated using maximum operating durations as decision variables.
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scenario and intra-scenario variance as shown in B.2.2:5
L∗ = min
K1,K2
L (4.9)
s.t. L =
2∑
u=1
(
Kucinv,u + E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]+ A
2
Q2u|s˜
(
Var
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]+ E [c˜u∣∣s˜]2)]− A
2
E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]]2)
+AE
[
Q1|s˜Q2|s˜
(
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜] + E
[
c˜1
∣∣s˜] ·E [c˜2∣∣s˜])]−AE[Q1|s˜E[c˜1∣∣s˜]] ·E[Q2|s˜E[c˜2∣∣s˜]]
(4.10)
D(0)−K1 −K2 ≤ 0 (4.11)
K1,K2 ≥ 0. (4.12)
As visualized in Figure 4.1, Qu|si denotes the energy produced by plant technology u over the
planning period [0, T ] given the fuel price state si with
Q1|s0 =
∫ K1
0
R(κ)dκ Q2|s0 =
∫ D(0)
K1
R(κ)dκ = QE −Q1|s0 (4.13)
Q2|s1 =
∫ K2
0
R(κ)dκ Q1|s1 =
∫ D(0)
K2
R(κ)dκ = QE −Q2|s1 . (4.14)
Here, QE :=
∫ T
0
D(t)dt =
∫D(0)
0
R(κ)dκ denotes the total energy demand in [0, T ].
Dmax
D(t)
T0
Dmax
K1
K2
Q1|s0
Q2|s0
K2
K1
D(t)
T
Q2|s1
Q1|s1
0 t2t1
Fig. 4.1: Reversals in the merit order influence the produced energy of technologies 1 and 2 in the default (left)
and reverse case (right). Note that total installed capacity may exceed the maximal demand for λ = 0.
4.2.3 Standard solutions to the portfolio problem in the two-technology case
with a deterministic merit order
Before approaching the unrestricted problem, we will first discuss possible solution cases assuming
a deterministic merit order without merit order risk, i.e. P(s˜ = s1) = 0. Then, problem (4.9)-(4.12)
5Notably, the objective function is different from the plain expected value of the preference function over the two
fuel price order scenarios which would be E
[
E[C|s˜] + 1
2
A ·Var[C|s˜]] 6= L.
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reduces to
L∗0 = min
K1,K2
L0 (4.15)
s.t. L0 =
2∑
u=1
cinv,uKu + cuQu +
A
2
(
2∑
u=1
2∑
v=1
σuvQuQv
)
(4.16)
D(0)−K1 −K2 ≤ 0 (4.17)
K1,K2 ≥ 0 (4.18)
As shown in Sunderko¨tter and Weber (2012), the central optimality condition can be obtained
from the KKT-conditions as
A
(
(σ21 − σ12)QE − (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)
=
cinv,2 − cinv,1
t1
− c¯1 + c¯2, (4.19)
with
Q2 =
∫ t1
0
D(t)−D(t1)dt, QE =
∫ T
0
D(t)dt = Q1 +Q2.
In Eqn. (4.19), the risk term and the cost term are separated, each to one side of the equation.
Although an explicit formulation of the optimal operating time (and therewith capacities) is not
possible for a generic load duration function D(t), the optimality condition allows to draw conclu-
sions on the structure of efficient portfolios. For that, the risk term on the left side and the cost
term on the right side of Eqn. (4.19), respectively, are denoted by
l0(t1) := A
(
(σ21 − σ12)QE − (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)
, (4.20)
r0(t1) :=
cinv,2 − cinv,1
t1
− c¯1 + c¯2. (4.21)
Thereby, the intersection of l0(t1) and r0(t1) characterizes a stationary point t
o
1 which is necessary
for the solution of the cost-variance efficient portfolio. Analysis of l0(t1) and r0(t1) shows that
three characteristic portfolio structures can be distinguished for the purely cost-efficient and the
variance efficient portfolio with either technology 1, technology 2, or both technologies being part
of the efficient portfolio. For the cost efficient portfolio with A = 0, three different solution cases
can be derived from the condition r0(t1) = 0:
Property 4.2.1. The purely cost efficient portfolio with A = 0 consists of
Only technology 1 for cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤ 0, (4.22)
Technology 1 and 2 for 0 <
cinv,1 − cinv,2
c¯2 − c¯1 < T, (4.23)
Only technology 2 for
cinv,1 − cinv,2
c¯2 − c¯1 ≥ T. (4.24)
Similarly, three solution cases can be stated for the variance minimal portfolio with A→∞:
Property 4.2.2. The purely variance efficient portfolio with A→∞ consists of
Only technology 1 for σ21 ≤ σ12, (4.25)
Technology 1 and 2 for (σ21 > σ12) ∧ (σ22 > σ12), (4.26)
Only technology 2 for σ22 ≤ σ12. (4.27)
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As a consequence of Properties 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, stationary points in nine different cases can be
distinguished to determine the general set of solutions for combined cost-variance efficient portfolios
as shown in Figure 4.2. Since the optimization problem is only convex in the case with both
technologies being part of the cost-minimal and the variance-minimal portfolios (case (V), Figure
4.2) as shown in Sunderko¨tter and Weber (2012), first derivatives can be used as sufficient test for
a local minimum in the other cases: Thereby, according to the mean value theorem, a stationary
point to1 is a minimum to L0 only if there exists a r ∈ R+ such that for all t1 ∈ (to1 − r, to1] it is
∂L0
∂K1
= l0(t1)− r0(t1) ≤ 0, and for every t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r) it is ∂L0∂K1 = l0(t1)− r0(t1) ≥ 0.
The identified stationary points allow to formulate the following properties for the structure of
cost-variance efficient portfolios given a deterministic merit order (P(s1) = 0):
Property 4.2.3. If both technologies 1 and 2 are included in the purely cost-efficient portfolio (i.e.
A = 0) and in the purely variance-efficient portfolio (i.e. A → +∞), then they are also included
in all cost-variance efficient portfolios with A > 0.
Property 4.2.4. If technology u is neither included in the purely cost-efficient portfolio nor in
the purely variance-efficient portfolio, then u is not included in any cost-variance efficient portfolio
with A > 0.
Property 4.2.5. If the purely cost-efficient (purely variance-efficient) portfolio consists only of
technology u ∈ {1, 2} and the purely variance-efficient (purely cost-efficient) portfolio consists of
both technologies, then there exists an A0 such that technology u is included in all efficient portfolios
for A > A0 (A < A0) and excluded in all efficient portfolios for A < A0 (A > A0).
4.2.4 Standard solutions to the purely cost efficient portfolio with uncertainty
of the merit order
As an extreme case of the general optimization problem, we will at first consider the purely cost-
efficient portfolio with an unstable merit order, i.e. the case A = 0. Under this premise, the
Lagrangian simplifies to
Lc =
2∑
u=1
(
Kucinv,u + E
[
Qu|s˜E [c˜u|s˜]
] )
+ λ · (D(0)−K1 −K2) (4.28)
With z denoting the difference in operating costs of technology 1 and 2, i.e. z := c2 − c1, the
corresponding KKT-conditions can be derived as shown in B.2.3 as
∂Lc
∂K1
= cinv,1 − λ− t1P(s0) ·E[z˜|s0] ≥ 0 ⊥ K1 ≥ 0 (4.29)
∂Lc
∂K2
= cinv,2 − λ+ t2P(s1) ·E[z˜|s1] ≥ 0 ⊥ K2 ≥ 0 (4.30)
∂Lc
∂λ
= D(0)−K1 −K2 ≤ 0 ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (4.31)
Two cases can be distinguished: For λ > 0, KKT condition (4.31) is binding. Hence, total
capacity will meet but not exceed the demand maximum in the optimum, i.e. K1 + K2 = D(0).
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Fig. 4.2: Solution cases for the portfolio problem without merit order risk, i.e. P(s˜ = s1) = 0. Stationary points
for cost-variance efficient portfolio combinations are characterized by the intersection of r0(t) (green) and
l0(t) (blue).
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For λ = 0, total installed capacity may exceed the maximal demand, i.e. K1 + K2 ≥ D(0). The
potential “overcapacities” in this case will be economically favorable, if the probability weighted
savings from operating costs in the reversed merit order case exceed the additional investment
costs for the capacity surplus. The excess capacity thus increases the fleet’s operating flexibility.
Nevertheless, the optimal energy produced in any scenario cannot exceed total energy demand,
thus it still holds
QE =
∫ T
0
D(t)dt = Q1|s0 +Q2|s0 = Q1|s1 +Q2|s1 .
It is intuitively clear that in the considered model framework with ideal and deterministic plant
availabilities excess capacities may only be economical if the technologies’ investment costs are
relatively small compared to the expected difference in operating costs. This becomes evident in
view of KKT conditions (4.29) and (4.30): The shadow price λ is linearly decreasing in t1 and t2,
respectively, with
λ = cinv,1 − t1P(s0)E[z˜|s0] = cinv,2 + t2P(s1)E[z˜|s1] (4.32)
Clearly, λ is positive for t1 = 0, t2 = 0 and reaches its minimum at t1 = T or t2 = T . Since the
solution for the cost efficient portfolio with excess capacities requires λ = 0, it can be concluded
that this case may only exist if expected operating costs and investment costs satisfy the necessary
condition
(cinv,1 − TP(s0)E[z˜|s0] < 0) ∧ (cinv,2 + TP(s1)E[z˜|s1] < 0) (4.33)
Notably, condition (4.33) will rarely be satisfied for applications related to power generation port-
folios with the cost characteristics of conventional plant technologies as shown in Section 4.4.
Similar to the special case with a deterministic merit order (cf. Section 4.2.3), three solution
cases can be distinguished for purely cost efficient portfolios with uncertainty of the merit order
B.2.3:
Proposition 4.2.1. With z := c2 − c1 denoting the difference in operating costs of technologies 1
and 2, the purely cost-minimal portfolio with merit order risk P(s1) consists of technology 2 if and
only if
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≥ TP(s0)E[z˜|s0]. (4.34)
In contrast, the portfolio consists of technology 1 if and only if
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤ TP(s1)E[z˜|s1]. (4.35)
With other words, the purely cost efficient portfolio consists of both technologies if and only if
TP(s1) ·E[z˜|s1] < cinv,1 − cinv,2 < TP(s0) ·E[z˜|s0]. (4.36)
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4.2.5 Standard solutions to the purely variance efficient portfolio with
uncertainty of the merit order
The variance efficient portfolio represents another extreme case of the general portfolio problem
obtained as A→∞. The Lagrangian may be written as
Lv = λ ·
(
D(0)−K1 −K2
)
+
1
2
2∑
u=1
(
E
[
Q2u|s˜ ·
(
Var
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]+ E [c˜u∣∣s˜]2)]−E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]]2
)
+E
[
Q1|s˜Q2|s˜ ·
(
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜] + E
[
c˜1
∣∣s˜] ·E [c˜2∣∣s˜])]−E[Q1|s˜E[c˜1∣∣s˜]] ·E[Q2|s˜E[c˜2∣∣s˜]]
(4.37)
The corresponding KKT-conditions can be derived as:
∂Lv
∂K1
= −λ−P(s0)t1 ·
2∑
u=1
(−1)uQu|s0
(
σ2u|s0 − σ12|s0+
+ P(s1) ·
(
c¯2u|s0 − c¯2|s0 c¯1|s0 − c¯u|s0
2∑
v=1
c¯v|s1
Qv|s1
Qu|s0
))
≥ 0, ⊥ K1 ≥ 0 (4.38)
∂Lv
∂K2
= −λ+ P(s1)t2 ·
2∑
u=1
(−1)uQu|s1
(
σ2u|s1 − σ12|s1+
+ P(s0) ·
(
c¯2u|s1 − c¯2|s1 c¯1|s1 − c¯u|s1
2∑
v=1
c¯v|s0
Qv|s0
Qu|s1
))
≥ 0, ⊥ K2 ≥ 0 (4.39)
∂Lv
∂λ
= D(0)−K1 −K2 ≤ 0, ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (4.40)
Since investment costs are neglected in the purely variance optimal investment decision, it can be
concluded from the existence of a variance-efficient portfolio without overcapacities that an increase
in the capacity of any technology is also efficient. With other words: If additional capacity has
zero cost, increasing the capacity of an efficient portfolio cannot negatively influence its optimality
as long as the expected technology deployment on the second stage of the optimization problem is
not changed compared to the situation without overcapacities.6 Therefore, we will restrict in the
following the variance minimization problem to the more interesting case in which total installed
generation capacity matches system demand. Then, the hitherto constraint inequality (4.11) is
replaced by the equality
D(0)−K1 −K2 = 0 (4.41)
Under this assumption it is not clear any longer whether the efficient portfolio consists of a single
technology or a mix of both technologies. With (4.41), t2 can be expressed as a function of the t1
with t2(t1) = R(D(0)−D(t1)). The latter expression may be used to reformulate the production
volumes as defined in Eqs. (4.13), (4.14) in order to express the problem solely dependent on t1.
6Notably, for a purely variance efficient solution the actual plant deployment on the second stage is irrelevant
and could theoretically be realized arbitrarily. Only the expected plant deployment is relevant for the variance
minimal investment decision on the first stage of the problem.
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For an interior solution with K∗1 ,K
∗
2 > 0, the KKT conditions (4.38) and (4.39) have to be
satisfied with equality as necessary optimality condition. Eliminating λ through subtraction of
these conditions yields the central optimality condition ∂LR∂K1 − ∂LR∂K2 = 0 which allows us to derive
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2.2. Under the restriction that total installed generation capacity must match
total demand, i.e. λ 6= 0, the purely variance minimal portfolio with a merit order risk P(s1) > 0
corresponding to optimization problem (4.9)-(4.12) consists of both technologies 1 and 2 if(
−
σ12|s0 − σ21|s0
E[z˜|s0]P(s1) > c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0
)
∧
(
c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0 <
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1
E[z˜|s1]P(s0)
)
(4.42)
The proof and supplementary discussions on other solution cases for the variance minimal port-
folio are provided in B.2.4
4.2.6 Standard solutions to the combined portfolio problem with uncertainty
of the merit order
We start solving the general non-convex problem (4.9)-(4.12) by using a standard Lagrange ap-
proach for the relaxed assumption of P(s˜ = s1) ≥ 0 to identify stationary points as necessary
conditions in the optimum. For ease of computation, again t1, t2 are used as equivalent decision
variables. Having obtained optimal values for t∗1, t
∗
2, we can subsequently derive K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 from Eqn.
(4.8) to complete the solution. Then, the Lagrangian L writes
L = L+ λ · (D(0)−K1 −K2), (4.43)
and the corresponding KKT-conditions may be written as:
∂L
∂K1
= cinv,1 − λ−P(s0)t1 ·
2∑
u=1
(−1)u ·
(
c¯u|s0 +AQu|s0 ·
(
σ2u|s0 − σ12|s0
+ P(s1) ·
(
c¯2u|s0 − c¯2|s0 c¯1|s0 − c¯u|s0
2∑
v=1
c¯v|s1
Qv|s1
Qu|s0
)))
≥ 0, ⊥ K1 ≥ 0 (4.44)
∂L
∂K2
= cinv,2 − λ+ P(s1)t2 ·
2∑
u=1
(−1)u ·
(
c¯u|s1 +AQu|s1 ·
(
σ2u|s1 − σ12|s1
+ P(s0) ·
(
c¯2u|s1 − c¯2|s1 c¯1|s1 − c¯u|s1
2∑
v=1
c¯v|s0
Qv|s0
Qu|s1
)))
≥ 0, ⊥ K2 ≥ 0 (4.45)
∂L
∂λ
= D(0)−K1 −K2 ≤ 0, ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (4.46)
The optimal portfolio mix (K∗1 ,K
∗
2 ) to problem (4.9)-(4.12) is either obtained as a boundary
solution with K∗1 = 0 or K
∗
2 = 0 or as an interior solution with K
∗
1 , K
∗
2 > 0. The necessary
condition for an interior solution is determined by the non-convex equation system with Eqs. (4.44),
∂L
∂K1
= 0, and (4.45), ∂L∂K2 = 0. Both equations represent functions of K1 and K2, respectively t1
and t2.
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As for the purely cost-minimal portfolio, two cases for λ have to be distinguished: For λ = 0,
total installed capacity can exceed the maximal demand, i.e. K1 + K2 ≥ D(0), while for λ > 0
total capacity will meet but not exceed the demand maximum, i.e. K1 +K2 = D(0).
First, we consider the case λ > 0. Here, λ can be eliminated in Eqs. (4.44) and (4.45) by
subtracting ∂L∂K1 − ∂L∂K2 =: υ. The resulting optimality condition can then be written as υ = 0 with
υ(t1) =AP(s0)P(s1)
1∑
i=0
ti+1
(
Qi+1|siE[z˜|si]2 −QE(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E[z˜|si](−1)i −E[z˜|s1]E[z˜|s0]Qi+1|si
)
+ cinv,1 − cinv,2 −E
[
(t|s˜) ·E[z˜|s˜]]+AE [(t|s˜) ·Q1|s˜Var[z˜|s˜]−QE(σ22|s˜ − σ12|s˜)] (4.47)
Remark that υ(t1) is solely dependent on the decision variable t1, respectively K1, if we use the
relation t2(t1) = R(D(0) − D(t1)). The combined cost-risk efficient portfolio structure given the
merit order risk P(s1) ≥ 0 can be characterized by the following property as shown in B.2.5:
Proposition 4.2.3 (Existence and uniqueness of an interior solution for the case λ 6= 0). Let be
cinv,1 > cinv,2 and total installed capacity matching maximum demand, i.e. λ 6= 0 in constraint
(4.12). If both technologies 1 and 2 are included in the purely cost-efficient portfolio (i.e. A = 0)
and in the purely variance-efficient portfolio (i.e. A → +∞) satisfying condition (4.42), then all
cost-variance efficient portfolios with A > 0 corresponding to problem (4.9)-(4.12) consist of a
unique combination of both technologies.
Based on the discussion in Section 4.2.4, the economic benefit of excess capacities in purely cost-
efficient portfolios is limited to investment settings with relatively small investment cost compared
to a large difference in operating costs and a severe merit order risk (see condition (4.33)). In a
risk-cost investment setting, excess capacities are beneficial from an economic point of view if the
difference in risk-adjusted expected operating costs is relatively large compared to the investment
costs of the generation technologies. Thus, the economic benefit of overcapacities increases with
the level of social risk aversion A.
Although thus rare in electricity investment applications, we continue to characterize this solution
case with λ = 0 in the following propositions (proofs are provided in B.2.5):
Proposition 4.2.4 (Implicit functions). For the implicit function ∂L∂K1 (tˇ1, tˇ2) = 0 with
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) :
[0, T ] × [0, T ] → Z1 ⊆ R+, there exists a unique function ζ1(t2) : (0, T ] → Z1 ⊆ R+ . Similarly,
for the implicit function ∂L∂K2 (tˇ1, tˇ2) = 0 with
∂L
∂K2
(t1, t2) : [0, T ]× [0, T ]→ Z2 ⊆ R+, there exists a
unique function ζ2(t1) : (0, T ]→ Z2 ⊆ R+ .
Proposition 4.2.5 (Monotony). For given expected fuel prices c¯1|s0 ≤ c¯2|s0 and c¯2|s1 ≤ c¯1|s1 and
ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1) being functions represented by the implicit functions
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) = 0 from Eqn.
(4.44), and ∂L∂K2 (t1, t2) = 0 from Eqn. (4.45), respectively, ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1) are both monotone
increasing in t2 and t1, respectively. For c¯1|s0 < c¯2|s0 and c¯2|s1 < c¯1|s1 , it follows strict monotony
of ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1).
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Fig. 4.3: Optimality condition for the portfolio problem as implicit functions of t1, t2. In the left diagram, the
intersection of ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1) represents the solution to the optimization problem for a symmetric,
exemplary parameter configuration. For the asymmetric parameter configuration in the right diagram,
the problem exhibits a corner solution.
With t1 = ζ1(t2), t2 = ζ2(t1) being the functions represented by the implicit function
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) =
0, and ∂L∂K2 (t1, t2) = 0, respectively, the existence of at least one stationary tuple (t
o
1, t
o
2) ∈
(0;T ) × (0;T ) with ζ1(to2) = to1 and ζ2(to1) = to2 is necessary prerequisite for an interior solu-
tion. This tuple represents graphically the intersection point of ζ2(t2) and ζ1(t2) as shown in cf.
Figure 4.3 for a typical parameter set. An explicit, analytical solution formulation is however in-
feasible for the case of a general demand function as both equations contain the objective variables
as integration limits in Qu|s˜. Thereby, the following solution cases may occur in the case λ = 0:
I) Corner solution with the efficient portfolio consisting of
i) only one technology, i.e. K∗1 = D(0),K
∗
2 = 0, or K
∗
2 = D(0),K
∗
1 = 0, respectively,
7
ii) both technologies, i.e. K∗1 = K
∗
2 = D(0),
II) Interior solution with the efficient portfolio consisting of both technologies, i.e. 0 < K∗1 ,K
∗
2 ≤
D(0).
Proposition 4.2.6 (Existence and uniqueness of an interior solution for the case λ = 0). If the
technology parameters satisfy
cinv,1
TP(s0)
−E[z˜|s0]−AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)E[z˜|s0](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0 (4.48)
and
cinv,2
TP(s1)
+ E[z˜|s1]−AQE
(
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)E[z˜|s1](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0, (4.49)
7Overcapacities may only be economical if they increase the operating flexibility of the generation portfolio. How-
ever, with a boundary solution with only one technology in the portfolio, there is no increase in flexibility and
therefore a boundary solution excludes excess capacities
52
4.3 Quantifying the merit order risk
then the cost-variance efficient portfolios with A > 0 corresponding to problem (4.9)-(4.12) consist
of a unique combination of both technologies. The total installed generation capacity of the cost-risk
efficient portfolio may exceed total demand, implying λ = 0 in constraint (4.12).
Notably, if there exists a local minimum of L in (K∗1 ,K∗2 , λ∗) with λ∗ = 0 according to Proposition
4.2.6, the installed capacity in the cost-variance efficient portfolio does not necessarily exceed
maximum demand. In addition, there may also exist a local minimum of L in another point
(K∗∗1 ,K
∗∗
2 , λ
∗∗) with λ∗∗ > 0. Finally, the corner points as discussed above have to be checked for
optimality due to the non-convexity of the problem.
4.3 Quantifying the merit order risk
The probability of a reversal in the merit order depends on the joint distribution of operating costs
c˜1, c˜2, or more precisely on the distribution of the difference in operating costs z˜ = c˜2 − c˜1. Before
we propose a general computation method for the merit order risk over the plant’s lifetime, we will
briefly discuss the basic calculation technique for the periodical risk in the next section.
4.3.1 Front year merit order risk
Given the distribution of fuel prices in the following period, the risk P(c1 > c2) for a reversal in
the merit order in this period can be computed from the two-dimensional density ϕ1,2 as
P(c1 > c2) = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c2
−∞
ϕ1,2(c1, c2)dc1dc2 = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c1
ϕ1,2(c1, c2)dc2dc1 (4.50)
Instead of computing the reversal likelihood directly from Eqn. (4.50), we can use the more
convenient transformation8 z˜ = c˜2−c˜1 with E[z˜] = c¯2−c¯1 and Var[z˜] = σ21+σ22−2σ12. In knowledge
of the cumulative distribution function of Φ(z) the likelihood for reversals can be calculated as
P(c1 > c2) = P(z < 0) = Φ(0), (4.51)
4.3.2 merit order risk over the plant’s lifetime
Up to now, we have calculated the probability P(c2 < c1) for a single realization of fuel prices
such that operating costs of technology 2 exceed those of technology 1. In fact, this calculation
captures only the merit order risk for the period τ + 1 given all information at τ , or more precisely
Pτ (c2,τ+1 < c1,τ+1) := P(c2,τ+1 < c1,τ+1|Fτ ). Beyond that, the investment decision requires to
take into account the merit order risk in all subsequent periods of the plants’ lifetime. Valuing
8It is well-known that the sum of n jointly normal distributed random variables Xi, with Xi ∼ N (µi, σ2i ) is also
normal distributed with mean and variance
µ =
n∑
i=1
µi, σ
2 =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σij =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρ, with ρ =
σij
σiσj
.
For a proof see e.g. Elishakoff (1999).
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the optimal fuel mix over all periods of the considered plant portfolio would in general require a
relatively complex multi-period model, but since the investment is limited to one point in time,
the problem can be reduced to a single-period model by calculating the average merit order risk
over all periods of the plants’ lifetime.
It is intuitively clear that the merit order risks for multiple periods ahead depends on the type
of the assumed underlying stochastic fuel price process and as a consequence on the type of the
resulting process of differences in operating costs. To study the impact on the merit order risk over
the plant’s lifetime, we will discuss in the following two fundamental stochastic processes which
are typically applied in financial energy-related applications:
First, let differences in periodic operating costs z˜τ = c˜τ,2− c˜τ,1 be represented by a random walk
defined on the probability space (Ω,Fτ ,P) of the form
∆zτ = σετ
√
∆τ , (4.52)
where ε denotes the standardized white noise with ετ
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), τ ∈ N. Since the distribution of
zτ+k given all information at time t is non-stationary with constant mean but linearly increasing
variance V art[zτ+k] = k · σ2, the likelihood for a reversal in the merit order k periods ahead
will also increase with k as shown in Figure 4.4. Typical solution approaches for these kinds of
problems apply multi-period optimization frameworks. To keep the simplicity of the annualized
valuation framework proposed in Section 4.2, we use instead the compound periodical likelihood
of reversals, calculated as the weighted average of the single-period merit order risk during the
lifetime τ ∈ [1, . . . , τˆ ] of the considered plants. Thereby, the discount factor is used as weighting
factor, i.e.
P(s˜ = s1) ≡ P(z[1,τˆ ] < 0) = q
τˆ · i
qτˆ − 1 ·
τˆ∑
k=1
P(zk < 0) · q−k, (4.53)
with q = 1 + i and i denoting the discount rate.
While the random walk model excludes any predictability of the difference in operating costs
of the two technologies, application of a mean-reversion model follows the idea that there is a
long-term equilibrium for both technologies. This rationale can be motivated with the long-term
substituting effects of commodities in many industries and is supported by various studies on coin-
tegration of commodity prices (cf. e.g. Schwartz, 1997, Alexander, 1999, Pindyck, 1999, Schwartz
and Smith, 2000, Pindyck, 2001, Geman, 2007, Mohammadi, 2009). In fact, mean-reverting behav-
ior of the differences of two stochastic processes does even imply cointegration, i.e. stationarity of
a linear combination of two stochastic processes. In addition to short-term deviations of operating
costs caused by fluctuations in supply and demand of the underlying fuel types, variations in the
long-run equilibrium may occur caused e.g. by technological progress impacting investment costs
of generation technologies. Hence, the distribution of price differences in operating costs of two
technologies is usually time-dependent and not constant over time.
We consider a mean-reversion process (corresponding to an AR(1) time series model) on the
probability space (Ω,Ft,P) of the form
∆zτ = θ(µ− zτ )∆τ + σετ
√
∆τ , (4.54)
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Fig. 4.4: Comparison of variance Var0[zt] (left) and corresponding periodical merit order risk for P0(z˜t < 0) (right)
for a random walk and a mean-reversion process (θ = 0.8). The expected mean difference is E[z] = 3 and
the standard deviation σ = 1 for both processes.
where ετ is again assumed to be the standardized white noise. For |θ| < 1 and ∆τ →∞, the process
is (weakly) stationary with bounded variance Var[zτ ] =
σ2
2θ and constant expectation E[zτ ] = µ.
As a consequence, the periodical merit order risk given mean-reverting difference in operating costs
is also limited to the merit order risk implied by the variance supremum (see Figure 4.4). If the
mean reversion parameter θ is sufficiently small, this upper bound may also be used as a fair
approximation for the periodical merit order risk, i.e.
P(s˜ = s1) ≡ P(z[1,τˆ ] < 0) ≈ Φzτˆ (0), (4.55)
where Φzτˆ is the unconditional cumulated normal probability distribution of zτˆ with z˜τˆ ∼ N (µ, σ
2

2θ ).
4.4 Application: Optimal generation portfolios of coal and
CCGT technologies for the German electricity market
To illustrate the results, the proposed model is calibrated on the German electricity market using
historical market data. For that, typical new CCGT and hard coal technologies are considered
for serving demand. Note that the purpose of the calibration is to allow us to derive practically
relevant results. The numbers thereby serve primarily as an illustration whereas this paper does
not claim to derive a complete picture on the efficient power generation fuel mix.
4.4.1 Estimation of model parameters
Economic and technical key parameters of the coal and CCGT plant technologies based on Kon-
stantin (2009) are depicted in Table 4.1. Total operating costs are calculated based on fuel, CO2
emission, and variable O&M costs. To account for fuel price risks, total operating costs c˜u are
modeled as normally distributed random variables calculated as the sum of the respective fuel
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prices plus the emission factor weighted price of CO2 emission rights divided by the technology
specific efficiency rate, i.e. cu = (pf,u + eupco2)/ηu. A two-step approach is used to determine the
merit order risk and the conditional distribution parameters as described in further detail in the
following paragraphs:
 In the first step, the compound periodical merit order risk is determined based on the his-
torical difference time series in operating costs of coal and CCGT technologies.
 In the second step, conditional distribution parameters for the individual time series of op-
erating costs of coal and CCGT are computed based on the corresponding unconditional
distribution parameters and the likelihood for reversals in the merit order.
Tab. 4.1: 2007 based key parameters for new conventional coal and CCGT technologies (source: Konstantin, 2009,
own analysis).
Parameter Unit Hard coal CCGT
Total net investment costs e/KW 1419 608
Technical lifetime a 45 30
Fixed O&M, overhead e/KW a 36.06 13.97
Annualized investment costs cinv e/KW 179.905 78.442
Variable O&M, transport e/KWhe 2.9 5.5
Thermal efficiency MWhe/MWht 0.46 0.56
Carbon emission rate tCO2/MWht 0.34 0.20
Estimation of the merit order risk
Time series of monthly coal and natural gas import prices 1970–2010 are used based on the price
indices provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (StaBu, 2010) and absolute data of the
German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA, 2010). The price data reflects
the average cross-border price converted to e/MWht for all contracted deliveries in the respective
month. Starting with the beginning of the European Union Emission Trading System in 2005,
total fuel prices are computed including the costs of CO2 emission allowances (EUA) based on
front year price data from EEX (2011). EUAs are modeled to be purchased at market conditions
(full auctioning) as it has been announced by the EU for ETS Phase III starting in 2013. Levels
of differences in variable generation costs of new CCGT and hard coal technologies are computed
from the nominal time series, i.e. zτ = cτ,ccgt − cτ,coal, as shown in Figure 4.5.9
9Instead of using nominal data, we also considered deflating the data into real terms. This methodology, however,
may yield biasing results since selection of an appropriate deflator is an ambiguous process. Having tested
wholesale price indices for deflation, the time series properties of the difference s in operating costs did not much
change.
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Fig. 4.5: Differences in total operating costs of new CCGT and hard coal plants in Germany 1970–2010 (source:
BAFA (2010); StaBu (2010); EEX (2011); own analysis).
The difference time series is then analyzed with respect to random walk and mean reversion
properties: Table 4.2 provides “regular” and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics on
unit roots of the difference time series zτ . While the DF test statistic does not allow to reject
the null hypothesis of unit roots, the ADF test allows a rejection at a weak 10% level indicating
trend-stationary time series characteristics. Following from both tests results, non-stationarity
for the differences time series in operating costs cannot be excluded. However, this hypothesis is
conflicting with the principles of a long-term market equilibrium: Since the gap in operating costs
will in the long-run influence new built decisions of power plant investors as well as substituting
effects in other industries, a mean-reverting behavior in the differences in operating costs would to
be expected in the long-term market equilibrium.
Tab. 4.2: Regular and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on unit roots and estimated parameters for the difference
time series of variable generation costs zτ = cτ,ccgt−cτ,coal, 1970–2010. The merit order risk is based on
the long-term mean difference in operating costs 1970–2010 for Pl(s˜ = s1) and on the short-term period
2007–2009 for Ps(s˜ = s1), respectively.
Time series zτ Test statistic Parameter estimates (t-statistics) merit order risk
DF ADF θ µ σε Pl(s1) Ps(s1)
Mean reversion
-1.772 -3.171*
0.013* (1.772) 5.667 (1.268) 1.088 0.202 0.038
Random walk - 3.988 (0.583) 6.840 0.401 0.240
Note: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level
To compare the impact of a mean-reverting process versus a random walk assumption for the
difference time series in operating costs with regard to the efficient capacity allocation, the sub-
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sequent analysis is carried out applying both types of time series.10 Parameter estimates and
t-statistics are also depicted in Table 4.2 for annual levels of gas and coal import prices 1970–2009.
Correspondingly, the table provides the computed lifetime annuities for a merit order risk for coal
and CCGT technologies calculated according to Eqs. (4.53) and (4.55). Thereby, Pl(s˜ = s1)
denotes the likelihood for reversals under the long-term mean difference in operating costs, z¯, over
the full estimation period 1970–2009. In contrast, Ps(s˜ = s1) is based on the mean difference in
operating costs z¯ estimated from the short-term period 2007–2009. Using the short-term period
for estimating mean operating costs is most suitable in our view since it ensures appropriate long-
term estimates for variance and covariance while it takes into account recent shifts in the means
of operating costs. The long-term estimate for expected operating costs would yield in contrast
severe inconsistencies with respect to the other key technology parameters which refer to new built
power plants based on recent data. Thus, we use Ps(s˜ = s1) to accomplish the further analysis.
As expected, the limiting periodical merit order risk given mean-reverting differences in operating
costs is with 3.8% much lower compared to compound periodic merit order risk of 24.0% under
the random walk hypothesis.
Unconditional and conditional distribution of operating costs
Having determined the compound merit order risk during the plant’s lifetime from the difference
time series of operating costs, the corresponding unconditional mean and variance are determined
for each time series of operating cost both under the mean reversion and random walk hypothesis.
Next, conditional means and variances are computed for each technology as shown in B.2.1 (cf.
Table 4.3).
Specification of the load duration curve
The estimation of a load duration function is performed as described in Sunderko¨tter and Weber
(2012): Historical load data for Germany provided in an hourly resolution by ENTSO-E (2009)
for the years 2006–2008 provide the basis for the fitting procedure. For comparability reasons, we
adjust the data sets for the general increase in energy consumption by 1.02% in 2007 and 0.4%
in 2008, respectively. A historical reference load duration curve is then generated from the hourly
means of the historic data. To accomplish the further analysis in Matlab with a continuous inverted
load duration function Rˆ(K) = Dˆ−1(t), we use OLS regression to fit a polynomial function of the
form
R˜(K) ≈

∑q
j=0Aj ·Kj , for K ≥ D(T )
T, for K < D(T ).
(4.56)
with T = 8760 hours and for a load ranging from D(T ) = 35031 MW to D(0) = 78332 MW.
Parameter estimates for a polynomial function of degree q = 7 are provided in Fig. 4.6.
10Further research remains necessary to provide empirical evidence on the question of random walk versus mean-
reverting time series behavior of difference of operating costs. Since the main objective of this section is to
provide an illustrative application of the analytical discussion, we kindly refer the reader to existing literature
58
4.4 Application: Optimal generation portfolios of coal and CCGT technologies for the German
electricity market
Tab. 4.3: Distribution parameters for operating costs of coal and CCGT technologies. Unconditionally expected
operating costs represent historical mean costs 2007–2009. Conditional distribution parameters were
calculated based on the merit order risk given a random walk and a mean reversion process.
Empirical estimate Random walk Mean reversion
E[c˜coal] 45.912 45.912 45.912
E[c˜ccgt] 57.975 57.975 57.957
Ps(s˜ = s1) - 0.238 0.0383
Var[c˜coal] 84.447 513.422 83.305
Var[c˜ccgt] 195.574 1189.223 192.957
Cov[c˜coal, c˜ccgt] 116.561 188.858 115.779
E[c˜coal|s0] - 50.606 46.315
E[c˜coal|s1] - 30.871 35.795
E[c˜ccgt|s0] - 69.505 58.958
E[c˜ccgt|s1] - 20.952 33.067
Var[c˜coal|s0] - 452.673 79.818
Var[c˜coal|s1] - 411.257 64.404
Var[c˜ccgt|s0] - 821.499 171.853
Var[c˜ccgt|s1] - 570.799 78.548
Cov[c˜coal, c˜ccgt|s0] - 559.261 106.415
Cov[c˜coal, c˜ccgt|s1] - 457.363 68.49
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Fig. 4.6: Historical and fitted load duration curve and parameter specification of the polynomially fitted inverse
load duration function R(K) = D−1(t) (ENTSO-E, 2009, own analysis).
on this topic as mentioned above.
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4.4.2 Results I: The cost and variance efficient portfolio fuel mix
We start interpreting the results by first investigating the efficient technology mix under the two
extreme cases with A = 0 and A→∞.
In a first approximation, the merit order risk may be neglected to assess the solution case for
the efficient portfolio structure as discussed in Section 4.2.3. Assuming risk-neutrality (i.e. A = 0)
given the estimated technology parameterization (cf. Tab. 4.3), the cost efficient portfolio includes
both generation technologies according to Property 4.2.1, since it holds (cinv,1 − cinv,2)(c¯2 − c¯1) =
8411 ∈ (0; 8760). The purely cost efficient portfolio (i.e. A = 0) consists of a balanced mix of
both technologies with about 48% CCGT and 52% hard coal capacity (Fig. 4.7). It can be
seen that the cost efficient technology mix both under the random walk and the mean-reversion
assumption is fairly well approximated by the calculation with neglected merit order risk. The
absolute discrepancy between the calculations with and without merit order risk is marginal.
From a pure risk perspective, a comparison of the unconditional variance of operating costs
shows the superiority of coal compared to the CCGT technology. Neglecting the merit order risk
and applying Property 4.2.2, it can bee seen that the variance efficient portfolio will only contain
coal technologies since σ21 − σ12 = 84.447 − 116.561 < 0. The picture does not change by taking
into account the merit order risk: Under the random walk assumption, the conditional variance
of the CCGT technology exceeds the conditional variance of the coal technology in both merit
order states. Put differently, the coal technology dominates the CCGT technology with respect to
the scenario variance. Hence, diversification is not efficient. As expected, the sufficient condition
(4.42) for variance efficient portfolios including both technologies as formulated in Property 4.2.2
is not satisfied.
Cost efficient portfolio Variance efficient portfolio
Capacity Kccgt
48.07%48.42%
100
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50
100
50 100 00% 100 00% 100 00%
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Fig. 4.7: Capacity structure of purely cost and variance efficient generation portfolios consisting of new CCGT and
hard coal technologies under the random walk and mean reversion hypothesis and for the approximating
calculation with neglected merit order risk.
4.4.3 Results II: Cost-risk efficient fuel mix under the random walk and the
mean reversion hypothesis
To assess the technology structure of cost-risk efficient portfolios, we compute efficient capacities
and total system costs of hard coal and CCGT technologies for levels of risk aversion in a range of
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A = [0, . . . , 10−9] under the two alternative assumption that differences in operating costs follow a
random walk or a mean reversion process.
Figure 4.8 presents the efficient capacity mix of CCGT and hard coal technologies under the
assumption that differences in operating costs follow a random walk. Correspondingly, Figure
4.9 depicts the efficient portfolio structure under the mean-reversion assumption. For reference
purposes, the hypothetical efficient portfolio structure without merit order risk is indicated by a
dashed line.
Despite the relatively high merit order risk under the random walk assumption, the share of
CCGT generation in the efficient portfolio is decreasing with increasing levels of risk aversion.
This is due to the specific risks of coal and CCGT technologies: The higher the risk aversion factor
A, the stronger is the impact of the variance in the objective function. With the risk contribution
of CCGT technologies being higher than that of coal technologies, the higher overall fiancial risk
in the case with merit order risk implies that the efficient portfolios contain higher shares of coal
generation compared to the calculations without merit order risk.
Under the random walk hypothesis, the share of coal generation in efficient generation portfolios
is much higher than under a mean-reverting difference time series of operating costs. This is due
to the fact that the higher probability of merit orders in the merit order results also in a higher
absolute portfolio risk (measured both by conditional and unconditional variances) than under the
mean-reversion assumption. Due to the relatively small merit order risk in the latter case, the
efficient portfolio structure under the mean-reversion assumption is fairly well approximated by a
model formulation with neglected merit order risks.
Remarkably, neither the efficient portfolios under the random walk nor under the mean reversion
hypothesis exhibit any overcapacities in the numerical example. This phenomenon will be analyzed
in detail in the following paragraph.
4.4.4 Results III: Overcapacities in efficient portfolios
In a world with deterministic peak demand and full information about plant availabilities, there
is no need to install more generation capacity than maximum demand as long as uncertainty of
generation costs does not lead to changes in the merit order.
The picture may change drastically given uncertainty in the merit order as already discussed
earlier in this paper: If there is a substantial risk that the CCGT plant may run as the base-load
plant in certain periods, then it may be economical to install a higher share of CCGT generation
capacity compared to the situation where CCGT is only expected to run as peak plant. Thereby,
the question whether to build more generation capacity than maximum demand depends highly
on the relation of capacity investment costs compared to the difference of operating costs: The
lower plant-specific investment costs, the more economical it becomes to build overcapacities.
Considering the extreme case with zero capacity investment costs, the cost-minimal generation
portfolio would include generation capacities of each technology at maximum demand, i.e. the
total installed capacity would be twice the maximum demand.
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Fig. 4.8: Capacity structure of efficient generation portfolios consisting of new CCGT and hard coal technologies
for varying risk aversion parameter, A, given that differences in operating costs follow a random walk.
The hypothetical efficient portfolio structure without merit order risk is shown by the dashed line.
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Fig. 4.9: Capacity structure of efficient generation portfolios consisting of new CCGT and hard coal technologies
for varying risk aversion parameter, A, given that differences in operating costs follow a mean-reversion
process. The hypothetical efficient portfolio structure without merit order risk is shown by the dashed
line.
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For the case with risk-neutrality (i.e. A = 0), a necessary parameter condition for plant over-
capacities has been formulated in Eqn. (4.33). For this case, the interdependency between total
excess capacity (measured by the system capacity ratio which equals total installed capacity di-
vided by maximal demand) and specific investment costs is shown in Figure 4.10 (left): While the
efficient portfolio does not include any overcapacity for the empirically estimated plant investment
costs (indicated by the red stack), the system capacity ratio increases up to 200% for decreas-
ing investment costs. Figure 4.10 (right) indicates at which parameter combination the necessary
condition for overcapacities, Eqn. (4.33), is satisfied.
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Fig. 4.10: System capacity ratio
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)
/D(0) for varying specific investment costs of coal and CCGT
technologies for the purely cost efficient portfolio, i.e. A = 0 (left). The red stack represents the efficient
capacity for the empirically derived annual investment costs. The graph on the right indicates, for which
parameter combinations the necessary condition for overcapacities discussed in Eqn. (4.33) is satisfied.
For the risk-extended portfolio problem, one could expect that the system capacity ratio would
increase the higher the levels of risk aversion. However, the opposite can be observed as shown
in Figure 4.11 assuming that operating costs follow a random walk: With increasing societal risk
aversion A, the installed overcapacity in efficient portfolios decreases. This is at first sight contra-
intuitive as one would expect that with increasing risk aversion, the limiting impact of investment
costs on the portfolio diversification decreases in favor of a more flexible plant portfolio. However,
the reason is again the specific risk of the coal and the CCGT technologies: The risk contribution
of the CCGT technology is higher compared to the coal technology. Thus, the higher the risk
aversion factor A, the greater is the impact of the variance in the objective function (4.5) and
hence the less attractive is diversification into the CCGT technology.
4.4.5 Results IV: Impact of increased risk of the coal technology
Based on the historically estimated operating costs parameters (cf. Tab. 4.3), the coal technology
is superior compared to the CCGT technology from a pure risk perspective (measured by variance
of operating costs). Yet, the variance of operating costs of the considered technologies is driven
by changes of the fuel and CO2 price levels and an increase of CO2 and coal price volatility seems
possible in the near to mid future. One reason are the ambitious EU emission reduction targets
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Fig. 4.11: System capacity ratio
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)
/D(0) for varying specific investment costs of coal and CCGT
technologies at risk aversion levels A = 5.0 · 10−11 (left), and A = 1.0 · 10−10 (right). Differences of
operating costs are assumed to follow a random walk. The red stack represents the efficient capacity for
the empirically derived annual investment costs.
and another is the increasing correlation of world market prices for coal with highly volatile oil
prices. This could improve the relative riskiness of the CCGT technology compared to coal. To
assess the impact of such a scenario, we assume the standard deviation of the coal operating
costs to be increased by 50%. As the mean operating costs are assumed to remain constant, the
variance increase implies also changed conditional distribution parameters for both technologies.
Furthermore, the (unconditional) variance of the difference time series decreases, resulting in a
slightly reduced likelihood for reversals in the merit order of 21.4%.
The resulting impact on the structure of the purely cost and the purely variance efficient portfolio
is depicted in Fig. 4.12: While the cost efficient portfolio structure remains widely unchanged, the
variance efficient portfolio includes now both technologies with a capacity share of about one third
coal and two third gas technology. Notably, there is again a significant discrepancy in the efficient
fuel mix based on the calculation with neglected merit order risk and the calculation with a merit
order risk under the random walk hypothesis. The calculation with the mean reversion hypothesis
again yields results close the case with neglected merit order risk.
We start by assuming again risk-neutrality (i.e. A = 0) to assess the benefit of overcapacities (cf.
Fig. 4.13, upper left): As in the previous section, building overcapacities becomes only efficient for
decreased levels of investment costs. Thereby, the required reduction of CCGT investment costs
is even higher compared to the previous section with the lower coal variance. This is plausible
keeping in mind the necessary condition for overcapacities discussed in Eqn. (4.33): Since the
higher coal variance implies a reduced merit order risk, P(s1), the CCGT investment costs must
even be smaller to satisfy the left part of condition (4.33).
With both technologies being included in the cost and in the variance efficient portfolio, it could
intuitively be expected that with increasing risk aversion building overcapacities becomes more
efficient. However, it can still be observed that with increasing societal risk aversion overcapacities
become less attractive (cf. Fig. 4.13). This at first sight surprising result is due to the fact that
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Fig. 4.12: Capacity structure (as a percentage of maximum demand D(0)) of purely cost and variance efficient
generation portfolios consisting of new CCGT and hard coal technologies under the random walk and
mean reversion hypothesis and for the approximating calculation with neglected merit order risk. The
standard deviation of the coal technology is increased by 50% compared to the empirically estimated
values from Tab. 4.3.
the variance term in the objective function is not only driven by the specific variance but also
by the expected energy produced by each technology which is subject to the second stage of the
optimization problem. To determine the expected value of the produced energy, we consider—as in
the classic peak load pricing theory—at the second stage of the optimization a technology dispatch
based on the merit order of generation costs: The technology with the lowest operating costs is used
as base load technology, the other to serve peak load demand. This cost-based—and not variance-
based—dispatch order influences the expected energy production for each technology. Installing
overcapacities in a plant portfolio can hence increase operating flexibility, but may lead to the
situation in which the expected mix of energy produced deviates from the variance optimum. Put
differently: The most flexible technology mix which would include overcapacities, does typically
not minimize the variance of operating costs.
4.5 Concluding remarks
This article analyzes efficient capacity allocation in electricity systems under uncertainty. Special
emphasis is put on the impact of the merit order risk due to long-term shifts in fuel prices. In
particular, technologies with operating costs characterized by little difference in mean, high variance
and imperfect correlation are affected by these changes in the merit order. The model approach
and the obtained insights are also relevant for investment decisions in other industries where
different technologies are to be selected to supply an (expected) demand pattern, such as e.g.
in transportation applications.
Our results show that risk in (variable) operating cost—measured by its variance—can heavily
affect efficient capacity allocation among different technologies. Thereby, two levers of impact can
be distinguished:
 Firstly, the cost risk affects the optimal capacity mix given a stable merit order of variable
production costs and a firm order of dispatch. However, the efficient technology mix deviates
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Fig. 4.13: System capacity ratio
(
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)
/D(0) for varying specific investment costs of coal and CCGT
technologies at risk aversion levels A = 0 (upper left), A = 5.0·10−11 (upper right), A = 1.0·10−10 (lower
left), and A = 1.0 · 10−9 (lower right). Differences of operating costs are assumed to follow a random
walk. The red stack represents the efficient capacity for the empirically derived annual investment costs.
The standard deviation of the coal technology is increased by 50% compared to the empirically estimated
values from Tab. 4.3.
from the purely mean-based optimum only under risk-averse social preferences.
 Secondly, fuel price fluctuations may result in reversals in the merit order which may sig-
nificantly influence the efficient technology mix. This risk is of particular importance if the
considered technologies are characterized by only small differences in their mean costs and
exhibit high, uncorrelated cost variances.
In a model application with CCGT and hard coal technologies in the German market envi-
ronment, we find that a cost efficient portfolio includes a balanced mix of both technologies. In
contrast, only coal is the risk efficient technology given the variance of operating costs based on
historical long-term estimates.
Thereby, the characteristic of the underlying difference time series in operating costs in the
considered technologies remains a crucial assumption of the model. Assuming random walk versus
mean reverting properties of the difference time series may result in significantly different likelihoods
for reversals in the merit order and therewith impacts massively the efficient technology mix. Given
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a mean reverting difference time series, the optimal portfolio structure deviates only marginally
from the efficient portfolio structure with neglected merit order risk.
With an increasing merit order risk, overcapacities exceeding maximum demand may become
economically favorable if investment costs are sufficiently low compared to the expected difference
in operating costs. Hence, under risk-neutral preferences with the sole objective to minimize
expected generation costs, an increasing merit order risk increases the degree of diversification in
efficient technology portfolios. However, our example shows that at current investment costs and
historically estimated cost variances, overcapacities are inefficient for CCGT and coal technology
portfolios.
The benefits of diversification may change in a risk-averse investment environment where the
total variance of operating costs is sought to be reduced: They are reduced if one technology
dominates the other(s) with respect to the specific cost risk induced by this technology. Then
increasing levels of risk aversion can even lead to efficient technology portfolios which are fully
non-diversified and consist of only one technology. In this case, there is also no economic benefit
from installing overcapacities—even if these are without additional costs. Hence, diversification of
the generation portfolio is—even under risk aversion—not beneficial per-se.
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Perfect competition vs. riskaverse agents: Technology
portfolio choice in electricity markets
5.1 Introduction
More than 10 years after the liberalization of electricity markets in Europe, there is a continuing
discussion among energy researchers and policy makers whether fully liberalized electricity markets
provide an adequate framework in which competition leads also to welfare optimal results (e.g.
Roques et al., 2008, Mu¨sgens, 2006, Bunn and Day, 2009). Following neoclassical economic theory,
the set of decisions by individual investors should also lead to a socially optimal capacity allocation
in efficient markets.1
In fact, there are several indications for insufficiencies observable on real electricity markets that
could lead to a suboptimal degree of fuel mix diversification from a welfare perspective:2 Thereby,
one potential conflict of interests between individual investors and social welfare is caused by
different valuation of market risks inherent to a generation portfolio with a particular fuel mix:
Given that all technology portfolios realize the same level of expected costs and profits, risk averse
plant investors on electricity markets will favor the plant portfolio with least variability in the
net cash flow (income minus operating costs). In contrast, the welfare optimal technology mix
would minimize the variability of total operating costs. This indicates that pricing mechanisms in
particular market settings do not allow an adequate risk transfer from investors to consumers so
1However, there are several important preconditions for this to hold: In addition to perfect competition (Pigou,
1932), complete financial spot and forward markets or perfect foresight, risk neutrality (or risk-sharing opportu-
nities), and convex production possibilities, which imply non-increasing returns to scale, are required to obtain
a match of investor and wealth optimum (e.g. Arrow and Debreu, 1954, Debreu, 1959).
2Imperfect competition on electricity markets has drawn great attention in academic literature. Market imperfec-
tions are usually analyzed using game theory and price equilibrium models (Bolle, 1992, Green and Newbery,
1992, Hobbs et al., 2000, Hobbs, 2001, Kleindorfer et al., 2001, Moitre, 2002). Several models have been discussed
in literature, including Cournot and Bertrand models (Joskow and Tirole, 2007, Ellersdorfer, 2005) and supply
function models (Day et al., 2002).
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that investor incentives lead to a market equilibrium which is also optimal from a social wealth
point of view.
This article aims to investigate impact of risk aversion on the choice of technology portfolios
on liberalized electricity markets. To our knowledge, a related study has only been published by
Meunier (2012): The author proposes a simple equilibrium model taking into account correlation
between technology costs and their implication on the firms’ revenues. Yet specific operating times
of the different technologies are neglected, implying an unrealistic derivation of the electricity
market price. Instead, we use an equilibrium model based on the peak-load pricing concept to
analyze the influence of risk aversion of the electricity market agents on the market outcome.
5.1.1 Market imperfections and risk-averse agents
Risk averse investor behavior represents one market imperfection which could lead to deviations
from a welfare optimal investment policy. The fact that many companies commit significant re-
sources to corporate risk management and portfolio management indicates the existence of risk-
averse behavior at the company level although this practice raises doubts in view of neoclassical
microeconomic theory. Following the validity of the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin,
1966) and the APT (Ross, 1976), investors on efficient capital markets value their investment deci-
sions solely based on the ratio of expected return and systematic risk of an investment, whereas the
unsystematic (i.e. firm-specific) risk is eliminated by diversification in other financial investments.
In such a world, corporate risk management has to be questioned as a whole because its impact
on the firm’s risk position would be irrelevant for the investors.
While the applicability of CAPM and APT with their idealistic assumptions on market per-
fection became increasingly questioned in view of more and more empirically observed market
anomalies in the last decades, valuation of corporate risk management in view of the firm’s value
has attracted substantial interest in economic literature. The rationale behind different corporate
risk management strategies such as corporate portfolio management including R&D project or
technology portfolios optimization hedging, has been intensively investigated and is summarized
e.g. in Bartram (2000) and Gossy (2008). Three main lines of argumentation can be identified
that may justify corporate risk management and risk averse behavior at the company level:
Firstly, agency-theory explains risk-averse management behavior through personal interests of
the management. The management’s wealth including future compensation is often little diversi-
fied, so that in-company diversification is in the management’s interest (Stulz, 1984, Smith and
Stulz, 1985). Furthermore, volatility reducing risk management activities allow an exacter cor-
porate planning and protect from negative outliers which makes it easier for the management to
deliver the promised performance and avoid situations which could be interpreted by the equity
holders as managerial incompetence.
Secondly, the costs of financial distress have been intensively discussed as a reason why firms
hedge their risk exposure (see e.g. Stulz, 1996, Bartram, 2000): If firms cannot meet their payment
obligations and enter the stage of insolvency, direct costs arise, e.g. for legal expenses, as well
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as indirect costs as e.g. the loss of tax shields. But even before this point, financial distress can
induce high costs due to e.g. higher financing costs as a result of a lower credit rating. The thread
of bankruptcy can furthermore yield a loss of reputation in view of employees and (potential)
customers, resulting in higher costs for human resources and customer discounts. If shareholders
see bankruptcy and financial distress as a real risk, corporate risk management can therefore
increase the firm’s value by reducing this risk.
Thirdly, effective capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs (especially
with not publicly listed companies such as many utilities) and taxes hinder the equity holders’ from
sufficient diversification in their financial portfolios. Instead, some investors may prefer adequate
risk management on the company level to reduce their risk exposure. Especially equity holders
in the electricity industry (to a high degree public entities) often have a strategic and long-term
interest in their investments which reduces the possibilities for diversification due to limited funds.
5.1.2 Mean-Variance optimization of corporate portfolios
Although mean-variance optimization of corporate portfolios has been variously discussed in cor-
porate finance literature, there is only one work transferring this approach to electricity generation
portfolios of a utility company: Roques et al. (2008) propose an optimization framework for gene-
ration portfolios from an investor perspective.
However, the applicability of the proposed model is limited to base load generation portfolios,
because the authors base their model on the assumption of a stable electricity price distribution
derived from historical data. The consequence is a net present value (NPV) distribution which
neglects the fact that the portfolio composition will also affect electricity prices and therewith
technology-specific full load hours in the long run. If however rational investors would apply Mean-
Variance Portfolio (MVP) theory market-wide, the resulting optimal technology mix will clearly
influence the shape of the price duration curve and therewith specific NPVs of the considered
generation technologies. By limiting the model to base load generation portfolios, Roques et al.
(2008) circumvent the problem of modeling technology-specific adjustments of full load hours and
implications on the electricity price distribution. While this limitation avoids inconsistencies in the
modeling results, it however prevents to derive conclusions about the optimal generation portfolio
for an electricity market as a whole and about the long-term market equilibrium which can have
– even for base load portfolios – a very different electricity price distribution due to changes in
the generation portfolio.3 Hence, a solid long-term modeling framework should therefore be based
on the integrated modeling of the long-term market optimum taking into account operating and
investment costs instead of unit costs.
3One central question remaining open concerns the market implications if all investors apply the proposed form of
portfolio optimization.
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5.1.3 Structure of this article
This article is structured as follows: Section 5.2 describes the general economic assumptions for the
capital and the electricity markets as the basics for the following considerations. In section 5.3, we
analyze the generation portfolio structure in the long-run equilibrium under perfect competition.
Thereafter, we reformulate in section 5.4 the problem as a decentralized market model with risk-
averse agents. The resulting market equilibria are compared in a numerical example in section
5.5.
5.2 General market assumptions
To study optimal investment equilibria in electricity generation portfolios, we consider a stylized
economy with perfect competitive4 electricity and capital markets. All other parts of the economy
may fairly be represented through the capital market. Investors decide on the amount of money
they want to invest in each market and on the allocation of capital to the different available assets
within each market. The capital market consists of a risk-free security with interest rate r0 and a
complete set of risky assets represented through the market portfolio with rate of return rm. The
yield of all assets and therewith the return of the market portfolio are random variables, and all
investors have full information and the same perception of its distribution.
In addition to the security market, the considered economy provides opportunity to invest in
generation assets on the electricity market. We assume that investment and production follows a
two stage process:
At the first stage, the suppliers choose their generation capacities from a set of different technolo-
gies U without knowledge of the real production costs but in full awareness of their distribution
parameters. Each technology u ∈ U with capacity Ku is assumed to be fully flexible and completely
described through its deterministic specific investment costs cinv,u and its normally distributed op-
erating costs c˜op,u with mean c¯op,u and standard deviation σu.
5 All technologies are numbered in
an increasing order of expected operating costs with u = 1 indicating the base load technology
with the least operating costs. We assume a deterministic order of operating costs and exclude
the risk of reversals in the merit order due to fuel price fluctuations, i.e. cop,u < cop,u+1 for all
realizations.6
Different ways to model consumers’ willingness-to-pay have been discussed in literature (see e.g.
Weber, 2005). One simple concept to cope with the idea is the introduction of an additional back-
stop technology of infinite capacity which can also be interpreted as a repurchase of demand, e.g.
by large industrial consumers or as a price-cap as it can be found in some electricity market designs.
4Perfect competition includes in particular atomistic and profit maximizing behavior of all market participants,
perfect information and precludes personal or corporate taxes, bankruptcy penalties, fees and other types of
transaction costs.
5This idealization is justifiable for most fossil thermal plants, which represent by far the biggest share of the
European generation mix.
6See Sunderko¨tter and Weber (2011) for a discussion of mean-variance efficient generation portfolios given uncer-
tainty in the merit order.
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Fig. 5.1: As in the standard peak-load pricing model, the welfare optimal generation schedule can be equivalently
characterized by lower bounds of optimal operating times (tu), optimal capacities (Ku), and produced
energies (Qu) of the generation technologies.
In the following, we assume that operating costs of this technology cd are fix with investment cost
equal to zero.7
At the second stage, electricity is produced and traded on the wholesale market given the realized
cost levels within the period [0;T ] (e.g. a year). The system’s energy demand is assumed to be
deterministic and inelastic, given in form of the load duration curve D : [0;T ] → R+, t 7→ D(t).
Then, the efficient production schedule can be determined as in the standard peak-load pricing
problem: Obviously from Figure 5.1, the upper bound of the optimal operating time of technology
1 equals t0 = T while the lower bound of the optimal operating time of the backstop technology
equals td = 0. In fact, the lower bound of the efficient operating time of technology u is given
through D(tu) = K
c
u, where K
c
u =
∑u
i=1Ki denotes the cumulative capacity (with K
c
0 := 0).
The cumulated energy in period [0, T ] by technologies 1, . . . , u is denoted by Qcu, whereas the
energy Qu generated by each technology u is defined as visualized in Figure 5.1 by
Qcu(K
c
u) =
∫ Kcu
0
R(κ)dκ; Qu(K
c
u−1,K
c
u) = Q
c
u(Ku)−Qu − 1c(Ku−1) =
∫ Kcu
Kcu−1
R(κ)dκ, (5.1)
By setting Kcd = D(0) it is assured that the total energy produced (including demand reduction
from the backstop technology) does exactly match maximal demand as a residual, i.e. Qd =
QE −
∑
uQu, with QE denoting the total energy demand in period [0, T ].
Since Ku,K
c
u, and Qu, Q
c
u are invertible functions of tu, there is a unique mapping between ca-
pacities and operating times. By defining R(K) as the inverse of the monotone decreasing function
D(t), we may write tu = R(Ku). Consequently, tu, Ku, and K
c
u can be used interchangeably as
decision variables.
For a better traceability of the optimality conditions, we will limit our considerations in the
following to the case with two generation technologies (U ∈ {1, 2}) and a backstop technology
available for serving demand.
7The costs of the backstop technology, cd, can also be interpreted as the value of lost load.
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5.3 Market equilibrium under perfect competition
Among economists it is without controversy that optimal investment decisions of individual com-
panies can as well be considered as the result of an optimal central planning if the characteristics
of perfect competition are fulfilled.8 Thus, we consider in this section the investment problem
from the perspective of a representative, central planning agent with limited budget B > 0. Two
decisions have to be made: (a) The optimal capital allocation between the electricity market and
other industries, and (b) the technology structure of the electricity generation portfolio.
5.3.1 Formulation of the optimization problem
Since the assumed inelastic electricity demand implies an infinite consumer surplus, welfare max-
imization in the electricity market is equivalent to minimizing total electricity generation costs
including the value of lost load. Additionally, the alternative use of capital in the financial market
has to be considered in the welfare function. Thus, the total welfare function W takes the form
W = B + r0X0 + r˜mXm −
∑
u∈U
(cinv,u ·Ku + c˜op,uQu)− cdQd, (5.2)
with X0 denoting the capital invested at risk-free return r0 in the risk-free security and Xm
the capital invested at risky return r˜m in the financial market portfolio. As a restriction, total
investment in the capital market and in the electricity market must not exceed the budgeting limit
B, i.e.
B ≥ X0 +Xm +
∑
u∈U
cinv,uKu (5.3)
From an economic perspective, it is clear that (5.3) will always be fulfilled with equality, since
maximal profit requires that all capital is invested either in the capital market or in the electricity
market.
To determine the optimal investment in the market equilibrium given the uncertainty of market
return and operating costs, expected utility maximization can be applied as one of the most
generic decision principles under uncertainty.9 Let societal utility be represented by an exponential
utility function of the form U(W ) = − 1A exp(−AW ) with risk aversion parameter A with normally
distributed profits W . It has been shown by Schneeweiss (1965) that in this case the exponential
utility function induces a unique preference function of the form
Ψ = E[W ]− 1
2
AVar[W ] (5.4)
Maximization of this preference function is consistent with the decision principle of expected utility
maximization. Based on these pre-considerations, the complete welfare optimization problem can
8This proposition, also known as the first theorem of welfare economics, is described in many economic textbooks
and goes back to the Adam Smith’s postulations of the ”‘invisible hand”’. Among others, Pigou (1932), chapter
II, contributed fundamentally to a precise formulation of this theorem and its prerequisites. One of the first
mathematical proofs was published by Lange (1942).
9This decision criterion is sometimes also referred to as the Bernoulli principle.
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be formulated as:
max
X0,Xm,Ku
E[W ]− 1
2
AVar[W ] (5.5)
with W = B + r0X0 + r˜mXm −
∑
u∈U
(cinv,uKu + c˜op,uQu)− cdQd (5.6)
s.t. B ≥ X0 +Xm +
∑
u∈U
cinv,uKu, (5.7)
Xm ≥ 0, X0 ≥ 0, Ku ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ U. (5.8)
5.3.2 Solving the optimization problem
Problem (5.5)-(5.8) can be solved under weak assumptions as shown in Sunderko¨tter and Weber
(2012) for the n-technology case: Given cinv,u > cinv,u+1 the problem is strictly concave and thus
has a unique solution, if and only if the covariance matrix of the market return and the technologies’
operating costs is positive definite. However, an explicit formulation of the solution will in general
not be possible.
In a first general solution approach, we will focus on inner solutions which include investments
in both technologies and the market portfolio, i.e. K1,K2, Xm > 0.
10
Assuming that the total investment in the economy is sufficiently large compared to the electricity
market, i.e. Xm 
∑
u cinv,uKu and Xm 
∑
uQu, we can state the following approximation for
the optimality conditions:
Proposition 5.3.1. [Market equilibrium under perfect competition] Let be a stylized economy and
as defined in Section 5.2 and an electricity market with two generation technologies. Furthermore,
a strictly positive societal risk aversion, i.e. A > 0 is assumed. If an interior solution to problem
(5.5)-(5.8) exists with K1,K2, Xm > 0, and under the assumption that Xm 
∑
u cinv,uKu and
Xm 
∑
uQu, the optimal investments into the market portfolio and the risk-free security are
given by
Xm =
1
A
r¯m − r0
σ2m
, (5.9)
X0 = B −Xm −
∑
u∈U
cinv,uKu. (5.10)
The optimal capacity structure within the generation portfolio is characterized by the following
optimality conditions, which are only dependent on the decision variables K1,K2 (or equivalently
on t1(K1), t2(K1,K2), and Q1(K1), Q2(K1,K2)):
(1 + r0) (cinv,1 − cinv,2)
t1
= c¯op,2 − c¯op,1 + r¯m − r0
σ2m
(σ1m − σ2m), (5.11)
(1 + r0)cinv,2
t2
= cd − c¯op,2 + r¯m − r0
σ2m
σ2m. (5.12)
10For the existence of corner solutions with only one technology in the efficient portfolio c.f. Sunderko¨tter and
Weber (2012).
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For the proof and the detailed optimality conditions without the assumptionsXm 
∑
u cinv,uKu
cf. C.2.1. Thus risk aversion affects the welfare-optimal solution only through the correlations σ1,m
and σ2,m of the fuel prices with the market returns. Positive correlations decrease the correspond-
ing expected costs, since then the electricity generation costs in the welfare term act as a hedge to
the financial market returns.
5.4 Market equilibrium with risk-averse agents
In the last section, we discussed the structure of the welfare optimal generation portfolio from
a central planning perspective which equals the market equilibrium under perfect competition.
However, risk-aversion of the electricity market agents may impact the market equilibrium sub-
stantially. Therefore, we now consider a stylized economy consisting of households, an imperfect
electricity market, and a perfect financial market.
Definition 5.4.1 (Electricity market agents). The electricity market is represented by profit max-
imizing agents with the following key properties:
1. Profit share: Each agent j ∈ J (one could simplifyingly say, the managers) receives a
certain fraction αj ∈ (0, 1) of the profit of his firm.
2. Risk aversion: The agents are risk-averse. The preferences of agent j ∈ J are represented
by a mean-variance preference functional with an absolute risk aversion Aj.
3. Diversification: The agents diversify their investments into a set of different electricity
generation technologies from the index set U = 1, ..., u.
4. Homogeneity: All agents j ∈ J have homogeneous risk aversion, receive identical profit
fractions αj, and thus invest in the same technologies.
11
The optimization rationales of the market participants are characterized in the following.
5.4.1 Formulation of the individual optimization problems
Households can invest their capital up to a budgeting limit B in a risk-free security with interest
rate r0 or in the economy’s market portfolio with uncertain return r˜m which together may represent
a complete set of assets. The amount of capital invested by the households in the risk-free and risky
asset are denoted with X0, and Xm, respectively. In addition, households may invest an amount
of capital xel,j in a security dedicated to electricity generation companies j ∈ J at an uncertain
return rel,j . Thereby, the gross security return of company j is defined as the sum of profits Πu,j
from all generation technologies in the portfolio per capital invested, i.e.
rel,j(ζ˜) :=
∑
u Πu,j
xel,j
. (5.13)
11We will first formulating the market equilibrium without the assumption of homogeneous agents and later come
back to this assumption.
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Thus, companies have to fully pay out total profits in each period without any internal accumulation
of funds.
Objective of the households is to optimally allocate funds into the capital and into the electricity
market so that risk-adjusted expected returns minus expected electricity costs are maximized.
Being αj ∈ (0, 1) the share of profit paid to the managers (e.g. executive bonuses), then the profit
share paid to the shareholders is given by (1 − αj) · rel,j · xel,j . The electricity costs Cel for the
households consist of the electricity market price pel(t, ζ˜) for the amount of consumed electricity
plus the incurred utility losses at costs cd through undelivered load which can be measured by the
value of lost load, i.e.
Cel =
∫ T
0
pel(t, ζ˜)D(t)dt−
∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ˜)− cd)yd(t)dt (5.14)
Assuming again exponential utilities with constant absolute risk aversion Ah, the households’
optimization problem can be written as:
max
X0,Xm,xel,j,u,yd
E[Vh]− Ah
2
Var[Vh] (5.15)
with Vh := r0X0 + r˜mXm +
∑
j∈J
(1− αj)rel,j(ζ˜)xel,j − Cel(ζ˜) (5.16)
s.t. B ≥ Xm +X0 +
∑
j∈J
xel,j , (5.17)
Xm ≥ 0, X0 ≥ 0, xel,j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J. (5.18)
Here, the random vector ζ˜ := (c˜op,1, c˜op,2, r˜m) denotes the vector of exogenous risk factors defined
on the probability space (Ω,A(R),P) with ζ : Ω 7→ R3.
Each electricity market agent seeks to maximize the expected profit Πel,j adjusted by its vari-
ance. Thereby the profit Πel,j is given by the contribution margin minus investment costs of each
generation asset reduced by the interest payable to the households (1−αj) · rel,j ·xel,j . Therewith,
the companies’ optimization problem can be stated as
max
ku,j ,yu,j(t,ζ˜)
E[Πel,j(ζ˜)]− Aj
2
Var[Πel,j(ζ)] (5.19)
with Πel,j(ζ˜) :=
∑
u
Πu,j(ζ˜)− (1− αj)rel,j(ζ˜)xel,j ; (5.20)
Πu,j(ζ˜) :=
∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,u)yu,j(t, ζ˜)dt− cinv,uku,j (5.21)
s.t. yu,j(t, ζ˜) ≤ ku,j ∀j ∈ J, ∀t, ∀ζ, (5.22)∑
u
cinv,uku,j ≤ xel,j ∀j ∈ J (5.23)
Thereby, the capacity constraint (5.22) ensures that at every point in time the electricity produced
by plant (u, j) does not exceed its capacity. The budget constraint (5.23) ensures that the total
investment costs for the capacity installed by company j does not exceed its available funds xel,j .
Ex post, the remaining profit of each electricity generation company equals the managerial profit
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share from all payoffs of the generation units due to Eqn. (5.13), i.e.
Πel,j(ζ˜) = αj
∑
u
Πu,j . (5.24)
In addition, the supply constraint (5.25) has to be satisfied as a market clearing condition: Total
production must meet or exceed system demand less the load of the backstop technology at any
point in time. It will exactly meet demand minus the load of the backstop technology unless the
electricity price is zero.∑
u∈U
∑
j∈Ju
yu,j(t, ζ˜) ≥ D(t)− yd(t, ζ˜) ⊥ pel(t, ζ˜) ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ ζ˜ (5.25)
To determine the market equilibrium, the intertwined optimization problems of the households
and the generation companies can be split up into two stages as discussed in Section 5.2. Thereby,
we will first determine the technology dispatching and electricity price formation at the second
stage (with given generation capacities) before we turn back to the investment decision of generation
companies and households at the first stage of the model. At the first stage all investment decisions
are made without knowledge of the values of ζ˜, i.e. the decision variables X0, Xm, xel,j,u, u ∈ Uj , j ∈
J for the households and ku,j , u ∈ Uj , j ∈ J for the electricity market agents, respectively, are set.
At the second stage these values are fix and no longer decision variables. The realization of ζ˜ is
now revealed and decisions are made with respect to yu,j(t, ζ˜), and yd(t, ζ˜).
5.4.2 Second stage of the market equilibrium: Technology dispatch and
electricity price formation
In a perfectly competitive power market the spot price will always reflect short term marginal
costs of the last producing unit as long as there is sufficient power generation capacity to meet
demand. In situations when demand comes close to available capacity the end-users’ willingness to
pay for electricity (value of lost load) determines the price. During these periods of peak demand
the resulting scarcity rent would pay off the investment cost of peak load units, and also contribute
to cover the fix costs for all other plants. This intuitive result can be easily derived from the
equilibrium model as formulated above (see C.2.2 for a formal proof).
Proposition 5.4.1. Let be a stylized economy as defined in Section 5.2. Then, the wholesale
electricity price is given by the function:
pel(t, ζ˜) =

c˜op,1, if t > D
−1(K1)
c˜op,2, if D
−1(K1) ≥ t > D−1(K2 +K1)
cd, if D
−1(K2 +K1) ≥ t
(5.26)
Note that this proposition holds both for the case of risk-neutral and risk-averse electricity market
agents, as it is solely derived at the second stage of the investment problem, where uncertainty has
been resolved. As a consequence, the electricity price formation can be characterized as shown in
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Dmax
D(t)
T0
p(t)
T0
K2
K1
t1t2
Qd
cd
cop,2
cop,1
lost load
t1t2
Q23
Q13 Q12
Q22
Q11
Fig. 5.2: Load duration curve D(t) (left) and the price duration curve p(t) (right) in the analysis period [0, T ].
Figure 5.2 for the two-technology case: Given a firm order of variable costs with cop,1 < cop,2 < cd it
can be concluded that the load D(t) is solely served by the base load technology 1 at a market price
of pel(t, ζ˜) = cop,1 at any time when demand is smaller than its installed capacity K1 =
∑
j k1,j .
With D(t) given in a decreasing order as load duration curve, this phase can be characterized
by the time segment between t1 and T . When demand exceeds capacity K1 but is still below
K1 +K2, technology 2 is dispatched to serve all additional demand at price pel(t) = cop,2. In this
time segment during t2 and t1, the base technology earns an operational margin of cop,2 − cop,1
per produced unit. Its production in this segment equals to the square Q12 =
∑
j q12,j between
t2 and t1 and with height K1.
12 Finally, when both technologies are operating at their capacity
limits, demand response comes in implying lost load and resulting in an electricity price equal to
the value of lost of load, i.e. pel(t) = cd. Both technologies, base and peak, earn contribution
margins of cd − cop,1 and cd − cop,2 per produced unit respectively with the produced amounts
Q13 =
∑
j q13,j and Q23 =
∑
j q23,j which are represented by the squares between 0 and t2 with
heights K1 =
∑
j k1,j and K2 =
∑
j k2,j . As a result, it holds for the cumulated production
quantities
q12,j = (t1 − t2)k1,j , q13,j = t2k1,j , q23,j = t2k2,j . (5.27)
We thereby have also shown (again, under the given assumptions, in particular for a stable
merit order) the simple intuitive result that production of each technology is not dependent at the
realization of the stochastic parameters ζ˜, i.e. the levels of t2 and t1 and consequently of Q12, Q13
and Q23 are deterministic functions of the choice of K1 and K2 at the first stage while the specific
contribution margins c˜op,2 − c˜op,1, cd − c˜op,1 and cd − c˜op,2 are stochastic at that point in time.
Based on these considerations at the second stage of the model, we can summarize the following
Proposition 5.4.2. The profits of the individual technologies Πu,j(ζ˜) as defined in (5.21) can be
12The subscription is to be read as follows: the first number is the producing technology, the second is the price-
setting technology.
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rewritten as:
Π1,j(ζ˜) = (t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1) + t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,1)k1,j (5.28)
Π2,j(ζ˜) = (t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,2)k2,j (5.29)
Proposition 5.4.3. The return rel,j(ζ˜) as defined in (5.13) can be specified as:
rel,j(ζ˜) =
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)k1,j + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(k1,j + k2,j)
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
− 1 (5.30)
5.4.3 First stage of the market equilibrium: Investment optimum
Under consideration of the market price formation and the efficient dispatch structure at the second
stage of the optimization problem, we can derive the equilibrium conditions for the optimization
problems of the households and of the electricity market agents. At first, the optimality condition
of the agents can be derived from the KKT conditions as shown in C.2.3:
Proposition 5.4.4. [Electricity market agents’ optimality condition] Let be a stylized economy as
defined in Section 5.2 and Definition 5.4.1.
Under the assumption of homogeneous market agents with identical risk aversion Aj ∀j ∈ J the
necessary optimality condition for an interior solution with k1, k2 > 0 for the optimization problem
of the electricity agents as stated in Eqn. (5.19)-(5.23) is given by:
t2
(
cd − c˜op,2
cinv,2
− Ajαj
Ncinv,2
(
t1K1(σ12 − σ22) + t2(K1 +K2)σ22
))
=t1
(
c˜op,2 − c˜op,1
cinv,1 − cinv,2 −
Ajαj
N(cinv,1 − cinv,2)
(
t1K1(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12) + t2(K1 +K2)(σ12 − σ22)
))
(5.31)
Under the assumption of homogeneity of the market agents, we can substitute the households’
decision variables xel,j by Xel = Nxel,j .
The optimality condition for the households’ optimization problem can then straightforwardly
be derived as shown in C.2.4. For a better traceability of the solution, we thereby assume that
the relative share of the returns which is paid to the managers is very small, i.e. we consider the
limiting case with αj → 0, yielding:
Proposition 5.4.5. [Households’ optimality condition] Let be a stylized economy as defined in
Section 5.2 and Definition 5.4.1. We assume a neglectable managerial profit share, i.e. 1−αj ≈ 1,
and total investments in the economy being sufficiently large compared to the electricity market, i.e.
Xm  Xel. Then, the necessary optimality condition for an interior solution with xel,j >, ∀j ∈ J
to the optimization problem of the households as stated in Eqn. (5.15)-(5.18), is given by:
t2(K1 +K2)(cd − c˜op,2) + t1K1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
= 1 + r0 +Xm
r¯m − r0
σ2m
· t1K1σm,1 − ((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)σm,2
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
(5.32)
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Remark that the left side of Eqn. (5.32) equals the electricity portfolio return rel,j as derived
in Proposition 5.4.3. Hence, the portfolio return equals the risk-free rate in case of Ah = 0 or
σm,1 = σm,2 = 0. In all other cases the term AhXm(·) on the right side of Eqn. (5.32) describes
the risk premium in the market.
We have now received two necessary conditions for an optimal solution of our equation system.
In total, this system originally contained the decision variables K1,K2 (equaling k1,j · N, k2,j · N
under common homogeneity assumptions) and yu,j(t, ζ˜) for the agents and Xm, Xel, X0, and yd
for the households. We have outlined that the optimal values for the yu,j(t, ζ˜) and yd are uniquely
defined by the optimal values for K∗1 and K
∗
2 at the second stage of the model.
The optimal investment into the non-electricity market, X∗m can be straigtforwardly derived from
the first order condition ∂Lh∂Xm of the household’s Lagrangian (cf. C.2.2). The obtained investment
X∗m equals the optimal investment in the welfare optimum as stated in Eqn. (5.9). The relation
to the value of X0 is given by the budget restriction (5.17) so that the optimal investment into the
risk-free security is given as in the welfare optimum in Eqn (5.10). Therewith, we have solved the
combined optimization problem of electricity market companies and households:
Corollary 5.4.1. [Market equlibrium] The long-term investment equilibrium with electricity mar-
ket agents j ∈ J with homogeneous risk aversion Aj and households with risk-aversion Ah and
decision variables X0, Xm, t1, t2 is given by the equation system (5.9), (5.10), (5.31) and (5.32) if
an inner solution exists.
Although an explicit solution of the equation system cannot be provided in general, it can be
seen that the first order optimality conditions deviate from those of the welfare optimum discussed
previously (cf. Eqs. (5.11)-(5.12)). We will further assess the deviations between welfare optimum
and long-term market equilibrium in the following numerical example.
5.5 A numerical example
To illustrate the results, the proposed model is calibrated to the German electricity market using
historical market data. The numbers thereby serve primarily as an illustration whereas it is not
intended to derive a complete picture on the efficient power generation fuel mix in Germany. For
the example, typical CCGT (peak) and hard coal (base) technologies are considered being available
for serving demand.
5.5.1 Model calibration and parameter estimation
Market parameters
The proposed model requires asumptions on mean and standard deviation of the market portfolio
and on the risk-free rate of return. Dimson et al. (2006) have analyzed historical equity returns and
equity premiums for different countries over the period 1900–2005. The authors report a global
average equity risk premium of 5.15% p.a. (relative to bonds) at a standard deviation of 14.96%.
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Given recent developments of German bond interest rates, we assume a risk-free rate of r0 = 2%,
yielding an expected market portfolio return of r¯m = 7.2%.
Generation technologies and value of lost load
Economic and technical key parameters of the coal and CCGT plant technologies are based on
Konstantin (2009) as depicted in Table 5.1. We exogeneously assume costs of capital of the elctricity
firms being 7.2%. This implies an investment cost annuity of 179.9 e/kW for the coal technology,
and 78.442e/kW for the CCGT technology, respectively.
Total operating costs are based on fuel, CO2 emission, and variable operating and maintenance
costs. Thereby, long-term time series of monthly coal and natural gas import prices 1970–2010
are used based on the price indices provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (StaBu,
2010) and absolute data of the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA,
2010) to estimate variance and covariance parameters. The price data reflect the average cross-
border price converted to e/MWht for all contracted deliveries in the respective month. Starting
with the beginning of the European Union Emission Trading System in 2005, total fuel prices are
computed including the costs of CO2 emission allowances (EUA) based on front year price data
from ECX (2010). EUAs are modeled to be purchased at market conditions (full auctioning) as it
has been put in place by the EU for ETS Phase III starting in 2013. The mean operating costs
are estimated from the same data set over the short-term period 2006–2008. This combination of
estimation periods is most suitable in our view since it allows appropriate long-term estimates for
variance and covariance while it takes into account recent shifts in the means of operating costs.
The estimated covariance of the operating cost levels of each technology with the market return
are very small. Since there is also no theoretical evidence for a linear dependency between the
returns and the cost levels, these parameters are set to zero.
Empirical studies on the value of lost load vary by country, by customer segment, and according
the applied research methodology. Following Gilmore et al. (2010) for the U.S., typical values are
ranging between 2$/kWh and 16$/kWh for the U.S. market. Reflecting these findings, we assume
a value of lost load of 5000e/MWhe.
Load duration curve
The estimation of a load duration function is based on 2006–2008 load data for Germany provided
in an hourly resolution by ENTSO-E (2009). For comparability reasons, we adjust the data sets
for the general increase in energy consumption by 1.02% in 2007 and 0.4% in 2008, respectively.
A reference load duration curve is then fitted as a polynomial function to the hourly means of the
historical data using OLS regression. The resulting maximum system load is D(0) = 78377 MW.
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Tab. 5.1: Key parameters new conventional coal and CCGT technologies (source: Konstantin, 2009, Sunderko¨tter,
2011, BAFA, 2010, StaBu, 2010, ECX, 2010, own analysis).
Parameter Unit Base Peak
Total net investment costs e/KW 1419 608
Technical lifetime a 45 30
Fixed O&M, overhead e/KW a 36.1 14.0
Annualized investment costs cinv,u e/KW a 179.9 78.4
Variable O&M, transport e/KWhe 2.9 5.5
Thermal efficiency MWhe/MWht 0.46 0.56
Carbon emission rate tCO2/MWht 0.34 0.20
Mean operating costs c¯u e/KWhe 37.3 56.8
Variance of operating costs σu e/KWhe 84.5 195.6
Covariance of operating costs σ12 116.6 116.6
Covariance of operating costs σmi 0.0 0.0
Value of lost load cd e/KWhe 5000.0
Risk aversion parameters
We first determine the societal risk aversion coefficient Ah. For given Xm, it can be seen from the
Lagrangian of the households’ optimization problem and the corresponding first order conditions13
AhXm =
rm − r0
σ2m
. (5.33)
Thereby Xm can be estimated from total gross asset investments in Germany which amounted to
469Be in 2010 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012). This yields a societal risk aversion in the order
of magnitude of Ah ≈ 5 · 10−12. Claiming a similar level of relative risk aversion for the market
agents on their ideosyncratic risk factor rel(ζ˜) requires
αjAj
Xel
N
=
rm − r0
σ2m
. (5.34)
Power generation asset investments account for approximately 1% of total investments in the
German economy14, i.e. approximately 5Be. Furthermore, we assume N = 50 power producers
and an agents’ profit share of αj = 0.001. Consequently, we obtain Aj ≈ Ah · 5 · 106.
13Eqn. (5.33) can be derived after some simple transformations from the first order conditions
∂Lh
∂Xm
= rm −AhXmσ2m − µh = 0,
∂Lh
∂X0
= r0 − µh = 0.
14Statistisches Bundesamt (2012) reports gross asset investments in the German elctricity industry of 13Bein 2010,
whereof estimated one third is attributable to generation assets.
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5.5.2 Determining the optimal technology mix
First, we determine the welfare optimal technology mix straightforwardly as discussed in Propo-
sition 5.3.1. The optimal values for t∗1, t
∗
2 (and subsequently K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 ) can be determined directly
from Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12) for the case with two generation technologies.
The mix of base and peak load technology in the decentralized market equilibrium case can be
determined from the optimality conditions (5.31) and (5.32) for varying firms’ risk aversion Aj .
Plotting these implicit functions of t1 and t2 allows to determine graphically the stationary points
for the households’ and the agents’ optimization problem as shown in Fig. 5.3 for different values of
Aj : For risk-neutral companies, the electricity market agents’ optimality condition is represented
by a linear function t1(t2) (Fig. 5.3, left). For increasing values of Aj , the intersection point of
both functions represents the market equilibrium (Fig. 5.3, middle). With Aj exceeding a certain
threshold, there is no stationary point for an inner solution within the domain of t1, t2 (Fig. 5.3,
right). In this case the market equilibrium is characterized by a corner solution.
Fig. 5.3: Optimality conditions (5.14) and (5.14) plotted as implicit functions of t1, t2. The parametrization is
αj = 0.001 for the managerial profit share, Ah = 5 · 10−12 for the societal risk aversion and firm’s risk
aversion Aj = 0 (left), Aj = Ah · 5 · 107 (middle), and Aj = Ah · 5 · 108 (right).
5.5.3 Results I: Impact of agents’ risk aversion
Based on the analytical considerations in the previous sections, we compare the efficient portfolio
structure under perfect competition with the market equilibrium under imperfect competition
given risk averse electricity market agents. The efficient portfolio structures for varying agent
risk aversion Aj and resulting technology returns are summarized in Fig. 5.4. Thereby, we first
assume that the operating costs of technologies 1 and 2 and the return of the market portfolio are
uncorrelated, i.e. σm1 = σm2 = 0.
In the market equilibrium under perfect competition and societal risk aversion, the equilibrium
investment portfolio consists 67.7% base-load technology, 31.9% peak-load technology and 0.5% loss
of load. Thereby, the results derived according to Proposition 5.3.1 match the portfolio structure
derived from Corrolary 5.4.1 for the case Aj = 0.
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Efficient portfolio for varying company risk aversion Aj
 = 0.001, A h = 5E-12
Efficient portfolio structure (% share of total capacity) Expected returns
Base tech 
capacity
Peak tech 
capacity
Loss 
of load
Ah = 5·10-12 67.7% 31.9% 0.5%
Base 
tech
Peak 
tech
2 0% 2 0%
Port-
folio
2 0%
Aj =  0 67.7% 31.9% 0.5% 2.0% 2.0%
. .
2.0%
.
A = A ·1·107 67 1% 32 4% 0 5%
Aj =  Ah·5·106 67.4% 32.1% 0.5%
Aj =  Ah·1·106 67.6% 31.9% 0.5%
2 4% 0 4%
2.1% 1.8%
1.2%2.2%
2 0%
2.0%
2.0%
0.0%
Aj =  Ah·1·108 60.5% 39.1% 0.4%
Aj =  Ah·5·107 64.7% 34.9% 0.4%
j   h . . . . .
4.2% -7.2%
8.3% -20.0%
.
2.0%
2.0%
8060 10040200
Aj =  Ah·5·108 99.6% 0.4% n.a. 2.0% 2.0%
Imperfect competition with risk-averse agents (Ah= 5·10-12)Perfect competition
Fig. 5.4: Efficient portfolio technology mix structures (as shares of installed capacity) in the long-term market
equilibrium under perfect competition (blue) and under imperfect competition with risk-averse firms
(green) for varying risk aversion of the electricity market agents Aj at a managerial profit share of
αj = 0.001 and societal risk aversion Ah = 5 · 10−12.
A risk averse investment behavior at the company level can induce structural changes in the
long-term equilibrium portfolio: Given a company risk aversion of Aj = Ah · 5 · 106, the portfolio
structure in the market equilibrium consists of 67.4% peak load and 32.1% base load technology.
The share of peak load technology steadily increases with higher levels of risk aversion. At risk
aversion levels of Aj ≥ Ah · 5 · 108, the market equilibrium is characterized by a corner solution
with solely peak load technology in the portfolio. The increasing investment in peak load can be
explained by the fact that it sets the price most of the time and is therefore less risky from the
investor’s point of view.
These results are consistent with the observations of Roques et al. (2008): “High degrees of
correlation between gas and electricity prices—as observed in most European markets—reduce gas
plant risks and make portfolios dominated by gas plant more attractive.” Our model shows that in
the long-term market equilibrium risk-averse firms would clearly invest into higher shares of peak
technologies—even more if the companies receive a substantial profit share.
The change in the technology structure in the decentralized market equilibrium leads also to
remarkable changes in the expected return E[ri,j ] for each generation technology.
15 The investment
returns for each technology in the welfare optimum equal the risk-free return given that we have
assumed so far no correlation between the fuel price risk and the market returns.
15Remember that the (non risk-adjusted) return on investment is obtained by the cumulated cash flow devided
by the investment costs, i.e. rel,j =
Πel,j∑
i∈j cinv,iKi
; r1,j =
(t1(cop,2−cop,1)+t2(cd−cop,2)−cinv,1)k1,j
cinv,1k1,j
; r2,j =
(t2(cd−cop,2)−cinv,2)k2,j
cinv,2k2,j
.
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Independently from Aj , the total expected returns E[rel,j ] of the electricity generation portfolio
remains constant and equal to the risk-free rate for the case σm1 = σm2 = 0. This becomes
obvious from the right side of optimality condition (5.32). The returns deviate with increasing
company risk aversion substantially between the two technologies. Since the loss of load remains
almost constant in all considered portfolios, the increasing company risk aversion and therewith
the increasing share of the less risky peak load technology lead to lower returns of investment for
the peak load and higher returns for the base load technology. Interestingly, the return of the peak
technology turns negative at risk aversion levels of Aj = Ah · 5 · 107. Nevertheless an increasing
share of the peak technology is beneficial from a company perspective as it helps decreasing the
variability of cash flow.
5.5.4 Results II: Impact of correlation between risk factors
In this section, we will relax the assumption σm1 = σm2 = 0 and investigate the impact of different
levels of correlation between operating costs and the return of the market portfolio. Market agents’
and societal risk aversion are kept constant with Aj = Ah ·5 ·106 and Ah = 5 ·10−12 at a managerial
profit share of αj = 0.001. For the purpose we use definition of the correlation coefficient
ρm,u :=
σm,u
σuσm
, u ∈ {1; 2} (5.35)
As shown in Fig. 5.5, the capacity share of a generation technology in the long-term equilibrium
portfolio increases with increasing levels of correlation between operating costs of the respective
technology and the market portfolio return. This holds both for the market equilibrium under
perfect competition and under imperfect competition given risk averse market agents. However,
risk-averse behavior of electricity market agents diminishes the degree of diversification compared
to the case with perfect competition. The assumed degree of correlation has significant impact at
the expected portfolio returns—even on the portfolio level: While the overall expected portfolio
return turns negative in the equilibrium portfolios for ρm,1 = 0.7 and ρm,2 = 0, we obtain a clearly
higher expected portfolio return for the inverse case ρm,1 = 0 and ρm,2 = 0.7.
5.6 Conclusion
This article compares optimal technology portfolio choices under market imperfections. Taking
investment decisions on electricity markets as an example, we first propose a partial equilibrium
model to determine the optimal portfolio consisting of two generation technologies with different
cost and risk characteristics under the assumption of perfect competition. The resulting portfolio
matches the welfare optimal technology mix, i.e. a generation portfolio minimizing the total risk-
adjusted costs of households over consumption and investments. Efficient generation portfolios are
derived from exogenous factors such as demand, risk aversions of the market participants, costs and
available budget on the basis of classic mean-variance-preference calculus and peak load pricing
theory. This immediately implies a distribution of prices with respective consumer and investor
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Efficient portfolio for varying company correlation levels
 = 0.001, A h = 5E-12, A j = A h * 5* 1E6
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Fig. 5.5: Efficient portfolio technology mix (as shares of installed capacity) in the long-term market equilibrium
under perfect competition (blue) and under imperfect competition with risk-averse firms (green) for vary-
ing levels of correlation between generation costs and market return, ρm,1, ρm,2. The risk aversion of the
market agents is Aj = Ah · 5 · 106 at a managerial profit share of αj = 0.001 and societal risk aversion
Ah = 5 · 10−12.
.
surpluses. In a second step, the model is extended by introducing electricity market agents (i.e.
companies) and market imperfections based on agency-theoretic considerations. By considering
that market agents receive a certain profit share and are risk-averse, we focus on two—in our view
crucial—imperfections which may be caused by lacking transparency in investment decisions.
In case of risk averse agents receiving a profit share, the long-term investment equilibrium can
substantially deviate from the welfare efficient portfolio mix. This implies that the risk-preferred
technology from a societal perspective (i.e. minimizing total cost risks) deviates from the risk-
preferred technology from a company perspective (i.e. minimizing total cost and revenue risks).
For a better traceability of the results, we have conceded a couple of strong simplifications in
the model. While these may open the need for further research, we are convinced that they do not
bias our principal findings in a substantial way. Many of these simplifications refer to the design
of the underlying peak-load pricing model and have been considered before by other authors: We
consider only two technologies but most arguments can easily be transferred to the n-technology
case (cf. Sunderko¨tter and Weber, 2012). In addition, we assume a deterministic merit order and
exclude the possibility of a fuel switch in our calculations. Sunderko¨tter and Weber (2011) discuss
this topic in detail and show that a fuel switch risk requires generation technologies with little
difference in the mean operating costs. Furthermore, one may criticize that the assumption of a
constant non-stochastic backstop technology is a too simple representation. Including stochastic
shocks or a description of the backstop price as an increasing function of load may be suitable
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for making the model more realistic at this point. However, we expect that implementing these
extensions would improve the quality of the numerical estimates but not lead to structural changes
of key results of this article.
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Fuel mix characteristics and expected stock returns of
European power companies
6.1 Introduction
Valuation of power generation assets under uncertainty represents one of the core issues for in-
dividuals and companies investing in power plants on liberalized electricity markets. Thereby, a
thorough analysis of risk and return is particularly important due to three reasons: Firstly, new-
build plants are capital intensive and require—depending on size and selected technology—up to
billions of euros. Secondly, plants typically have long life cycles of 30 to 50 years resulting in long
periods of tied-up capital. Thirdly, investors face cost-, price-, and volume-risks which directly
impact the return on investment on liberalized markets.
Following Leahy and Whited (1996), one fundamental dimension to classify investment theories
under uncertainty is the scope of considered assets. Thereby, it can be distinguished between
theories that look at a firm or investor in isolation and capture the risk of some aspect of the
firm’s environment in total and theories that look at the firm or investor in relation to other
market participants and emphasize the covariance in the returns of different investments. While
in the first case the absolute value of a risk measure matters, uncertainty is only relevant in the
second case as far it affects covariances with respect to some market measures. As the most
prominent representative of the first class of models, mean-variance portfolio optimization based
on the work of Markowitz (1952) applies variance of return as the relevant risk measure to derive
an efficient frontier of asset combinations. Thereby, it is not distinguished between systematic
and unsystematic asset fluctuations. In contrast, the CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin,
1966) and other market models rely on the assumption that capital market investors will only
value the systematic risk component of assets since firm-specific (i.e. unsystematic) risks can be
eliminated through diversification and are thus irrelevant. Despite some ongoing controversy on the
empirical validity of the CAPM, both approaches are widely used in academia and practice for asset
pricing application and managerial decision support, although the models differ fundamentally in
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the treatment of unsystematic risk.
Investment decisions in the electricity industry bear the complexity that electricity can hardly
be stored on a large-scale and thus needs to be instantly generated to serve demand. Taking into
account this particularity, different authors have proposed optimization models for decision support
tailored to long-term investment and portfolio management decisions on competitive electricity
markets.
Different concepts to adapt mean-variance portfolio optimization to power plant investments
under uncertainty from an investor perspective have been proposed in recent literature: Apply-
ing Monte-Carlo simulation, Roques et al. (2008) come to the result that portfolios with a high
share of gas plants are most attractive in view of risk and return due to a high correlation of gas
and electricity prices observable on many liberalized markets. Another set of publications uses
partial equilibrium models to value the trade-off between risk and return in investment decisions
on liberalized electricity markets: Chuang et al. (2001) present a model for generation expansion
planning based on an equilibrium formulation in a Cournot oligopoly. In a setting with separate
energy and capacity markets, the authors find greater reserve capacities and thus system relia-
bility in Cournot competition than in centralized planning. Zo¨ttl (2008) theoretically compares
equilibrium fuel mixes and electricity prices in markets with centralized planning, perfect and im-
perfect competition. Botterud et al. (2003) use stochastic dynamic programming to identify an
optimal generation investment strategy from a profit-oriented investor perspective. Different from
equilibrium models, the spot price is empirically estimated as a function of load level and installed
generation capacity. More complex market interactions with several market constraints can be
simulated with agent-based models (e.g. Gnansounou et al., 2004).
Although these studies indicate that power generation technologies differ fundamentally in terms
of risk as measured e.g. by the absolute variance of generation costs, there is so far no empirical
evidence to support the same hypothesis for the systematic risk with respect to the overall market
and/or other risk factors. In other words, the proposed models may be adequate to manage all
kinds of risks inherent in generation asset portfolios, but it is questionable whether these risks are
relevant at all for decisions of capital market investors.
Empirical studies on asset pricing and costs of equity in the utility industry and for power pro-
ducers are very rare: Bower et al. (1984) investigate U.S. utility stocks over the period 1971–1979.
The authors come to the conclusion that multi-factor models can better approximate expected re-
turns of utility companies and should therefore be preferred to model risk compared to the CAPM.
Extending this study, Bubnys (2005) cannot confirm the superiority of multi-factor models com-
pared to the CAPM based on an analysis of 128 public utility companies over a longer period of
time. Sadorsky (2001), Boyer and Filion (2007) present a multi-factor market model to estimate
the expected returns of Canadian oil and gas industry stock prices. In recent years, alternative
energy companies have become another focus of research in the field of empirical works related
to asset pricing in the energy industry (see e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 2007). However, all
those articles are neither focusing on power generation companies nor on liberalized markets. Fur-
thermore, the systematic risk characteristics of different power generation technologies and their
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implications on the cost of equity of power generation companies have not been investigated before
to our best knowledge. Due to the lack of empirical evidence on technology-specific risk factors
of power plants, utilities and power producers typically still rely on valuation approaches based
on weighted average costs of capital (WACC). These, however, may massively bias an investment
decision as the average company risk is assumed also for a specific investment project.
In this paper, the systematic risk characteristics of different power generation technologies (i.e.
hard coal, lignite, nuclear, natural gas, and renewables) and their impact on (individual) stock
returns of the power generation companies are investigated using an approach based on the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) and multi-factor market models. The analysis involves 22 major power
generation companies that are publicly listed at European stock exchanges, representing together
the biggest European listed power generation firms. Thereby, one core question is whether different
power generation technologies face significant differences in the systematic risk. Furthermore, this
study aims to analyze the overall explanatory power of a technology-beta oriented market model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides an overview of the
considered models and data. Empirical results for the estimated models focusing on the explanatory
power of the models are discussed in section 6.3. The article concludes with section 6.4.
6.2 Models and data
6.2.1 Considered models
Following the well-known CAPM (Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin, 1966), the expected return
of any asset i can be explained by the company-specific (market-)beta factor βi and the expected
excess return of the overall market performance by
E[ri] = rf + βi(E[rm]− rf ), (6.1)
where ri denotes the return of stock i and rm the return of the market portfolio, and rf the risk-
free rate of return. OLS regression can be used to estimate from each asset return time series the
average abnormal return over the expected return βi(rm,t − rf,t), αˆi, and βˆi for each asset i from
the equation
r∗i,t = αˆi + βˆir
∗
m,t + i,t. (6.2)
Here, r∗i,t := ri,t− rf,t denotes the excess return over the risk-free rate for stock i and i,t the error
term. This yields the beta estimator βˆi = Cov(rm, ri)/Var(ri). The form of the model is identical
with a standard one-factor model
r∗i,t = λˆ0,i + λˆ1,iFt + i,t (6.3)
with the excess return of the market portfolio, Ft ≡ r∗m := rm,t − rf,t assumed as the only risk
factor.
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If the fuel mix of a power generation company has an impact on its systematic risk, then there will
exist technology-specific beta factors βu representing the systematic risk sensitivity of technology
u in the market. Assuming the same capital structure for all companies, the technology betas
are constant across the industry. Typically, the generation asset portfolio of a power producing
company i consists of a mix of different generation technologies u ∈ U . Since in an arbitrage-
free market the portfolio’s beta must equal the weighted average of the constituent asset betas,
the company-specific beta-factor βi from Eqn. (6.1) can be decomposed into a weighted sum of
technology-specific betas βu yielding
E[ri] =
∑
u∈U
wu,i ·E[ru,i] = rf +
∑
u∈U
wu,iβu(E[rm]− rf ), (6.4)
where wu,i denotes the value-based weighting factor of technology u in portfolio i with
∑
u∈U wu,i =
1. Note that the technology beta βu equals the company-specific beta in case of a “pure-play” power
generator who operates only generation assets of technology u.
In fact, Eqn. (6.4) ignores differences in the companies’ capital structure. However, “borrowing
from whatever source, while maintaining a fixed amount of equity, increases the risk of the investor”
(Hamada, 1972) and companies with higher debt-to-equity ratio (leverage) face a higher systematic
risk in the equity since debt is not subject to market risk. To realistically compare the systematic
risk across the sample and identify the technology-specific impact, the impact on estimated betas
induced by differences in the capital structure of the analyzed firms needs thus to be removed. To
correct for differences in the sample companies’ leverage, delevered betas βdi are calculated from
equity betas following Hamada (1972). Specifically, it is
βdi =
βi
1 +Di/Ei(1− τi) (6.5)
where τi is the corporate tax rate, and Di and Ei denote the market value of debt and equity,
respectively.
Assuming that portfolio weights wu,i are constant over time, unlevered technology betas can be
obtained from a cross-sectional multiple least square regression of the form
βdi =
∑
u∈U
wu,iβˆ
d
u + εi (6.6)
The selection of an adequate measure to determine weighting factors is crucial. Financial the-
ory suggests to use weighting factors based on the actual market value of the respective asset
in the portfolio with respect to the total portfolio market value. Since market values of power
plants cannot be observed directly, one possibility would be to derive technology weights from
actual installed capacities (in GW) times the average specific investment costs of the respective
technologies (e/GW). Despite the difficulty of estimating time-constant specific investment costs
for power plants of varying age, this methodology would ignore the technology characteristics of
specific operational costs such as fuel costs and the resulting dispatch.
Following the peak-load pricing concept (see e.g. Oren et al., 1985), the electricity markets
will reflect both fixed and variable costs in the (long-term) equilibrium. Operating hours of each
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technology can thus be determined from the full-cost characteristics of the different technologies.
Therefore, actual electricity generation data (in TWh) should be a fairly good proxy for the relative
market value of different technology classes. Actual production data from annual company reports
is used to calculate the portfolio weights by dividing the electricity produced from one of five fuel
type classes (hard coal/lignite, natural gas, nuclear, renewables and miscellaneous1 technologies)
by the total production of the respective year. Thereby, electricity purchases are not included.
Since fuel type specific energy production data is not publicly reported by all companies for each
year, time-constant average weighting factors are used for the periods 2005–2007 and 2008–2010
derived from the reported data.2
Estimation of technology-specific beta factors from the actual fuel mix of the considered com-
panies proceeds along the lines proposed by Boquist and Moore (1983), Ehrhardt and Bhagwat
(1991), Kaplan and Peterson (1998) for deriving full-information industry betas. Thereby, estima-
tion of technology betas is performed in two steps: First, firm-specific beta factors βi are estimated
from an OLS time-series regression on historical returns 2005–2010 using Eqn. (6.2). In a sec-
ond step, technology-specific betas βu can be estimated from a multiple, cross-sectional regression
based on Eqn. (6.6).
In addition to the one-factor models, the explanatory power of different multi-factor models (see
e.g. Ross, 1976) of the form
r∗i,t = λˆ0,i +
k∑
j=1
λˆi,jFj,t + i,t. (6.7)
is investigated. Thereby, different energy-related risk factors are discussed and tested (cf. section
6.3.3). The full-information approach can be applied straightforwardly to derive technology-specific
sensitivities for each risk factor.
6.2.2 Model tests
One classical approach for CAPM tests is based on cross-sectional analysis. The principle of these
tests relies on the fact that given validity of the CAPM, average abnormal returns αi must jointly
equal zero. Adopting the well-known test of Fama and MacBeth (1973) with the regression equation
r∗i,t = γ0,t + γ1,tβi + ξi,t, (6.8)
the hypothesis γ¯0 = 0, γ¯1 > 0 can be tested using the t-statistic γj/σγj . Thereby, the time-series
averages are used as estimates of expected coefficient values, i.e. γ¯j =
∑T
t=1 γˆj,t, j = 1, 2. However,
this test requires the βi to be known, whereas these coefficients need to be estimated in practice.
Since the limited sample size in our application prevents from building sufficiently diversified asset
1The “miscellaneous” technology category includes reported generation from oil-fired plants, waste, combined heat
and power, as well as generation from unreported sources and rounding differences.
2Since investments and divestments affect the fuel mix of the sample companies over time, just taking the average
fuel mix over the total period could bias the results. Since, however, the annual changes remain marginal and
are subject to reporting inaccuracies, distinguishing two sub-periods seems most suitable.
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portfolios to circumvent this problem, time-series tests are used instead. Thereby, the finite sample
GRS test proposed by Gibbons et al. (1989) is applied to test the hypothesis whether the estimated
αi are jointly zero. Under the assumption of normal, homoskedastic, and independent disturbances
over time, the test statistic is given by
W = αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ · T −N − 1
N
·
(
1 +
(
µˆ∗m
σˆm
)2)−1
∼ FN,T−N−1, (6.9)
where αˆ denotes the N -dimensional vector of estimated intercepts, Σˆ the residual covariance ma-
trix computed from the vector of residuals t by Σˆ := E[t
′
t], and µˆ
∗
m and σˆm sample mean and
standard deviation of the excess return r∗m,t := rm,t−rf,t. An overview of this test is e.g. provided
in Cochrane (2001).
To ensure time-consistent results and exclude potential biasing effects from a specific selection
of the analysis period, the Chow (1960) test is used to test for equality of coefficients over time
versus structural breaks within the time series. For that, the time series is split up in sub-periods
a and b. The CAPM regressions are then performed both for the combined period and for each
sub-period separately. Let S be the sum of squared residuals from the combined data, Sa be the
sum of squared residuals from the first sub-period, and Sb be the sum of squared residuals from
the second sub-period. Furthermore, T a and T b denote the number of observations in each group
and k the total number of parameters. Then the Chow test statistic is
(S − Sa − Sb)/(k + 1)
(Sa + Sb)/(T a + T b − 2(k + 1)) ∼ Fk+1,T−2(k+1), (6.10)
Having determined technology-specific beta-factors from the multiple regression according to
Eqn. (6.6), the question arises whether the obtained βu, u ∈ U are significantly different from
each other. To provide evidence on this question, we can pairwise test for the following hypothesis:
H0 : βu = βu′ , u, u
′ ∈ U, u 6= u′ versus H1 : βu 6= βu′ , u, u′ ∈ U, u 6= u′
If the null hypothesis is correct, a reduced regression model with five (or less) independent variables
should explain as much variance in the delevered company beta factor βd as a the initial regression
model with six independent variables. Testing for instance the null hypothesis that coal and gas
technologies have equal beta coefficients, the initial regression model from Eqn. (6.6) would be
restricted to
βdi = (wcoal,i + wgas,i)βˆ
d
coal,gas + . . .+ wrenew,iβˆ
d
renew + εi
The pairwise hypotheses can be tested by comparing the unrestricted model with six independent
variables with a restricted model with a reduced number of variables in an F-test with the following
test statistic (cf. Greene and Zhang, 2003):
(R2u −R2r)
(1−R2u)/(N − 1− 1)
∼ F1,N−2, (6.11)
94
6.2 Models and data
where R2u and R
2
r denote the coefficient of determination of the unrestricted and the restricted
model, respectively.
6.2.3 The data
The following analyses are based on monthly returns of the 22 biggest power generation companies
listed at different European stock exchanges in the period 2005–2010.3 Although most empirical
stock return studies are based on longer analysis periods, we abstained from a longer time frame for
two reasons: Firstly, electricity market liberalization started in most European countries in the late
1990s, triggered by the EU Directive 96/92/EC. While continental European countries had opened
their electricity markets on average to less than 25% in 1999, the value increased to more than
75% in 2005 (Haas et al., 2006). Although the intensity of electricity market competition across
European countries still varies, European electricity wholesale markets have reached sufficient
comparability in the fundamental competitive structures since the mid-decade. Secondly, it has
to be ensured that markets had fully absorbed all consequences of the Enron bankruptcy from
2001/2002 which were likely to disturb asset pricing in the whole energy sector for years.
In total, the considered time period yields T = 72 observations of monthly returns for each of the
considered firms.4 The considered firms exhibit an annual average production from owned assets
ranging from 18 to 621 TWh at an installed capacity between 4 and 131 GW. Annual electricity
production data of the sample companies was then systematically categorized into five technology
classes (gas, coal/lignite, nuclear, renewable, and miscellaneous) as illustrated in Figure 6.1. The
companies’ generation portfolios differ widely in the technology mix: Only two companies (Drax
Group and Iberdrola Renowables) show “pure-play” generation portfolios consisting solely of hard
coal respectively renewable generation technologies. A detailed description of the sample companies
and corresponding operational and financial key data can be found in D.1.
For the classical CAPM specification, historical one-week Euribor rates provided by DB (2011)
are used for the risk-free rate rf of return and the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Utility index (ECB, 2011)
to represent the return of the relevant market portfolio rm. Following and extending the work of
Sadorsky (2001), the impact of potential risk factors such as commodity prices and economic
sentiment indicators are investigated in one-factor and multi-factor models in addition to the
classical CAPM specification. Where available, futures prices are used rather than spot prices since
spot prices are more affected by short-run price fluctuations due to temporary market imbalances.
All considered risk factors in this study are measured by excess returns r∗ in monthly granularity
as shown in Table 6.1. The relative development of all risk factor returns is depicted in Figure 6.2.
3Note that only companies with stock price data available in at least four years within the period 2005–2010 are
included in the analysis. Companies that were de-listed during the period due to takeovers or mergers are also
excluded.
4Shortened time series were accepted for Edf (listed since November 2005), Drax Power (listed since December
2005), and Iberdrola Renowables (listed since January 2008).
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1.  GDF Suez listed since July 2008 - stock price calculated between July 2005 and June 2008 as weighted average of Gdf and Suez shares
Source: Annual reports 2005-2009, own analysisFig. 6.1: Annual average power production and generation fuel mix of the sample companies 2005–2010
Tab. 6.1: Captured risk factors and corresponding data sources in this study.
Symbol Description Source
r∗m Market portfolio return Dow Jones Euro Stoxx Utility index (ECB, 2011)
r∗eua Carbon price return EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011)
r∗el Electricity price return EEX Phelix year-ahead base electricity futures (EEX, 2011)
r∗es Economic sentiment index ifo German Business Climate index (IFO, 2011)
r∗oil Oil price return WTI crude oil futures, four months to delivery (EIA, 2011)
r∗gas Gas price return German cross-border gas import prices (BAFA, 2010)
6.3 Empirical results
This section provides the estimation results and corresponding tests on the explanatory power of
the described models. Since the estimation of technology betas is performed in two steps, results
for the standard CAPM with estimation of firm-specific beta factors βi are presented first in section
6.3.1. Subsequently, technology-specific betas estimates βu in the CAPM framework are provided
in section 6.3.2. Similarly, firm-specific results of different multi-factor market model specifications
are analyzed in section 6.3.3, before the implied technology characteristics are discussed in section
6.3.4.
6.3.1 Firm characteristics in the one-factor models
Table 6.2 provides sample means of the estimated regression coefficients and coefficients of de-
termination R2 for the CAPM and other one-factor models.5The standard CAPM provides the
best model fit measured by the coefficient of determination at an average R2 of 0.22, indicating
5Detailed regression results and coefficient estimates are provided in D.2.
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Fig. 6.2: Relative development of DJ Euro Stoxx Utility index (ECB, 2011), IFO Business climate index for Ger-
many (IFO, 2011), WTI oil futures four months to delivery (EIA, 2011), German gas import prices BAFA
(2010), EEX Phelix year-ahead base and EUA year futures (EEX, 2011).
that about 22% of the variation in returns of the considered energy companies may be explained
through variations of the market portfolio represented through the DJ Euro Stoxx Utility index.
The characteristics of the estimated coefficients from single time series support this hypothesis: For
the standard CAPM, all estimated coefficients βi are significantly greater than zero even beyond
a 5% level of significance. In contrast, in all other one-factor models a non-zero number of stocks
have βi estimates which are not significantly different from zero. In particular, applying gas import
price returns and the economic sentiment indicator as regressors yield 6 respectively 7 insignificant
coefficients (cf. Tab. D.8 and Tab. D.6).
Tab. 6.2: Summary results for 2005–2010 univariate OLS regressions with varying risk factors. For each considered
risk factor, the table provides sample averages of coefficient estimates αi, βi, standard errors are provided
in parenthesis.
α¯i β¯i R¯
2
i
r∗m 0.002 (0.008) 0.780 (0.183) 0.22
r∗eua 0.001 (0.010) 0.205 (0.090) 0.11
r∗el 0.002 (0.009) 0.238 (0.134) 0.07
r∗es 0.003 (0.009) 0.910 (0.501) 0.05
r∗oil 0.002 (0.009) 0.132 (0.116) 0.04
r∗gas 0.005 (0.009) -0.335 (0.227) 0.04
The standard CAPM specification is tested for structural breaks within the analysis period.
For that, two additional OLS regressions are performed covering the sub-periods 2005–2007 and
2008–2010. The coefficient estimates are tested for significant cross-periodic differences applying
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the test procedure proposed by Chow (1960).6 The test results indicate only for 2 of 22 companies
a structural break at a significance level of 10% as shown in D.2, Table D.3. Thus, we continue
the majority of the following analyses for the combined period 2005–2010.
As described in the previous section, the specified CAPM is tested on abnormal returns using the
GRS methodology. In consistency with the CAPM assumptions, the null hypothesis of jointly zero
abnormal returns, i.e. αi = 0 (i = 1, . . . , N), cannot be rejected given a test statistic of W = 1.06
(p-value 0.418) for the full analysis period 2005–2010. For the sub-periods, the GRS tests confirm
this result with W = 0.525 (p-value 0.911) for the sub-period 2005–2007 and W = 0.281 (p-value
0.996) for the sub-period 2008–2010.
6.3.2 Technology characteristics in the CAPM
Before the technology-specific beta factors are derived from the multiple regression, the data set
is assessed for multicollinearity by computing the correlation matrix of the technology weighting
factors wu,i. This is important as neglecting multicollinearity in the multiple regression could yield
misleading and erratic results. As shown in Table 6.3, the absolute coefficients of correlation of
the pairwise analysis of weighting factors are consistently less than 0.5 and thus do not indicate
multicollinearity.
Tab. 6.3: Pairwise coefficients of correlation of the technology weighting factors wu,i during the period 2005–2010.
R wgas wcoal wnuc wmisc wrenew
wgas 1.00 -0.45 -0.48 -0.17 -0.28
wcoal 1.00 -0.19 0.07 -0.41
wnuc 1.00 -0.10 -0.13
wmisc 1.00 0.04
wrenew 1.00
Having estimated the firm-specific beta factors βi from the historical returns, corporate tax rates
2008 from KPMG (2008) and 2008 debt and equity data from Bloomberg are used to calculate
delevered company betas βdi . Next, a second pass cross-sectional OLS regression without constant
according to Eqn. (6.6) is applied to estimate delevered technology-specific betas βdu. Coefficient
estimates and standard errors are provided in Table 6.4. For the total analysis period 2005–2010
all coefficient estimates except for the miscellaneous technology class are greater than zero at a 5%
level of significance at minimum. This is generally confirmed when considering the two sub-periods
separately.
Note that the firm-specific βdi which are used as the left hand-side of the second pass regression
6Application of the Chow test requires knowledge about the timing of a structural break. Although there is no
evidence on a structural break end of 2007, we abstain from testing for other potential timing of structural breaks
due to the limited length of the considered analysis period.
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Tab. 6.4: Delevered technology-specific coefficient estimates βˆdu, standard errors, and adjusted coefficient of deter-
mination R2adj from multiple OLS regression. Dependent variable is βi. Thereby,
∗∗∗ denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Period (2005–2010) Period I (2005–2007) Period II (2008-2010)
βˆdgas 0.262
∗∗ (0.204) 0.094 (0.129) 0.301∗∗ (0.109)
βˆdcoal 0.367
∗∗∗ (0.230) 0.337∗∗ (0.136) 0.337∗∗ (0.123)
βˆdnuc 0.431
∗∗ (0.299) 0.555∗∗∗ (0.186) 0.28∗∗ (0.158)
βˆdmisc 0.112 (1.049) 0.248 (0.538) -0.27
∗∗ (0.436)
βˆdrenew 0.645
∗∗∗ (0.227) 0.897∗∗∗ (0.194) 0.587∗∗∗ (0.112)
R2adj 0.860 (0.166) 0.825 (0.204) 0.810 (0.171)
(see Eqn. (6.6)) are subject to estimation errors. Given that beta factors are constant over time,
this measurement error in beta declines as the time-series sample size, T , increases. Since the mea-
surement errors occur only in the dependent variable while weighting factors wu,i as independent
variables are without errors, the standard OLS regression model accounts sufficiently for errors in
βi.
The coefficient of determination of R2adj = 0.86 indicates a very high explanatory power for the
second pass regression. This is particularly remarkable taking into account that most of the con-
sidered companies are not pure power generators but companies with other utility-related business
activities such as sales, trading, transmission, and distribution. Over the total period 2005–2010,
all coefficients except βmisc are significantly greater than zero, with the beta factors of coal and
nuclear technologies showing significance even at the 1% level. Renewables (i.e. predominantly hy-
dro) exhibit absolutely the highest beta factors while gas technologies show the lowest β-sensitivity
to the market portfolio. Hypothetically, this might be due to the fact that hydro technologies face
only little volatility in generation costs. Consequently, the operational margin of these technologies
highly depends on the electricity price which is expected to be cointegrated or even correlated with
the overall market performance. The lower gas technology betas might be explained following the
argumentation of Roques et al. (2008): Caused by a high correlation of earnings from electricity
sales and costs from gas purchases, the resulting operational margin of gas technologies may be
expected to be less volatile compared to nuclear or hydro generation, justifying a lower beta factor.
These first hypotheses and potential explanations will be further investigated and tested in the
following sections using different multi-factor market models.
As discussed before, we test for equality of technology-specific beta coefficients by applying the
pairwise F -test as discussed in Section 6.2.2. As shown in Table 6.5, the null hypothesis of equal
beta coefficient can be rejected at a confidence level of at least 5% for gas and renewables as well
as for coal and renewable technologies based on the analysis of the combined period and period
I. In period II, the null hypothesis can only be rejected at a confidence level of 10% for gas and
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renewables technologies. This supports the hypothesis that the unlevered market beta factor of
renewable technologies is significantly higher compared to the betas of gas and coal technology
classes.
Tab. 6.5: Pairwise test on equality of technology-specific beta coefficients. The table provides the F -distributed
test statistics applied on unlevered betas according to Eqn. (6.11). Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of
the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
βˆdcoal βˆ
d
nuc βˆ
d
misc βˆ
d
renew
Combined
period
(2005–2010)
βˆdgas 0.414 0.976 0.168 4.812
∗∗
βˆdcoal 0.140 0.439 3.216
∗
βˆdnuc 0.611 1.531
βˆdmisc 4.959
∗∗
Period I
(2005–2007)
βˆdgas 1.529 4.057
∗ 0.111 7.718∗∗
βˆdcoal 0.751 0.000 5.194
∗∗
βˆdnuc 0.387 1.574
βˆdmisc 1.173
Period II
(2008–2010)
βˆdgas 0.099 0.026 1.747 3.046
∗
βˆdcoal 0.101 1.637 2.621
βˆdnuc 1.636 2.321
βˆdmisc 3.061
∗
6.3.3 Firm characteristics in the multi-factor models
Based on the insights gained from the analysis of the one-factor models, the explanatory power of
a combination of risk factors with respect to stock returns and technology characteristics of power
generation companies is investigated in multi-factor models. Thereby, we consider the same risk
factors as in the univariate analysis. Multi-factor models, however, bear the risk that risk factors
are not significantly different from zero or exhibit linear interdependencies among each other. To
assess this risk of multicollinearity, the coefficient of correlation for each pair of risk factors is
analyzed as shown in Table 6.6. With a maximum coefficient of correlation of R = 0.45 for the
cross-correlation in returns between returns of EEX electricity futures and EEX EUA future prices,
a risk for multicollinearity among the risk factors can be neglected.
The selection of risk factors for an optimal multi-factor specification is performed consistently
for all sample companies i = 1, . . . , N by backward selection starting with the complete 6-factor
market model. The risk factor with the lowest F-stat over the sample average is removed for the
next regression unless it is significantly different from zero at the 10%-level at minimum. Following
this rule, all multi-factor models have to be rejected since only the market return shows significant
difference from zero over the sample average. Even in the 2-factor model, only the sensitivity
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Tab. 6.6: Pairwise coefficients of correlation in returns of the market portfolio r∗m, electricity price rel, oil price,
roil, economic sentiment res, EUA price reua, and clean spark spread rsp.
R r∗m r∗eua r∗el r
∗
es r
∗
oil r
∗
gas
r∗m 1.00 0.29 0.29 0.42 0.31 -0.11
r∗eua 1.00 0.45 0.21 0.35 -0.21
r∗el 1.00 0.18 0.43 -0.02
r∗es 1.00 0.41 -0.12
r∗oil 1.00 -0.02
r∗gas 1.00
factors for 10 out of 22 companies are significantly different from zero with respect to the emission
certificate price return (see Table D.9).
All multi-factor model specifications show an improved explanatory power compared to the
CAPM measured by the adjusted coefficient of determination7 R¯2adj as shown in Table 6.7.
Tab. 6.7: Comparison of sample averages of adjusted coefficients of determinations for the considered one-factor
and multi-factor model specifications.
R¯2adj,i r
∗
m r
∗
eua r
∗
el r
∗
es r
∗
oil r
∗
gas
1-factor models 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.03
2-factor model - - - 0.27 - - -
3-factor model - - - - - - - 0.3 - - - - - - -
4-factor model - - - - - - - - - - 0.31 - - - - - - - - - -
5-factor model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.25 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6-factor model - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.36 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
6.3.4 Technology characteristics in the multi-factor models
Again, multiple, cross-sectional OLS regressions according to Eqn. (6.6) are performed to deter-
mine technology-specific sensitivity factors. Thereby, the analysis is limited to the 2-factor model
specification with market return and emission certificate price return representing the regressors,
since the other risk factors yield non-significant coefficients for even more companies.
In this two-factor analysis, renewable (i.e. mostly hydro), gas, and coal technology classes exhibit
in the second pass regression sensitivities significantly greater than zero with respect to the market
portfolio (cf. Table 6.8). As in the one-factor model specification, we can again observe significant
7The adjusted coefficient of determination is computed by R2adj,i = 1 − (1 − R2i ) T−1T−K−1 , with K denoting the
number of applied risk factors (without constant).
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Tab. 6.8: Unlevered technology-specific coefficient estimates λˆdm, λˆ
d
eua and standard errors from multiple OLS
regressions corresponding to the two-factor model using market return and EUA future price return as
relevant regressors. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level
and ∗ at the 10% level.
λˆdm,i λˆ
d
eua,i
λˆd·,gas 0.274∗∗∗ (0.094) 0.004 (0.046)
λˆd·,coal 0.267
∗∗ (0.104) 0.075 (0.051)
λˆd·,nuc 0.216 (0.136) 0.14∗ (0.067)
λˆd·,misc 0.033 (0.375) -0.06 (0.184)
λˆd·,renew 0.516∗∗∗ (0.100) 0.068 (0.049)
differences between the market risk factor coefficients for gas-renewable and nuclear-renewable
technology combinations. In contrast, most technology classes do not show significant sensitivities
with respect to the EUA price returns: Only the nuclear technology shows a sensitivity coefficient
which satisfies a weak confidence level of 10%. This could be the fact that high certificate prices
lead to high electricity prices and therewith to higher profits of the nuclear technology while the
EUA price represents for all other thermal technologies also a cost factor.
6.4 Concluding remarks
This article investigates the systematic risk of European power generation companies relative to
the overall market using an approach based on the CAPM and multi-factor market models. The
analysis of historical stock returns of 22 European power companies over the period 2005–2010
supports the validity of the CAPM with respect to the sample. However, the explanatory power
of the standard CAPM can be improved by including other energy-related and macroeconomic
measures such as EUA prices, power prices, oil prices, gas prices, or an economic sentiment indicator
as additional risk factors in multivariate model specifications.
A simple but powerful estimation approach is examined to derive technology-specific beta factors
for the standard CAPM. The results indicate that gas and coal technologies face significantly lower
beta factors with respect to the market portfolio as renewable (dominated by hydro) technologies,
which show the highest market portfolio sensitivity across the sample. While the proposed model
specification can be transferred to various markets, one should note that the estimated technology
betas refer only to the European liberalized electricity markets. For companies with operational
focus in non-liberalized electricity systems or in markets that differ in basic regulatory setting,
technology betas may vary substantially. Therewith, this paper contributes an easy-applicable
valuation approach which may be used in practice both for single power plant valuations as well
as for portfolio considerations.
102
C
h
a
p
te
r
7
Concluding evaluation
7.1 Review of results and conclusions
The four papers presented in this thesis analyze the economics of capacity allocation and investment
problems under uncertainty focusing on power generation assets in electricity markets. The papers
serve the primary objective of this thesis to improve the understanding on how the portfolio
selection of different generation technologies affects the trade-off between financial risk and return in
power generation portfolios. As a second objective, the proposed models aim to provide analytical
decision support for both electricity market investors and political decision makers to determine the
efficient fuel mix in power generation portfolios with respect to financial risk and return. Thereby,
the exact numbers in the presented applications have primarily illustrative character and are to
be considered as exemplary case studies. However, the models are sufficiently generic to be easily
transferred to the context of other electricity markets and investment decisions.
By reviewing existing work and developing novel theory and applications based on a broad
methodological spectrum with respect to specific aspects of investment and portfolio optimization
problems, the papers in this thesis contribute to different areas of research within the field of en-
ergy economics. Thereby, the connecting element between all papers is the central question of the
efficient power generation fuel mix from a societal and investors’ perspective.
The study from Chapter 3 has analyzed the impact of fuel mix diversification on the long-term
optimum of electricity generation portfolios. By integrating Mean-Variance Portfolio theory into a
classic peak-load pricing framework, conditions for efficient capacity allocation in power generation
portfolios have been derived and analyzed.
Applied to the German electricity market, the model provides evidence on the following insights:
First, the calculations show that fuel mix diversification can considerably influence the total stan-
dard deviation of generation costs by more than 10%. However, the exemplary results for the
German generation mix have also demonstrated that fuel-mix diversification does not provide re-
duced risk characteristics per se. Blind diversification without consideration of technology costs
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and price risks as well as the correlation of risks may even be counterproductive. Second, with
respect to the current debate on security of supply, the results indicate that increasing risk aver-
sion implies a higher share of lignite and nuclear generation in efficient portfolios and conversely a
decrease of gas-fired generation. Consistent with the results of Fan et al. (2010), the optimal fuel
mix shows independently from the risk attitude a high sensitivity to the price and/or the alloca-
tion method of CO2 emission rights. Third, the results indicate that with full auctioning of CO2,
efficient portfolios at historically observed CO2 price levels consist of more nuclear and lignite and
less coal-fired generation compared to the current fuel mix. If nuclear and lignite capacities are
reduced or fixed at the current level, hard coal is the most economical technology instead.
Building on the insights gained from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 has investigated with special emphasis
the impact of merit order risks due to fluctuations and long-term shifts of fuel prices. It has been
shown that an increasing degree of diversification in technology portfolios is efficient for increasing
merit order risks—even under risk-neutral preferences. The merit order risk is of particular im-
portance if the considered technologies are characterized by only small differences in their mean
costs and high, uncorrelated cost variances and for difference time series of operating costs of two
technologies without mean reverting behavior. Given a substantial likelihood for reversals in the
merit order, even overcapacities exceeding maximum demand can become economically favorable if
investment costs are sufficiently low compared to the expected difference in operating costs. How-
ever, these excess capacities do rarely occur for typical parametrizations of thermal technologies
and the efficient amount of reserve capacity in electricity systems is hence much more determined
by other factors not considered in this article, such as demand uncertainty and risk of operating
defaults.
The results show that the main driver for the merit order risk is the underlying time series
of differences in operating costs of the considered technologies. Thereby, the efficient portfolio
structure with merit order risks given a mean reverting difference time series of operating costs
is very close to the efficient portfolio structure with neglected merit order risk. In contrast, the
efficient technology mix is strongly affected by a random walk proporty of the difference time series
of operating costs.
Although the provided model applications both of Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the German elec-
tricity market, the general model frameworks and several of the obtained insights are also relevant
for investment decisions in other energy markets and even in other industries where different tech-
nologies may be selected to serve an (expected) demand pattern, such as e.g. in transportation
applications.
The optimality conditions from Chapters 3 and 4 for welfare efficient power generation portfolios
rely on a central planning perspective. In Chapter 5, these results are compared to the competitive
market equilibrium based on decentralized investment decisions of electricity generation companies
which are considered as representative market agents. Thereby, the market equilibrium under per-
fect competition matches welfare optimal results. The picture changes with market imperfections
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induced by agency theoretic causes: Both the risk attitude and the profit share of the electric-
ity market companies influence the technology structure in the competitive market equilibrium:
While the competitive market equilibrium is congruent with the welfare optimal solution given
risk-neutral market agents and vanishing managerial profit shares, the market equilibrium given
risk-averse agents yields considerably higher shares of the peakload technology. With managerial
profit shares substantially greater than zero, the preference for the peakload technology increases
strongly. The efficient share of the baseload technology is by far the highest in the decentralized
market equilibria with risk-averse companies. Given the possibility of financial diversification at
the capital markets, investment in the peak load technology equals zero. In consistency with pre-
vious discussions in literature (cf. e.g. Roques et al., 2008), the model shows that in the long-term
market equilibrium risk-averse firms would clearly invest into higher shares of peak technologies—
even more if the companies receive a substantial profit share. With empirical studies supporting
the hypothesis that agents’ behavior is risk-averse in management decisions, it is likely that in
real-world settings market equilibrium and welfare optimum do not coincide.
It can be shown that the mean variance based decision models are consistent with the well-
known postulations of the CAPM given the existence of a perfect capital market and investors
with homogeneous expectations on the available assets (cf. Section 7.2.2). Hence, the question
arises from an investor perspective whether there are significant differences in the systematic risk
of different power generation technologies. To answer this question, Chapter 6 leaves the mean-
variance based framework and applies the CAPM and other multi-factor models for the analysis
of technology-specific differences in power generation portfolios.
For that, the study empirically investigates the systematic risk of European power generation
companies relative to the overall market using an approach based on the CAPM and multi-factor
market models. The analysis of historical stock returns of 22 European power companies over the
period 2005–2010 supports the validity of the CAPM with respect to the sample. However, the
explanatory power of the standard CAPM can be improved by including other energy-related and
macroeconomic measures such as EUA prices, power prices, oil prices, gas prices, or an economic
sentiment indicator as additional risk factors in multivariate model specifications. A simple but
powerful estimation approach is examined to derive technology-specific beta factors for the standard
CAPM. The results indicate that gas and coal technologies face significantly lower beta factors
with respect to the market portfolio renewable (dominated by hydro) technologies, which show the
highest market portfolio sensitivity across the sample. It is thus shown that a valuation of power
plant projects based on non-differentiated weighted average cost of capital (WACC)—in practice
frequently applied due to its simplicity—leads to biased investment decisions.
These insights are relevant both for financial investors with regard to their risk-adjusted valuation
of power generation companies which may vary in the structure of their generation portfolios and
for power generation companies itself with regard to the valuation of new power generation projects.
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7.2 Practical applicability of mean-variance decision models
Compared to other (scenario based) stochastic models, the mean-variance based decision models
presented in this thesis exhibit a relatively high modeling simplicity. This is due to two main
assumptions: Firstly, the assumption of normally distributed payoffs which allow to fully describe
the distribution of random variables by their mean and variance. Secondly, the reduction of the
problem to a one-period model reduces the complexity massively. This allows to study analytically
mean-variance efficient portfolios and serve the main objective of this thesis, i.e. contributing to a
better understanding of risk-return trade-offs associated with power plant investments.
Besides simplicity, the applicability of the economic models presented in Chapters 3-4 in practice
depends on three crucial criteria which will be discussed in the following sections:
 Straightforward and unambiguous model parametrization—most critically the risk aversion
parameter A
 Consistency with other well-accepted decision models such as the CAPM
 Acceptable model limitations
7.2.1 Model parametrization and estimation of the absolute level of risk
aversion
To apply the mean-variance models proposed in Chapters 3-5 in real-world portfolio planning prob-
lems, a correct parametrization of the models is crucial. In most cases, the parametrization will be
done based on historical data. Although the discussed estimation procedures are straightforward
for all of the proposed models, using historical data implies two inherent dilemmas: Firstly, the
general validity of using historical data as input for future-oriented decisions remains questionable
but is a necessary evil as there is no better data available. However, risk managers should not
solely rely on historical data but also reflect sensitivities to switches in the market regime which
possibly have not been observed before. Secondly, practitioners will still face a general lack of
sufficiently long and consistent energy market data, especially with regard to data from younger
energy markets as e.g. in Europe. However the usage of shorter time series data implies typically
ambiguity of results and reduces the robustness of the model.
One of the most crucial model parameters to be estimated throughout Chapters 3-5 is the level
of risk aversion, A. Recap the preference functional Ψ with r˜i denoting the return on investment
on the capital invested xi
max Ψ = E[r˜i · xi]− A
2
·Var[r˜i · xi], (7.1)
If there is a unique market price of risk1 observable in the market, this implies the societal risk
aversion in the economy. For instance, a zero market price of risk implies risk neutrality. However,
1In financial literature, the market price of risk is mostly defined within the CAPM framework as the expected
excess return that is required in the market for each unit of risk held in the equilibrium. It represents the slope
of the security market line (cf. Sharpe (1964)).
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the risk aversion parameter in the mean-variance preference functional, A, is scale-variant and
depends on the absolute amount of capital invested, xi.
Given a capital market with a risk-free asset and a market portfolio, the market price of risk and
the implied absolute market risk aversion can be determined straightforwardly: For the market
to be arbitrage free, it can be concluded that the utility from capital x invested into the risky
market asset with expected return r¯m and variance σm equals the utility of an investment into a
risk-free asset with return r0. With other words, the risk-adjusted return of the risky market asset
equals the risk-free return. Under mean-variance preferences, the following equation must thus be
satisfied
Ψ(rm · xi) = E[r˜m] · xi − A · x
2
i
2
Var[r˜m] = r0 · xi (7.2)
Solving (7.2) for A yields then absolute risk aversion (ARA) in the mean-variance preference
functional with respect to the capital invested for the capital one unit of the market portfolio:
A =
2(E[r˜m]− r0)
xi ·Var[r˜m] (7.3)
In fact, it becomes obvious from the last equation that A(xi) is a function of the capital invested.
Conversely, a constant absolute risk aversion A would imply an linearly increasing relative risk
aversion (RRA), since the variance of return increases by the second order while the expected
value increases linearly in xi.
The application of the scale-variant risk aversion A(xi) is, however, is a severe weakness of the
mean-variance preference approach, since the capital invested is in general not known ex-ante for
portfolio applications as discussed in this thesis. Hence, an iterative approach is advisable to
determine A(xi) these cases:
1. First, the capital investment xr0, x
v
0 is determined for the purely return maximal portfolio
(i.e. A = 0), respectively for the purely variance minimal portfolio (i.e. A→∞).
2. The corresponding absolute market price of risk A(xr0), and A(x
v
0) is computed according to
Eqn. (7.3)
3. The optimal investment xr1, x
v
1 is determined for the efficient portfolio for A(x
r
0), respectively
for A(xv0).
4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated iteratively, until the stopping criterion |xru − xvu| ≤ α, α ∈ R is
satisfied after the uth iteration.
An numerical estimation of the societal risk aversion for the German market is provided in
Section 5.5.1.
7.2.2 Comparison of mean-variance based decision models and the CAPM
The mean-variance based approach is not a stand-alone concept but is closely related to other
well-known concepts from financial risk theory. Thereby, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM
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Sharpe, 1964, Lintner, 1965, Mossin, 1966) represents one of the most widely used concepts for
valuation of risky assets in practice. In this section we will discuss the similarities and differences
of the mean-variance optimization discussed in the previous section and risk-return optimization
based on the classic CAPM framework and show how the two modeling approaches are interrelated.
Same as mean-variance models which are based on the preference functional (7.1), the CAPM
builds on the fundamental assumption of risk-averse investors who apply the mean variance prin-
ciple for their decisions (cf. Definition 2.2.2). Furthermore, the CAPM imposes a set of additional
assumptions on the capital market:
 It exists an efficient (i.e. complete and frictionless) capital market with a risk-free rate of
return r0 at which investors may borrow or lend unlimited amounts.
 All investors have homogeneous expectations on the distribution of returns of all traded asset.
Following the CAPM, investors on efficient capital markets value their investment decisions solely
based on the ratio of expected return and systematic (i.e. market-specific) risk of an investment.
The unsystematic (i.e. firm-specific) risk component can be eliminated through diversification and
is thus irrelevant for the investment decision. Given arbitrage-free markets, the security market
line (SML) says that the expected rate of return of an individual asset i is a linear function its
systematic, non-diversifiable risk (i.e. its beta):
E[ri] = r0 + βi(E[r˜m]− r0), (7.4)
where βi := Cov(rm, ri)/Var(ri) denotes the beta factor of asset i, rm the return of the market
portfolio, and r0 the risk-free rate of return.
Different approaches have been proposed in literature to derive the SML: Sharpe (1964) considers
an arbitrary portfolio p as a combination of a risky asset i and the market portfolio m and concludes
that in the market equilibrium there is a unique ratio, γ, of the marginal return contribution to
the marginal risk contribution for any asset i in the market portfolio with γ = (E[r˜m]−r0)/σm. In
contrast, Lintner (1965) derives the SML from the optimality conditions of the efficient portfolio
selection problem.
Similarly to the latter approach, the SML can also be obtained from a mean-variance preference
functional given the existence of an efficient capital market: In an efficient and arbitrage-free
market, the value of the preference functional for a diversified portfolio p must equal the return of
the risk-free rate, i.e. Ψ(rp) = Ψ(r0) which is equivalent
E[r˜p]− A(rm)
2
Var[r˜p] = r0 (7.5)
Inserting the risk aversion A(rm) that is implied by the market price of risk as derived in Eqn.
(7.3) followed by simple transformation yields
E
[∑
i
ωir˜i
]
= r0 +
E[r˜m]− r0
σ2m
·
ω2i σ2i + ∑
j=1,i6=j
ωiωjCov(ri, rj)
 . (7.6)
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with rm =
∑n
i=1 ωiri.
To determine that portfolio combination which maximizes the expected profit, the partial deriva-
tives with respect to the share of the asset i,
∂Ψ(rp)
∂ωi
, i = [1, . . . , n] are required to equal zero. This
yields for the asset i
E[r˜i] = r0 +
E[r˜m]− r0
σ2m
·
2ωiσ2i + ∑
j=1,i6=j
ωjCov(ri, rj)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Cov(ri,rm)
(7.7)
With perfect diversification for n→∞, the risk contribution of asset i is reduced to its systematic
risk, i.e. the covariance with the market portfolio. The remainder, i.e. the cost changes that are
uncorrelated with the market portfolio return, is the uncorrelated risk component.
This shows that the optimization approach based on the mean-variance preference functional
(7.1) is consistent with the CAPM given the existence of a perfect capital market and investors
with homogeneous expectations on the available assets.
7.2.3 (Ir-)relevancy of reflecting unsystematic risk
Based on the previous section the question arises whether energy politicians as well as investors
should only reflect the systematic risk incurred with a generation portfolio. If so, a CAPM based
valuation of generation assets would be advisable. Otherwise, if unsystematic risk is to be valued
as well, a modeling approach based on the mean-variance preference functional from Definition
2.2.2 seems appropriate.
From an energy policy view, neglecting the unsystematic risk from generation portfolios requires
the capital market being sufficiently large compared to the electricity market. Under this premise
the society has the opportunity to eliminate almost entirely the impact of the unsystematic risk
induced by the generation assets by applying and overall diversification of investments. The same
rationale applies from an investor’s perspective on efficient capital markets: If investors can opti-
mally diversify their investment portfolio, then companies and their managers do not need not act
risk aversely and apply diversification of the investment portfolio on the corporate level.
Nevertheless, many companies commit significant resources to corporate portfolio management
due to several reasons (cf. also Section 5.1.1): Firstly, agency theory suggests it may be in the
manager’s interest to diversify his personal risk position by diversifying the company portfolio.
Secondly, costs of financial distress and illiquidity might be significant and could therefore motivate
corporate diversification. Thirdly, capital market imperfections such as agency costs, transaction
costs and taxes might hinder the equity holders from sufficient diversification in their financial
portfolios. In this context it also has to be considered that public investors in many European
countries may have an eligible interest to hold shares of energy companies (from the viewpoint of
easier implementation of the energy politic targets), while their possibilities for diversification are
limited due to public budget constraints and limited public interest in other industries. This could
additionally motivate utilities to diversify their business—also in the interest of their shareholders.
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Since the question whether unsystematic risk in power generation investments should be reflected
or not cannot be answered in general, this thesis discusses both approaches in parallel: The models
proposed in Chapters 3 and 4 do not incorporate the wider capital market and rely on the societal
perspective that both the unsystematic and the systematic risk of generation investments are
relevant. In Chapter 5, the wider capital market is added to the set of assumptions and opens
the the possibility for diversification also from a welfare perspective. Finally, Chapter 6 extends
the traditional CAPM framework which is mostly used in corporate finance applications to the
valuation of generation technologies. Thereby, the model is based on the premise that the electricity
market investments are small compared to the overall market and thus only systematic risk is
relevant for the corporate investment decision.
7.2.4 Model limitations and prospects for future research
Although the relative simplicity of mean-variance decision models provides a wide applicability
in academia and practice, the inherent model limitations are to be kept in mind to avoid biasing
results under certain circumstances.
Constant absolute risk aversion
As previously discussed, mean-variance preference functionals as defined in Definition 2.3.1 require
knowledge of the absolute risk aversion parameter A. The latter depends—as discussed in Section
7.2.1—on the absolute amount of capital invested. In typical investment decisions, however, the
invested capital itself depends the portfolio structure and therewith again on the risk aversion. This
interdependency require either an iterative solution procedure or yield to approximate solutions in
case A has been estimated from historic investments decisions as applied in the numerical example
presented in Section 5.5.
Assumptions for consistency with expected utility maximization
Decision models based on the mean-variance preference functional as defined in Definition 2.3.1
impose particular requirements on the utility function of the decision maker and on the distribution
of returns to be consistent with the expected utility principle: Firstly, it requires exponential
utilities of the decision maker and, secondly, normally distributed payoffs (cf. Theorem 2.3.2).
While the exponential utility function could be avoided in case of zero expected payoffs (which
itself is an unrealistic assumption), normally distributed payoffs remain a necessary requirement.
However, normally distributed payoffs cannot be assumed to be fulfilled in all practical applica-
tions although this is frequently done. The findings from Chapter 4 illustrate this limitation: Given
a substantial risk for reversals of the merit order, risk-averse society, and power plant investment
costs close to or equal zero, a clearly dominant strategy with respect to both states of the merit
order would be to install as much capacity from each technology that maximal demand is covered,
i.e. the total installed capacity is twice the maximal demand. However, the empirical results from
Section 4.4 show that even for minimal investment costs the case for overcapacities becomes less
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beneficial the higher the society’s risk aversion. This result seems paradox and is due to the fact
that total costs given the risk for reversals in the merit order are not normally distributed.
Selection of risk measures
A general point concerning all models presented in this thesis refers to the selection of adequate
risk measures: Although allowing a relatively high simplicity in analytical approaches, application
of variance as a measure of risk is generally problematic. For further practical applications of
the proposed model frameworks aiming to provide direct decision support in risk management
issues, the adaptation to other, more powerful risk measures is advisable. In financial economic
literature, different properties have been discussed as requirements for a risk measure for being
able to aggregate financial risks as good as possible. One of the most widely applied property sets
for risk measures has been formulated by Artzner et al. (1999). The authors define a coherent risk
measure R as a function R : X 7→ R, with X denoting the set of real random variables defined on
an appropriate probability space, based on the following four properties:
1. Translation invariance: R(X + c) = R(X) + c, for all c ∈ R
2. Sub-additivity: R(X1 +X2) ≤ R(X1) +R(X2)
3. Positive homogeneity: R(cX) = cR(X), for all c ≥ 0
4. Monotonicity: X ≤ Y ⇒ R(Y ) ≤ R(X).
Clearly, the variance operator is neither homogeneous nor monotone, nor sub-additive and thus
violates the properties of coherent risk measures in multiple dimensions. Although widely used
in academia and risk management applications at the firm level, value-at-risk is in general not
a coherent risk measure either, since it does not fulfill the sub-additivity property.2 Due to its
relative simplicity compared to other risk measures, conditional value-at-risk3 (Acerbi and Tasche,
2002) is one of the practically most accepted coherent risk measures.
Extending the mean-variance approach to the inclusion of coherent measures of risk seems
promising—in particular in numerical applications since this will probably reduce the analytical
traceability of solutions.
Technical power plant restrictions
Throughout this thesis, generation technologies are only characterized by their fixed and variable
costs. For simplicity reasons, other technical parameters have been ignored. Since these restrictions
are relevant for the dispatch decision, they should also be reflected for the investment decision. In
particular, the following parameters and restrictions are relevant to be reflected:
 Ramp-up times and corresponding costs
2Value at risk is only coherent under certain distributional assumptions with respect to the underlying risk factor,
such as e.g. for normally distributed risks.
3Conditional value-at-risk is sometimes also referred to as expected shortfall.
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 Plant indivisibilities and minimum capacities per plant
 Minimum and maximum run-times per plant/technology
 In-availabilities of plants/technologies, e.g. due to maintenance
Consideration of other risk factors
The mean-variance models proposed in Chapters 3-5 exclusively focus on long-term risks in power
plant investments and more precisely on risks in operating cost and electricity price risks due
to volatile fuel prices. This narrow focus implies of course a high degree of simplification from
real world complexity—as with most economic models. The simplifications are necessary to allow
an easy traceability of solutions and therewith an in-depth understanding of results. However,
the simplifications limit the direct applicability of the models for energy politics and investment
decisions as other important risk factors are neglected. Thus it makes sense to keep the time-
frame focus on long-term risks and not try to model all other kinds of mid- and short-term risks
(cf. Denton et al. (2003)) within the same model. Nevertheless, the following relaxations of
simplifying assumptions and extensions to the risk factors captured in the discussed models should
be considered to increase the model’s fit to reality and the relevance for decision support:
 Capturing demand uncertainty instead of a deterministic load duration curve as one im-
portant part of reserve capacity planning. Thereby, different modeling approaches might be
considered: For instance, a stochastic load function Ds(t) could be created as a superposition
of a deterministic and a stochastic component as Ds(t) = D(t) + d˜.
 On the supply side, an extension of the peak-load pricing model to capture fluctuating re-
newable energy supply and stochastic plant availabilities would enable the model to study
comprehensive portfolio applications—in particular for renewables.
 Furthermore, the peak-load pricing model could be extended by storage technologies—similarly
to the model proposed by Steffen and Weber (2011), however under the assumption of risk-
averse investors.
Notably, the suggested extensions will rise complexity and might risk the analytical solvability of
the models. Ultimately, by including all above-mentioned potential extensions, the model might
converge to a fundamental market model which is typically used for scenario-based market studies
and relies on Monte Carlo simulation to calculate development paths for a considered market.
Time series properties and the risk for reversals in the merit order
The results of Chapter 4 have shown that considering potential reversals in the merit order of
thermal plants may largely affect the technology structure in efficient power generation portfolios.
Thereby, the assumptions on the underlying time series of differences in operating costs (e.g.
mean reversion versus random walk) of the considered technologies massively drive the likelihood
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for reversals in the merit order. In this context, further research may be necessary to provide
empirical evidence on random walk versus mean reverting behavior for the difference time series
in operating costs for typical (thermal) generation technologies.
Managerial view on differences in the systematic risks of different generation technologies
The empirical study presented in Chapter 6 indicates considerable differences in the systematic
risk of gas and coal technologies compared to renewable (dominated by hydro) technologies. A
larger sample—both with respect to the length of the considered asset return time series but
most importantly with respect to the number of analyzed companies—would be desirable but
will realistically be hard to obtain in the near future. While the total number of listed electricity
companies in Europe exceeds the selected sample size, all other companies known to the author are
disqualified by high shares of non-generation related business activities. Moreover, the results open
the need for further empirical investigations on the management side: Based on the observations of
significant differences in the systematic risk of different power generation technologies observable
in the market, an empirical survey among plant investors and market analysts could confirm the
application of technology-specific internal rates of return at the decision maker level.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Symbols and model notation
Indices
u Generation technology
t hours Time step during analysis period [0;T ]
Vectors and matrices
i One vector
in Unit vector of dimension n
I Identity matrix
Σ Covariance matrix
L Lag operator
Other
Var[ · ] Variance operator
E[ · ] Expected value operator
P( · ) Probability measure
L Lagrangian
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Parameters and variables
A 1/e Risk aversion parameter
Dt MW Total system demand at time t
tu hours Lower bound of operating hours of technology u
during analysis period [0;T ]
pu,t e/MWhth Fuel price of technology u in period t
ηu MWhe/MWhth thermal efficiency of technology u
hu MWhth/MWhe heat rate of technology u
eu tCO2/MWhth emission rate of technology u
Ku MW Installed capacity of technology u
Qu MWh Energy produced of technology u in period [0;T ]
QE MWh Total energy produced in the system in period [0;T ]
yu,t MW Output level of plant u at time t
C e Total generation costs
Cinv,u e Annuity of “overnight” investment costs of technology u
cinv,u e/MWe Annuity of specific overnight costs of plant u per capacity Ku
Cop,u,t e Operating costs of plant u in period t
cop,u,t e/MWhe Specific operating costs of plant u in period t per output yu,t
c¯op,u e/MWhe Mean operation costs of plant u
σu e/MWhe Standard deviation of total operation costs of technology u
σuv e2/MWh2e Covariance of total operation costs of technologies u and v
ρ - Coefficient of correlation
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A.2 Proofs and mathematical appendix
A.2.1 Portfolio variance and variance of operating costs
Proof. As in Section 3.3.2, we assume specific operating costs per MWh to be uncertain but
constant within the planning period. More specific, let specific operating costs for technology
u be represented by multivariate distributed random variables, c˜op,u, with mean c¯op,u, variance
Var(cop,u) = σ
2
u and corresponding covariance σuv. Then, the relation between variance of to-
tal operating costs for technology u, Var(Cop,u), and the variance of specific operating costs,
Var(cop,u) = σ
2
u, can be calculated as follows:
Var[Cop,u] = Var [Qucop,u] = Var
[∫
t
yu,tcop,udt
]
= E
[(∫
t
yu,tcop,u − yu,tc¯op,udt
)2]
= E
[(∫
t
yu,t(cop,u − c¯op,u)dt
)2]
= E
[(∫
t
yu,tdt
)2
(cop,u − c¯op,u)2
]
=
(∫
t
yu,tdt
)2
E
[
(cop,u − c¯op,u)2
]
= σ2u
(∫
t
yu,tdt
)2
= Q2uVar [cop,u] .
The variance of specific operating costs, Var(cop,u) = σ
2
u, can be calculated from the technology-
specific heat rate, hu, and from the variance of the underlying fuel price, Var(pu), as
Var [cop,t] = h
2
uVar [pu,t]
Thus, the total variance of operating costs for the set of all plants u = {1, . . . , n} can be calculated
as:
Var[Cop] = Var
[∑
u
(∫
t
yu,tcop,udt
)]
=
∑
u
∑
v
(∫
t
yu,tdt
)(∫
t
yv,tdt
)
σuv =
=
∑
u
σ2u
(∫
t
yu,tdt
)2
+
∑
u
∑
v,v 6=u
σuv
(∫
t
yu,tdt
)(∫
t
yv,tdt
)
=
∑
u
σ2uQ
2
u +
∑
u
∑
v,v 6=u
σuvQuQv.
A.2.2 Optimal technology selection for purely cost minimal portfolios with n
technologies
Proposition 3.3.1. Let be
tou :=
cinv,u − cinv,u+1
cop,u+1 − cop,u , (1 ≤ u < n) (3.19)
If tou < t
o
u−1 for all 1 ≤ u < n, then the cost-minimal portfolio consists of all technologies, i.e.
K∗u > 0 for all 1 ≤ u < n.
117
Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 3
Q
colo
r
Q2
4
Q1
Fig. A.1: Graphical solution of the deterministic capacity planning problem from the load duration function and
full-cost production functions. With to3 > t
o
2, technology 3 will not be included in the cost-efficient
portfolio.
Proposition 3.3.2. Technology u is part of the cost-minimal portfolio, i.e. K∗u > 0, only if
tou < t
o
u−1.
A graphical interpretation of these propositions is depicted in Figure A.1: Comparison of the
full cost curves shows that although technology 3 (dashed line) is not “dominated” by any other
technology v such that cop,2′t + cinv,2′ > cop,vt + cinv,v for all admissible t, it is not part of the
cost-minimal portfolio because the condition formulated in Proposition 3.3.1 is violated. The cost-
efficient technology mix is characterized by the lowest envelope of the different cost functions which
yield piece-wise linear efficient cost curve per capacity unit as function of operating time (gray line
in Figure A.1). Only if all intersections of the full cost curves are obtained in a decreasing order
the cost-minimal portfolio will consist of all technologies.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. The proposition is proved by contradiction: From Ku = D(t
∗
u) −
D(t∗u−1) > 0, it can be concluded from KKT condition (3.10) that µu = 0. Assuming contrarily
to the proposition that tou ≥ tou−1. We can compute straightforwardly t∗u = tou + µu+1cop,u+1−cop,u and
t∗u−1 = t
o
u−1 − µu−1cop,u−cop,u−1 from Eqn. (3.18). Given that µu−1, µu+1 ≥ 0, this implies t∗u > t∗u−1.
The strict monotony of D(t) then yields D(t∗u) −D(t∗u−1) < 0, which is in contradiction with the
initial hypothesis Ku > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. To show the implication
tou < t
o
u−1 for all u ⇒ K∗u > 0 for all u,
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we proceed again by contradiction. Taking tou < t
o
u−1 for all u as given, we assume for one single
u that Ku = D(t
∗
u) −D(t∗u−1) = 0. Without much limitation of the generality for the succeeding
technology u + 1 and the preceding technology u − 1, we assume Ku+1 > 0,Ku−1 > 0, implying
µu+1 = 0 and µu−1 = 0.1 Straightforwardly, t∗u = t
o
u− µucop,u+1−cop,u and t∗u−1 = tou−1 +
µu
cop,u−cop,u−1
may be computed which yields t∗u < t
∗
u−1 for all µu ≥ 0. This, however, implies Ku = D(t∗u) −
D(t∗u−1) > 0, in contradiction to the starting assumption.
A.2.3 Solution to the pure variance minimization problem with n technologies
Proposition 3.3.3. Let be a portfolio with n generation technologies with linearly independent
operating costs cop,u, 1 ≤ u ≤ n. Then the covariance matrix Σ is positive definite and hence
invertible and the central optimality condition of the variance minimal portfolio is given by
Q = Σ−1
(
λQi + µQ
)
with (3.26)
λQ =
1
iTΣ−1i
(
QE − iTΣ−1µQ
)
(3.27)
Proof of Proposition 3.3.3. Given linearly independent generation technologies, the covariance ma-
trix of operating costs Σ will be not only positive semi-definite as satisfied per definition (cf. e.g.
Horn and Johnson, 1985, p. 392), but even positive definite. Consequently it is also invertible
and the two equations (3.21) and (3.23) may be combined to yield unique solutions for λQ and Q
as a function of µQ (cf. A.2.3). Now, the optimality conditions (3.27) and (3.26) can be derived
as follows: Starting with λQi = ΣQ − µQ from Eqn. (3.24), the positive definiteness of matrix
Σ allows multiplication with iTΣ−1 from the left followed by division through the scalar iTΣ−1i
yielding(
iTΣ−1
)
λQi =
(
iTΣ−1
)
ΣQ− (iTΣ−1)µQ
⇔ λQ = 1
iTΣ−1i
((
iTΣ−1
)
ΣQ− (iTΣ−1)µQ) = 1
iTΣ−1i
(
iT Q− iTΣ−1µQ
)
Finally, we apply QE = i
TQ from Eqn. (3.25) to obtain optimality condition (3.27):
λQ =
1
iTΣ−1i
(
AQE − iTΣ−1µQ
)
.
By inserting λQ in Eqn. (3.24), Q can be computed as
Q = Σ−1
(
λQi + µQ
)
= Σ−1
(
1
iTΣ−1i
(
QE − iTΣ−1µQ
)
i + µQ
)
= Σ−1
(
1
iTΣ−1i
(
QEi− iiTΣ−1µQ
)
+ µQ
)
=
QE
iTΣ−1i
Σ−1i +
(
Σ−1 − 1
iTΣ−1i
Σ−1iiTΣ−1
)
µQ.
1In the more general case with possibly several subsequent technologies with zero capacities, a recursive procedure
of elimination of inefficient technologies has to be started.
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Proposition 3.3.4. The pure variance-minimal portfolio problem is convex in Q. If and only if
Σ is positive definite, then the optimization problem is strictly convex in Q.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. For the purely variance minimal portfolio, the objective function from
problem (3.8) can be rewritten as
Lr(Q) = QTΣQ
The Hessian of the objective function can be derived straightforwardly with matrix calculus as
Hr = Σ. Taking into account that an arbitrary covariance matrix Σ is positive semi-definite (cf.
Horn and Johnson, 1985, p. 392), convexity of Lr can be concluded. Furthermore, the Hessian is
positive definite and consequently Lr strictly convex if and only if Σ is positive definite. Using Q
as decision variable, constraints (3.10) and (3.12) can be rewritten as −Q ≤ 0 and QE −Qi ≤ 0,
so that linearity and hence also convexity of both constraints become obvious.
Proposition 3.3.5. Let be
Qo =
QE
iTΣ−1i
Σ−1i (3.28)
with i = (1, . . . , 1)T . The variance-minimal portfolio consists of all available technologies, i.e.
Qu > 0 for all 1 ≤ u ≤ n, if and only if Qou > 0 for all 1 ≤ u ≤ n. Then, Q∗ = Qo is a solution
to the variance minimal optimization problem. The solution is unique if Σ is positive definite.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.5. For notational brevity, we define R := ωΣ−1
((
iTΣ−1i
)
I− iiTΣ−1
)
with ω :=
(
iTΣ−1i
)−1
. Then, we can rewrite Eqn. (3.26)
Q = Qo + RµQ.
Remark that the symmetric matrix R is in general indefinite, even for Σ−1 being positive defi-
nite.2 Suppose Qu > 0, which implies µ
Q
u = 0 according to KKT condition (3.10). Consequently,
Qu > 0 for all 1 ≤ u < n implies Qou > 0 for all 1 ≤ u < n. Therewith, Qou > 0 for all 1 ≤ u < n
represents the necessary condition for the variance-minimal portfolio to consist of all available
technologies.
The condition is even sufficient for the variance-minimal solution, since Qu = Q
o
u, µu = 0 for all
1 ≤ u < n represents a solution to the equation system (3.27)-(3.26) and therewith a local variance
minimum to the considered portfolio problem. Taking into account convexity of the optimization
problem as shown in Proposition 3.3.4, it is clear that any local variance minimum is also global.
For Σ being positive definite, the optimization problem is strictly convex and hence the obtained
solution is unique.
2Only nonnegative linear combinations of positive semi-definite matrices are again positive definite (cf. Horn and
Johnson, 1985, Observation 7.1.3), however, R represents a negative linear combination of definite matrices.
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A.2.4 Solution to the general portfolio problem with n technologies
Proposition 3.3.6. The central optimality condition for the combined portfolio problem is given
by
−AΣQ(Kc,LKc) = diag((I− L)t(Kc))−1((I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop.)
(3.33)
Proof of Proposition 3.3.6. The central solution condition (cf. Eqn. (3.33)) for the general risk-
adjusted portfolio problem can be derived from ∂Ln∂Kc as follows:
Adiag
(
(I− L)t(Kc)))Σ(L− I)QI(Kc) = (I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop
⇔ AΣ(L− I)QI(Kc) = diag((I− L)t(Kc))−1((I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop)
⇔ −AΣQ(Kc,LKc) = diag((I− L)t(Kc))−1((I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop)
⇔ Q = − 1
A
Σ−1diag
(
(I− L)t(Kc))−1((I− L)T (cinv + µ) + diag(t(Kc))(I− L)T cop)
Proposition 3.3.7. Let be A > 0 and cinv,u > cinv,u+1 for all (u = 1, . . . , n − 1). Then the
combined portfolio problem (3.8)-(3.12) is convex in Q. If and only if Σ is positive definite, then
the optimization problem is strictly convex in Q and hence has a unique solution.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.7. As shown in Proposition 3.3.4, the pure variance-minimization problem
is convex (strictly convex) in Q if and only if Σ is positive semi-definite (positive definite). For the
second part of the proof, we consider the objective function of the pure cost-minimization problem
Lc(Q) = cinv
T (I− L) Kc(Q) + c¯TopQ
Note that the first summand is linear in Kc(Q), which itself is a nonlinear function of Q. From
the definition of QIu in Eqn. (3.7) it is known that Q
I
u(K
c
u) = f(K
c
u) is an increasing and concave
function of Kcu since
d(QIu(K
c
u))
2
d2Kcu
=
dR(Kcu)
dKcu
≤ 0 since D(t) is monotone decreasing. Hence, it can
be concluded that the inverse function Kcu(Q
I
u) = f
−1(QIu) is convex in Q
I
u. In fact, Q
I
u can be
expressed as the nonnegative linear combination QIu =
∑u
i=1Qi, hence K
c
u(Q
I
u) = K
c
u(Q1, . . . , Qu)
is also convex in each Qi, (i = 1, . . . , u). Finally, cinv
T (I− L) Kc(Q) is convex as a nonnegative
linear combination of convex functions if cinv,u > cinv,u+1 for all (u = 1, . . . , n− 1).
The second summand of Lc is linear in Q and therefore also convex in Q. Thus, also the objective
function L = Lc +Lr of the general cost variance optimization problem is convex as a nonnegative
linear combination of convex functions if cinv,u > cinv,u+1 for all (u = 1, . . . , n− 1).
121
Appendix A Appendix to Chapter 3
A.2.5 Proof of uniqueness and existence of the portfolio optimum with two
technologies
Proposition 3.3.8. The combined portfolio problem (3.8)-(3.12) with two technologies u = {1, 2}
has a unique solution if
AQE(σ
2
2 − σ12) ≥
1
T
(cinv,1 − cinv,2) + c¯op,1 − c¯op,2. (3.36)
Proof of Proposition 3.3.8. Rewriting the optimality condition as given by Eqn. (3.35) leads to
A(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12)Q2 −A(σ21 − σ12)QE =
cinv,1 − cinv,2
t1
+ c¯op,1 − c¯op,2
Here, the risk-free term is separated from the risk-term, each to one side of the optimality condition.
For brevity, we denote the left hand-side of the latter equation with l(t1) and the right hand-side
with r(t1), i.e.
l(t1) :=A(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12)Q2 −A(σ21 − σ12)QE , (A.1)
r(t1) :=
cinv,1 − cinv,2
t1
+ c¯op,1 − c¯op,2. (A.2)
Because it holds (σ21+σ
2
2−2σ12) ≥ 0 for all σ1, σ2, σ12 ≥ 0, |ρ| ≤ 1 and since Q2 =
∫ t1
0
D(t)−D(t1)dt
is monotone increasing in t1, it can be concluded that also l(t1) is monotone increasing in t1, i.e.
∂l(t1)
∂t1
≥ 0. In contrast, it can be seen that r(t1) is hyperbolically decreasing in t1 thus ∂r(t1)∂t1 ≤ 0,
given (cop,1 < cop,2) ∧ (cinv,1 > cinv,2).
The optimal operating time t∗1 satisfying condition (3.35) is given by the intersection of l(t1)
and r(t1) (see Figure A.2). This value represents the optimal operating time of the peak-load
technology and captures the trade-off of the variance-minimal and the cost-minimal run-time of
the peak load technology. A unique intersection point is obtained if l(T ) ≥ r(T ), i.e.
AQE(σ
2
2 − σ12) ≥
1
T
(cinv,1 − cinv,2) + c¯op,1 − c¯op,2
and the two functions will cross exactly once in the interval [0, T ], resulting in a unique solution
from the optimality condition (3.35). The latter assumption will generally be fulfilled as empirically
shown in Section 3.4. In the rare case of AQE(σ
2
2 − σ12) < 1T (cinv,1 − cinv,2) + c¯op,1 − c¯op,2, l(t1),
and r(t1) have no intersection in the interval [0, T ]. Hence, in this case there is no interior solution
to problem (3.8) to (3.12).
A.2.6 Proof of sensitivity properties of the cost-variance efficient portfolio
Proposition 3.3.10. For a risk-cost-efficient portfolio, the sensitivity of optimal operating hours
(and respectively capacities) of the considered technologies with respect to the risk-aversion param-
eter A is only dependent on the covariance of operating costs with
dt∗1
dA
Q 0, for σ1
σ2
Q ρ. (3.38)
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t∗1
tc∗1
cop,1 − cop,2
T
−A(σ21 − σ12)QE
A(σ22 − σ12)QE
r(t1)
l(t1)
tr∗1
Fig. A.2: Graphical proof of the uniqueness of results from the optimality condition. The intersection of r(t1) and
l(t1) represents the optimal operating time.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.10. To derive sensitivity properties of the optimal portfolio fuel mix on the
risk attitude factor A, we use in the two-technology case the first order derivative of the optimality
condition itself. Total differentiation of Eqn. (3.35) with respect to A and following reallocation
leads to
dt∗1
dA
(
c¯op,1 − c¯op,2 +AQE(σ21 − σ12)−A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)
+
+ t∗1
(
(σ21 − σ12)QE −Q2(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12) +A
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
)
t2D
′(t∗1)
dt∗1
dA
)
= 0
⇔ dt
∗
1
dA
=
(t∗1)
2
(
Q2(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12)−QE(σ21 − σ12)
)
cinv,2 − cinv,1 + (t∗1)3A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)D′(t∗1)
. (A.3)
At first, suppose
dt∗1
dA ≤ 0. Taking into account the negativity of the denominator in Eqn.
(A.3), this requires consequently the enumerator in the latter term to be non-negative, i.e. Q2QE ≥
σ21−σ12
σ21+σ
2
2−2σ12 . By inserting 0 as the lower bound of
Q2
QE
, it follows ∀σ1, σ2, ρ with
(
σ1
σ2
≤ ρ
)
⇒(
dt∗1
dA ≤ 0
)
.
From the upper bound Q2QE ≤ 1 it can be concluded in this case
(
dt∗1
dA ≤ 0
)
⇒
(
σ2
σ1
≥ ρ
)
. Remark
that condition σ1σ2 ≤ ρ can be considered as sufficient and σ2σ1 ≥ ρ as necessary for the case
dt∗1
dA ≤ 0.
Per definition of the coefficient of correlation it is |ρ| ≤ 1. Therefore, σ1σ2 ≤ ρ implies σ2 ≥ σ1. The
latter again implies σ2σ1 ≥ ρ. Hence, with
(
σ1
σ2
≤ ρ
)
⇒
(
σ2
σ1
≥ ρ
)
, the necessary condition implies
the sufficient condition and we can simply state(
dt∗1
dA
≤ 0
)
⇔
(
σ1
σ2
≤ ρ
)
.
Now, the case
dt∗1
dA ≥ 0 follows directly from the negation of this equivalence:(
dt∗1
dA
≥ 0
)
⇔
(
σ1
σ2
≥ ρ
)
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Proposition 3.3.11. Alternatively, a comparison of optimal operating times for the purely cost-
efficient portfolio, tc∗1 , and for the purely risk-efficient portfolio, t
r∗
1 , can provide evidence on the
sensitivity. As shown in A.2.6, it equivalently holds
dt∗1
dA
Q 0, for tc∗1 R tr∗1 . (3.39)
Proof of Proposition 3.3.11. Alternatively, the sensitivity of t∗1 on the parameter A can be checked
by comparison of the optimal operating times of the purely cost-efficient portfolio, tr∗2 , and the
purely risk-efficient portfolio, tr∗2 : (
dt∗1
dA
Q 0
)
⇔ (tc∗1 Q tr∗2 )
This can be seen from the risk term and the cost term of optimality condition (cf. Eqn. (3.35))
as previously defined in Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2). With l(t1) monotone increasing and r(t1) mono-
tone decreasing in t1, we can indirectly derive sensitivity properties of t
∗
1 from the sensitivities of
l(0), l(T ), and the variance minimal operating time tr∗1 with l(t
r∗
1 ) = 0 (cf. Figure A.2). Knowing
that Q2(t
r∗
1 ) is monotone increasing in t
r∗
1 , it can be seen from that the variance minimal operating
time is independent from the parameter A:
Q2(t
r∗
1 ) =QE
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
σ21 − σ12
> 0 for σ1 ≷ σ2.
Therefore, it holds(
∂l(0)
∂A
R 0
)
∧ (tc∗1 < tr∗1 )⇒
(
∂t∗1
∂A
R 0
)
,
(
∂l(T )
∂A
Q 0
)
∧ (tc∗1 > tr∗1 )⇒
(
∂t∗1
∂A
R 0
)
.
For l and its partial differentials we can state
l(0) = −A(σ21 − σ12)QE Q 0 for ρ Q
σ1
σ2
,
∂l(0)
∂A
= −(σ21 − σ12)QE Q 0 for ρ Q
σ1
σ2
,
l(T ) =A(σ22 − σ12)QE R 0 for ρ Q
σ2
σ1
,
∂l(T )
∂A
= (σ22 − σ12) R 0 for ρ Q
σ2
σ1
.
Note that from l(0) < 0 follows ∂l(0)∂A < 0, similarly l(T ) > 0 implies
∂l(T )
∂A > 0. Thus, within the
boundaries where both technologies are part of the purely risk-efficient portfolio, i.e. ρ ≤ σ2σ1 and
ρ ≤ σ1σ2 (cf. Property 3.3.9), we can conclude(
tc∗1 Q tr∗1
)⇔ (∂t∗1
∂A
R 0
)
.
Proposition 3.3.12. Given technologies 1 and 2 being part of the cost-efficient and the variance-
efficient portfolio, the following parameter conditions are sufficient for the stated sensitivity prop-
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erties of optimal operating hours (respectively capacities) of technology 2:
dt∗1
dσ1
≥ 0 for all σ1, σ2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (3.40)
dt∗1
dσ2
≤ 0 for all σ1, σ2 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, (3.41)
dt∗1
dρ
≤ 0 for all σ1, σ2,≥ 0, −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. (3.42)
Proof 1 for Proposition 3.3.12. Total differentiation of optimality condition Eqn. (3.35) with re-
spect to σ1 yields
dt∗1
dσ1
(
cop,1 − cop,2 +AQE(σ21 − σ12)−A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)
+
+ t∗1A
(
(2σ1 − σ2ρ)QE − 2Q2(σ1 − σ2ρ) +
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
)
t∗1D
′(t∗1)
dt∗1
dσ2
)
= 0
⇔ dt
∗
1
dσ1
=
(t∗1)
2A
(
(σ2ρ− 2σ1)QE − 2Q2(σ2ρ− σ1)
)
cinv,2 − cinv,1 + (t∗1)3A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)D′(t∗1)
. (A.4)
Consider
dt∗1
dσ1
≥ 0 which requires the enumerator in Eqn. (A.4) to be negative. Consequently, two
cases have to be differentiated:
I) For non-negativity of the term Q2(·) in Eqn. (A.4), let be ρ > σ1σ2 : Consequently,
Q2
QE
≥
σ2ρ−2σ1
2σ2ρ−2σ1 has to hold. Using
Q2
QE
≥ 0 as the lower bound, it follows ρ ≤ 2σ1σ2 .
II) For negativity of the term Q2(·) in Eqn. (A.4), let be ρ < σ1σ2 : Then
dt∗1
dσ1
≥ 0 requires
Q2
QE
≤ σ2ρ−2σ12σ2ρ−2σ1 . Using
Q2
QE
≤ 1 as the upper bound, it follows ρ ≥ 0.
Hence, within the boundaries σ1σ2 > ρ and
σ2
σ1
> ρ, it can be concluded
dt∗1
dσ1
≥ 0 for all σ1, σ2, ρ ≥
0.3
Proof 2 for Proposition 3.3.12. Total differentiation of Eqn. (3.35) with respect to σ2 yields
dt∗1
dσ2
(
cop,1 − cop,2 +AQE(σ21 − σ12)−A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)−
− t2A
(
σ1ρQE + 2Q2(σ2 − σ1ρ)−
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
)
t∗1D
′(t∗1)
dt∗1
dσ2
)
= 0
⇔ dt
∗
1
dσ2
=
(t∗1)
2A
(
σ1ρQE + 2Q2(σ2 − σ1ρ)
)
cinv,2 − cinv,1 + (t∗1)3A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)D′(t∗1)
. (A.5)
The case
dt∗1
dσ2
≤ 0 requires the enumerator in Eqn. (A.5) to be non-negative. It needs to be
distinguished between the following cases:
I) For non-negativity of the term Q2(·) in Eqn. (A.5), let be ρ < σ2σ1 , i.e.
Q2
QE
≥ σ1ρ−22(σ1ρ−σ2) .
Using Q2QE ≥ 0 as the lower bound, it follows ρ ≥ 0.
3For
dt∗1
dσ1
≤ 0, we can proceed vice versa to obtain a sufficient condition for σ1, σ2, ρ fulfilling the assumption.
Since we do only obtain the null set, the existence of a parameter set with
dt∗1
dσ1
≤ 0 remains unproven.
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II) For negativity of the term Q2(·) in Eqn. (A.5), let be ρ > σ2σ1 : Then
dt∗1
dσ2
≤ 0 requires
Q2
QE
≤ σ2ρ−2σ12σ2ρ−2σ1 . Using
Q2
QE
≤ 1 as the upper bound, it follows ρ ≤ 2σ2σ1 .
Taken both cases together and considering the boundaries σ1σ2 > ρ and
σ2
σ1
> ρ, we obtain for all
σ1, σ2, ρ ≥ 0, dt
∗
1
dσ2
≤ 0.4
Proof 3 for Proposition 3.3.12. As shown, total differentiation of the optimality condition Eqn.
(3.35) with respect to ρ leads to
dt∗1
dρ
(
cop,1 − cop,2 +AQE(σ21 − σ12)−A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)Q2
)−
− t∗1A
(
σ1σ2QE − 2σ1σ2Q2 −
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12
)
t2D
′(t2)
dt∗1
dρ
)
= 0
⇔ dt
∗
1
dρ
=
(t∗1)
2Aσ1σ2 (Q1 −Q2)
cinv,2 − cinv,1 + (t∗1)3A(σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12)D′(t∗1)
(A.6)
For
dt∗1
dρ ≤ 0, it can be reasoned from Eqn. (A.6) that (Q1 −Q2 ≥ 0) ⇔
(
Q2
QE
≤ 12
)
has to be
fulfilled. As seen in proof 2, if σ1σ2 ≥ ρ the relation
Q2
QE
≤ σ21−2σ12
σ21+σ
2
2−σ12 holds and represents an upper
bound for the quotient Q2QE . Thus, we can conclude(
σ21 − σ1σ2ρ
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ1σ2ρ
≤ 1
2
)
⇔ (σ1 ≤ σ2) .
Hence, within the boundaries σ1σ2 > ρ and
σ2
σ1
> ρ, we can conclude
dt∗1
dσ1
≤ 0 for all σ1, σ2 ≥ 0 with
σ1 ≤ σ2.
4Applying the analogue estimation for
dt∗1
dσ2
≥ 0, however, cannot prove the existence of a feasible set of σ1, σ2, ρ
as we only obtain the null set.
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B.1 Symbols and model notation
Indices
u Plant technology
si Merit order state
t hours Intra-period time step during analysis period [0;T ]
τ years Period time step during considered plant lifetime [0; τˆ ]
Operators
Var[ · ] Variance operator
Var[ · |si] Conditional variance operator given scenario si
E[ · ] Expectation operator
E[ · |si] Conditional expectation operator given scenario si
P( · ) Probability measure
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Parameters and variables
A 1/e Social risk attitude
Dt MW Total system demand at time t
tu hours Minimal operating duration of u when
representing the base technology
Ou hours Minimal operating duration of technology u
pu,t e/MWhth Fuel price of technology u in period t
ηu MWhe/MWhth thermal efficiency of plant technology u
hu MWhth/MWhe heat rate of plant technology u
eu tCO2/MWhth emission rate of plant technology u
Ku MW Installed capacity of plant technology u
Qu MWh Energy produced of plant technology u in period [0;T ]
QE MWh Total energy produced in the system in period [0;T ]
yu,t MW Output level of plant u at time t
Cinv,u e Annuity of overnight costs (total investment costs) of plant u
cinv,u e/MWe Annuity of specific overnight costs of plant u per capacity Ku
Cu,t e Operating costs of plant u in period t
cu,t e/MWhe Specific operating costs of plant u in period t per output yu,t
c¯u e/MWhe Mean operating costs of plant u
σu e/MWhe Standard deviation of operating costs of plant u
σuv e2/MWh2e Covariance of operating costs of plant u and v
c¯u|si e/MWhe Conditional mean operating costs o given scenario si
σu|si e/MWhe Conditional standard deviation of op. costs given scenario si
σuv|si e
2/MWh2e Conditional covariance of op. costs given scenario si
ρ - Coefficient of correlation
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B.2 Mathematical Appendix
B.2.1 Calculation of conditional expectations and variances
To calculate the conditional expectations and variances used in the optimization problem from
Eqs. (4.9)-(4.12), we start with the conditional joint distribution of c˜1, c˜2 given c˜1 ≤ c˜2 which can
be obtained as the truncated distribution (see Figure B.1) with density
f1,2(c1, c2|s˜ = s0) = f1,2(c1, c2|c1 < c2) = ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
P(s˜ = s0)
, for −∞ < c1 ≤ c2 <∞, (B.1)
where P(s˜ = s0) denotes the fuel-switch likelihood which can be computed from the distribution
of differences in operating costs z˜ = c˜2 − c˜1 as discussed in Eqn. (4.51). Next, the conditional
densities of c˜1, c˜2 under the condition c˜1 ≤ c˜2 (see Figure B.2) and given a fixed value of c2, c1,
respectively, are determined as:
f1(c1|c1 ≤ c2) = f1,2(c1, c2|c1 ≤ c2)
ϕ2(c2)
=
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ2(c2)
(B.2)
f2(c2|c1 ≤ c2) = f1,2(c1, c2|c1 ≤ c2)
ϕ1(c1)
=
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ1(c1)
(B.3)
From these, we can straightforwardly derive the (single) conditional expectations as
E[c˜1|c2 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)] =
∫ c2
−∞
c1f1(c1|c1 ≤ c2)dc1 =
∫ c2
−∞
c1
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ2(c2)
dc1 (B.4)
E[c˜1|c2 ∧ (c1 > c2)] =
∫ ∞
c2
c1f1(c1|c1 > c2)dc1 =
∫ ∞
c2
c1
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ2(c2)dc1 (B.5)
E[c˜2|c1 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)] =
∫ ∞
c1
c2f2(c2|c1 ≤ c2)dc2 =
∫ ∞
c1
c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ1(c1)
dc2 (B.6)
E[c˜2|c1 ∧ (c1 > c2)] =
∫ c1
−∞
c2f2(c2|c1 > c2)dc2 =
∫ c1
−∞
c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ1(c1)dc2 (B.7)
Here, conditional expectations E
[
c˜1
∣∣c2 ∧ (c1 Q c2)] = g(c2) and E [c˜2∣∣c1 ∧ (c1 Q c2)] = g(c1)
represent functions which are solely dependent on c1 and c2, respectively. Hence it makes sense to
define the conditional expectation c¯u|s0 ≡ E[c˜u|s˜ = s0] given the default fuel cost order scenario s0
as the double expectation E
[
E[c˜1|c2 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)]
]
. Straightforwardly, we obtain
E[c˜1|s˜ = s0] := E
[
E[c˜1|c2 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)]
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c2
−∞
c1
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ2(c2)
dc1dc2 (B.8)
E[c˜1|s˜ = s1] := E
[
E[c˜1|c2 ∧ (c1 > c2)]
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c2
c1
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ2(c2)dc1dc2 (B.9)
E[c˜2|s˜ = s0] := E
[
E[c˜2|c1 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)]
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c1
c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ1(c1)
dc2dc1 (B.10)
E[c˜2|s˜ = s1] := E
[
E[c˜2|c1 ∧ (c1 > c2)]
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c1
−∞
c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ1(c1)dc2dc1 (B.11)
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that E
[
E[c˜u|s˜]
]
= E[cu]. Thus, the probability-weighted sum of
the conditional expectations of operating costs E[c˜u|s˜ = si] given both fuel cost scenarios, equals
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the unconditional expectation of c˜u, i.e.
E
[
E[c˜u|s˜ = si]
]
=
2∑
i=1
(P(s˜ = si)E[c˜u|s˜ = si]) = E[c˜u]. (B.12)
Recall that the conditional variance of a random variable x˜ given y˜ is defined as
Var[x˜|y˜] := E[(x˜−E[x˜|y˜])2∣∣y]. (B.13)
In analogy to the conditional expectation, we denote the conditional variance given the fuel price
scenario s0
σ2u|s0 ≡ Var[c˜u|s˜ = s0] := E
[
Var[c˜u|c2 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)]
]
= E
[
E[c˜2u|c2 ∧ (c1 ≤ c2)]
]−E[c˜u|s0]2 (B.14)
σ2u|s1 ≡ Var[c˜u|s˜ = s1] := E
[
Var[c˜u|c2 ∧ (c1 > c2)]
]
= E
[
E[c˜2u|c2 ∧ (c1 > c2)]
]−E[c˜u|s1]2 (B.15)
It can be obtained by incremental computation from the square expectations1 with
Var[c˜1|s˜ = s0] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c2
−∞
c21
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ2(c2)
dc1dc2 −
(
E[c1|s˜ = s0]
)2
(B.16)
Var[c˜1|s˜ = s1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c2
c21
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ2(c2)dc1dc2 −
(
E[c1|s˜ = s1]
)2
(B.17)
Var[c˜2|s˜ = s0] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c1
c22
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ1(c1)
dc2dc1 −
(
E[c2|s˜ = s0]
)2
(B.18)
Var[c˜2|s˜ = s1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c1
−∞
c22
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ1(c1)dc2dc1 −
(
E[c2|s˜ = s1]
)2
(B.19)
In a straightforward manner we obtain for the conditional covariance σ12|si ≡ Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜ = s0]
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜ = s0] = E[c˜1c˜2|s˜ = s0]−E[c˜1|s˜ = s0] ·E[c˜2|s˜ = s0] (B.20)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ c2
−∞
c1c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
Φ(0)ϕ2(c2)
dc1dc2 −E[c˜1|s˜ = s0]E[c˜2|s˜ = s0]
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜ = s1] = E[c˜1c˜2|s˜ = s1]−E[c˜1|s˜ = s1] ·E[c˜2|s˜ = s1] (B.21)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
c2
c1c2
ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ)
(1− Φ(0))ϕ2(c2)dc1dc2 −E[c˜1|s˜ = s1]E[c˜2|s˜ = s1]
1Alternatively, the expected conditional variance could be derived from the law of total variance, i.e. Var[x˜] =
Var[x˜|y˜] + Var[E[x˜|y˜]]. Based on the latter, the expected conditional variance can be written as
E
[
Var[x˜|y˜]] = Var[x˜]−E[Var[E[x˜|y˜]]]
.
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Fig. B.1: Unconditional bivariate density function ϕ1,2(c1, c2, ρ) (left) and conditional (truncated) bivariate density
function f1,2(c1, c2|c1 < c2) (right).
Fig. B.2: Marginal densities f1(c1, c2|c1 < c2) (left) and f2(c1, c2|c1 < c2) (right).
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B.2.2 The risk-adjusted portfolio problem with merit order risk
Proof of Eqn. (4.10). Total expected generation costs can be calculated as
E[Cop] = E
[
E[Cop|s˜]
]
= E
[
E
[∑
u
(
Qu|s˜c˜u
) ∣∣∣s˜]] = E[∑
u
E
[ (
Qu|s˜c˜u
) ∣∣∣s˜]]
= E
[∑
u
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]] = ∑
u
E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]] = ∑
u
∑
i
(
P(s˜ = si)Qu|siE[c˜u|s˜ = si]
)
(B.22)
Similarly, conditional variance is used to calculate total variance of generation costs. Thereby, the
total variance consists of intra-scenario variance and inter-scenario variance. For the variance of
generation costs of technology u we obtain by inserting the conditional expectation as calculated
above followed by rewriting
Var[Cu] = E
[
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2
c˜2u
∣∣s˜]]− (E[E[Qu|s˜c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
= E
[
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2
c˜2u
∣∣s˜]]−E[(E[Qu|s˜c˜u∣∣s˜])2]+ E[(Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜])2]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
= E
[
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2
c˜2u
∣∣s˜]− (E[Qu|s˜c˜u∣∣s˜])2]+ E[(Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜])2]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
= E
[
Var
[
Qu|s˜c˜u
∣∣s˜]]+ Var[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]]
= E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2 ·Var[c˜u∣∣s˜]]+ E[(Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜])2]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
= E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2 · (Var[c˜u∣∣s˜]+ (E[c˜u∣∣s˜])2)]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2 (B.23)
Similarly, the covariance of operating costs of technologies u, v can be derived as
Cov[Cu, Cv] = E
[
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)
c˜u
∣∣s˜] ·E[(Qv|s˜)c˜v∣∣s˜]]−E[E[Qu|s˜c˜u∣∣s˜]] ·E[E[Qv|s˜c˜v∣∣s˜]]
= E
[
Qu|s˜Qv|s˜Cov
[
c˜u, c˜v
∣∣s˜]]+ E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]Qv|s˜E[c˜v∣∣s˜]]
−E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]]E[Qv|s˜E[c˜v∣∣s˜]]
= E
[
Qu|s˜Qv|s˜
(
Cov
[
c˜u, c˜v
∣∣s˜]+ E[c˜u∣∣s˜]E[c˜v∣∣s˜])]
−E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]]E[Qv|s˜E[c˜v∣∣s˜]] (B.24)
Hence, the total variance of operating costs for the set of all technologies u = {1, . . . , n} can be
calculated as:
Var[Cop] = Var
[∑
u
Cu
]
=
∑
u
Var[Cu] +
∑
u
∑
v,v 6=u
Cov[Cu, Cv]. (B.25)
By inserting E[Cop] and Var[Cop] as derived above into Eqn. (4.5), we obtain as objective
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function of the optimization problem as formulated in Eqs. (4.9)-(4.12):
L =
∑
u
(
Kucinv,u + E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]])
+
A
2
∑
u
∑
v
(
E
[
Qu|s˜Qv|s˜
(
Cov[c˜u, c˜v |s˜] + E[c˜u|s˜] ·E[c˜v |s˜]
)]−E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]] ·E[Qv|s˜E[c˜v∣∣s˜]]
)
=
∑
u
(
Kucinv,u + E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]]+ 1
2
A
(
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2(
Var[c˜u|s˜] + (E[c˜u|s˜])2
)]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
+
∑
v,v 6=u
(
E
[
Qu|s˜Qv|s˜
(
Cov[c˜u, c˜v |s˜] + E[c˜u|s˜] ·E[c˜v |s˜]
)]−E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]] ·E[Qv|s˜E[c˜v∣∣s˜]]
)))
=
∑
u
(
Kucinv,u + E
[
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜]]+ 1
2
A
(
E
[(
Qu|s˜
)2(
Var[c˜u|s˜] + (E[c˜u|s˜])2
)]− (E[Qu|s˜E[c˜u∣∣s˜]])2
))
+A
(
E
[
Q1|s˜Q2|s˜
(
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜] + E[c˜1|s˜] ·E[c˜2|s˜]
)]−E[Q1|s˜E[c˜1∣∣s˜]] ·E[Q2|s˜E[c˜2∣∣s˜]]
)
=
∑
u
(
Kucinv,u +
1∑
i=0
P(s˜ = si)
(
Qu|siE
[
c˜u
∣∣si]+ 1
2
A
∑
v
Qu|siQv|si
(
Cov[c˜u, c˜v |si] + E[c˜u|si]E[c˜v |si]
))
+AQ1|s˜Q2|s˜
(
Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s˜] + E[c˜1|s˜] ·E[c˜2|s˜]
)))
− A
2
1∑
i=0
P(s˜ = si)
(∑
u
Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜])2 + A
2
(
1∑
i=0
P(s˜ = si)Qu|s˜E
[
c˜u
∣∣s˜])2 (B.26)
B.2.3 Standard solutions to the purely cost efficient portfolio with
uncertainty in the merit order
Proof of Eqs. (4.29) and (4.30). In an extensive form, the Lagrangian (4.28) can be written as
Lc =
2∑
u=1
Kucinv,u +Q1|s0P(s0)c¯1|s0 +Q1|s1P(s1)c¯1|s1
+Q2|s0P(s0)c¯2|s0 +Q2|s1P(s1)c¯2|s1 + λ(D(0)−K1 −K2)
(B.27)
Denoting z := c2 − c1, the KKT-conditions (4.29) and (4.30) can be derived from Lc as follows:
∂Lc
∂K1
= cinv,1 − λ+
∂Q1|s0
∂K1
·P(s0)c¯1|s0 +
∂Q2|s0
∂K1
·P(s0)c¯2|s0
= cinv,1 − λ+ t1P(s0)c¯1|s0 − t1P(s0)c¯2|s0 = t1P(s0) ·E[z˜|s0] (B.28)
∂Lc
∂K2
= cinv,2 − λ+
∂Q1|s1
∂K2
·P(s1)c¯1|s1 +
∂Q2|s1
∂K2
·P(s1)c¯2|s1
= cinv,1 − λ− t2P(s1)c¯1|s1 + t2P(s1)c¯2|s1 = t2P(s1) ·E[z˜|s1] (B.29)
Proposition 4.2.1. With z := c2 − c1 denoting the difference in operating costs of technologies 1
and 2, the purely cost-minimal portfolio with merit order risk P(s1) consists of technology 2 if and
only if
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≥ TP(s0)E[z˜|s0]. (4.34)
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In contrast, the portfolio consists of technology 1 if and only if
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤ TP(s1)E[z˜|s1]. (4.35)
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1. We will first prove the equivalence K∗2 = 0 ⇔ cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤
TP(s1)
(
c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1
)
by showing the validity of the two implications:
Given K∗2 = 0, it can be concluded in the case λ > 0 (i.e. no overcapacities in the optimum)
t∗1 = 0 since K1 = D(0) = D(t
∗
1) according to Eqn. (4.31). Since for the lower bound of the
operating time of the respective base load technology it holds D(t∗u) = K
∗
u, it must furthermore
be t∗2 = T . Since Eqn. (4.29) holds with equality, λ can be be eliminated by subtraction of Eqs.
((4.29) and ((4.30) yielding
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤ TP(s1)
(
c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1
)
The case λ = 0 (i.e. there may be overcapacities in the optimum) can be rejected with the
initial assumption: Since K∗2 = 0 implies t
∗
1 = 0, KKT condition (4.30) yields the contradiction
cinv,1 = 0.
2
To prove the converse implication, we assume for cinv,1− cinv,2 ≤ TP(s1)
(
c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1
)
without
limitation of the generality K∗2 > 0. This implies 0 ≤ t∗2 < T , 0 < t∗1 ≤ T . Hence KKT condition
(4.30) has to be fulfilled with equality. Eliminating λ through subtraction of KKT conditions (4.29)
and (4.30) yields
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≥ t∗1P(s0)(c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s0) + t∗2P(s1)(c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1)
However, the latter inequality is contradictory to the initial assumption for all feasible 0 ≤ t∗2 < T ,
0 < t∗1 ≤ T since (c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s0) > 0 and (c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1) < 0. Thus it follows K∗2 = 0 from
cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≤ TP(s1)
(
c¯2|s1 − c¯1|s1
)
.
The proof of the analogue equivalence K∗1 = 0 ⇔ cinv,1 − cinv,2 ≥ −TP(s0)
(
c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s0
)
can
be obtained in a straightforward manner analogue to this proof.
B.2.4 Standard solutions to the purely variance efficient portfolio with
uncertainty in the merit order
Proposition 4.2.2. Under the restriction that total installed generation capacity must match
total demand, i.e. λ 6= 0, the purely variance minimal portfolio with a merit order risk P(s1) > 0
corresponding to optimization problem (4.9)-(4.12) consists of both technologies 1 and 2 if(
−
σ12|s0 − σ21|s0
E[z˜|s0]P(s1) > c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0
)
∧
(
c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0 <
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1
E[z˜|s1]P(s0)
)
(4.42)
Proof of Proposition 4.2.2. Given the initial assumption λ 6= 0, t2 can be expressed as a function of
t1 throughout this proof with t2(t1) = R(D(0)−D(t1)). Hence, t1 can be used as the only decision
2The rejection of the case λ = 0 is intuitively plausible from an economical perspective, since it does not make
sense to build overcapacities in the optimum if only one technology is selected.
134
B.2 Mathematical Appendix
variable in the problem since K1,K2, t2 are all functions of t1. Theoretically, locating the root
dLv(t1,t2(t1))
dt1
= 0 would allow to further discuss the considered solution case.3 Since an analytical
discussion of the latter derivative seems practically impossible, we use an alternative approach in
the proof:
For an interior solution with 0 < t∗1 < T (and hence K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 > 0), KKT conditions (4.38) and
(4.39) have to be satisfied with equality as necessary optimality condition. Eliminating λ through
subtraction of these conditions yields ∂Lv∂K1 − ∂Lv∂K2 = 0. For t1 > 0, the latter condition may be
equivalently transformed by division through t1. Substitution of Q2|si by utilizing the relation
Q2|si = QE −Q1|si , i ∈ {1, 2}, finally yields the equivalent optimality condition l(t1) = r(t1) with
l(t1) := P(s0)
((
Q1|s0
(
Var[z˜|s0] + P(s1)E[z˜|s0]2
)−P(s1)Q1|s1E[z˜|s1]E[z˜|s0])−
−QE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E[z˜|s0]
))
(B.30)
r(t1) := P(s1)
t2
t1
(
P(s0)E[z˜|s0]Q1|s0E[z˜|s1]−
(
Var[z˜|s1] + P(s0)E[z˜|s1]2
)
Q1|s1+
+QE
(
σ22|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)(c¯2|s1 − c¯2|s0)E[z˜|s1]
))
(B.31)
Thereby, the corresponding boundaries for l(t1) can straightforwardly be obtained as
l(0) = P(s0)QE
(
P(s1)E[z˜|s0](c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0) + σ21|s0 − σ12|s0
)
, (B.32)
l(T ) = −P(s0)QE
(
P(s1)E[z˜|s0](c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1) + σ22|s0 − σ12|s0
)
. (B.33)
By applying the derivatives
dt2(t1)
dt1
=
d
dt1
(
R(D(0)−D(t1))
)
= −R′(D(0)−D(t1)) ·D′(t1) < 0 ∀ t1 ∈ [0, T ], (B.34)
dQ1|s0(t1)
dt1
=
d
dt1
(∫ D(t1)
0
R(κ)dκ
)
= D′(t1) · t1 < 0 ∀ t1 ∈ [0, T ], (B.35)
dQ1|s1(t1)
dt1
=
d
dt1
(∫ D(0)
D(0)−D(t1)
R(κ)dκ
)
= −R′(D(0)−D(t1)) ·D′(t1) < 0 ∀ t1 ∈ [0, T ],
(B.36)
it becomes obvious that l(t1) is monotone decreasing on its domain, i.e.
dl(t1)
dt1
< 0 ∀t1 ∈ [0;T ].
Function r(t1) can be considered as being of the form r(t1) = f(t1)/t1, where f(t1) is defined as
the function f(t1) := r(t1) · t1. We obtain for f(0) and the boundaries of r(t1)
f(0) = P(s1)TQE
(
E[z˜|s1]P(s0)(c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0)− σ21|s1 + σ12|s1
)
, (B.37)
r(T ) = 0, lim
t1↘0
r(t1) =

+∞ for f(0) > 0
0 for f(0) = 0
−∞ for f(0) < 0
(B.38)
3Note that the derivative
dLv(t1,t2(t1))
dt1
equals the directional derivative ∇~tLv(K1,K2) = ∂Lv(K1,K2)∂K1 · t1 +
∂Lv(K1,K2)
∂K2
· t2(t1) with the directional vector ~t = (t1, t2(t1))T of unit length, i.e. |~t| = 1.
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Furthermore, it can be concluded that r(t1) is monotone increasing (and decreasing, respectively)
in an interval (0; ξ) for arbitrary means and variances, before it may start to decrease if f(0) < 0
(and increase if f(0) > 0, respectively). Thereby, non-monotony of r(t1) can only occur if
g := σ22|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)(c¯2|s1 − c¯2|s0)E[z˜|s1]
> 0 for f(0) < 0< 0 for f(0) > 0
where g refers to the last summand of f(t1).
Since an explicit formulation of the stationary points is not possible and the problem is non-
convex in variable t1, we use the first derivatives to test whether one of the possibly multiple
stationary points is a local minimum or a local maximum: If there exists a r ∈ R+ such that
for every t1 ∈ (to1 − r, to1] it holds ∂Lv∂K2 (t1) − ∂Lv∂K1 (t1) ≤ 0, and for every t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r) it is
∂Lv
∂K2
(t1)− ∂Lv∂K1 (t1) ≥ 0, then Lv has a local minimum at to1 according to the mean value theorem.
Consequently, a local minimum in to1 implies that r(t1)−l(t1) ≤ 0, ∀t1 ∈ (to1−r, to1] and r(t1)−l(t1) ≥
0, ∀t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r). The obtained stationary points to1 ∈ (0;T ) with l(to1) = r(to1) and therewith
∂Lv
∂K1
(to1) =
∂Lv
∂K2
(to1) = 0 can be characterized as follows corresponding to Figure B.3:
I) For l(0) ≥ 0 ∧ f(0) ≤ 0, there may exist up to two stationary points to1:
– For two stationary points to exist, it is required g > 0. Then Lv(to1) takes a minimum
if r(t1)− l(t1) ≤ 0, ∀t1 ∈ (to1 − r, to1] and r(t1)− l(t1) ≥ 0, ∀t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r). Hence, the
efficient portfolio consists of both technologies.
– For g ≤ 0 ∧ l(T ) ≤ 0 there exists a unique local minimum at to1 and the variance efficient
portfolio consists of a combination of both technologies.
– Otherwise, if a feasible stationary point to1 does not exist, the variance efficient portfolio
consists only of technology 2.4
II) For l(0) < 0 ∧ f(0) ≤ 0 (equivalent to condition (4.42)), there exists a unique local minimum
at to1. Hence, the variance efficient portfolio consists of both technologies.
III) For l(T ) ≥ 0 ∧ f(0) > 0, there exists a unique local maximum at to1, since it is r(t1)− l(t1) ≥
0, ∀t1 ∈ (to1 − r, to1] and r(t1) − l(t1) ≤ 0, ∀t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r). Hence, it can be concluded that
the variance efficient portfolio consists only of technology 2.
IV) For l(T ) < 0 ∧ l(0) > 0 ∧ (f(0) > 0), there may exist up two feasible stationary points to1:
– In case of two stationary points , Lv(to1) takes the minimum if r(t1) − l(t1) ≤ 0, ∀t1 ∈
(to1 − r, to1] and r(t1)− l(t1) ≥ 0, ∀t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r). Hence, the efficient portfolio consists
of both technologies.
– Otherwise, if a feasible stationary point to1 does not exist, the variance efficient portfolio
consists only of technology 1.
4Since l(T ) ≥ 0 requires the variance of technology 1 to be much greater than the variance of technology 2, it can
be concluded that the variance efficient portfolio will only consist of technology 2, not of technology 1.
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I
II
III
IV
V
Fig. B.3: Stationarity conditions for the purely variance-minimal portfolio in the case λ > 0. The intersection of
l(t1) (green line) and r(t1) (blue line) represents the optimal operating time.
V) For l(0) ≤ 0 ∧ f(0) > 0, there may exist up two feasible stationary points to1:
– For two stationary points to exist, it is required g < 0. Then, Lv(to1) takes the minimum
if r(t1)− l(t1) ≤ 0, ∀t1 ∈ (to1 − r, to1] and r(t1)− l(t1) ≥ 0, ∀t1 ∈ [to1, to1 + r). In this case,
the efficient portfolio consists of both technologies.
– Otherwise, if a feasible stationary point to1 does not exist (for which g > 0 is sufficient),
the variance efficient portfolio consists only of technology 1.5
5Since this case requires the variance of technology 2 to be much greater than the variance of technology 1, the
efficient portfolio consists of technology 1 and not of technology 2.
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B.2.5 Standard solutions to the combined portfolio problem with uncertainty
in the merit order
Proof of Eqs. (4.44) and (4.45). For the case with two technologies, the KKT conditions (4.44)
and (4.45) can be derived from the Lagrangian (4.43) as follows:
∂L
∂K1
= cinv,1 − λ−P(s0)t1
(
2∑
u=1
(−1)u
(
E[c˜u|s0] +AQu|s0
(
Var[c˜u|s0]− Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s0]
+ P(s1)
(
E[c˜u|s0]2 −E[c˜2|s0]E[c˜1|s0]−E[c˜u|s0]
2∑
v=1
E[c˜v|s1]
Qv|s1
Qu|s0
))))
= t1P(s0)A
(
Q1|s0
(
Var[z˜|s0] + P(s1)E[z˜|s0]2
)
−QE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E[z˜|s0]
))
− t1P(s0)E[z˜|s0]
(
P(s1)Q1|s1E[z˜|s1] + 1
)
+ cinv,1 − λ (B.39)
∂L
∂K2
= cinv,2 − λ+ P(s1)t2
(
2∑
u=1
(−1)u
(
E[c˜u|s1] +AQu|s1
(
Var[c˜u|s1]− Cov[c˜1, c˜2|s1]
+ E[c˜u|s1]
2∑
v=1
E[c˜v|s0]
Qv|s0
Qu|s1
))))
= t2P(s1)E[z˜|s1]
(
AP(s0)Q1|s0E[z˜|s0] + 1
)− t2P(s1)A(Q1|s1 (Var[z˜|s1] + P(s0)E[z˜|s1]2)
−QE
(
σ22|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)(c¯2|s1 − c¯2|s0)E[z˜|s1]
))
+ cinv,2 − λ (B.40)
Proposition 4.2.3 (Existence and uniqueness of an interior solution for the case λ 6= 0). Let be
cinv,1 > cinv,2 and total installed capacity matching maximum demand, i.e. λ 6= 0 in constraint
(4.12). If both technologies 1 and 2 are included in the purely cost-efficient portfolio (i.e. A = 0)
and in the purely variance-efficient portfolio (i.e. A → +∞) satisfying condition (4.42), then all
cost-variance efficient portfolios with A > 0 corresponding to problem (4.9)-(4.12) consist of a
unique combination of both technologies.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.3. According to the assumption λ 6= 0, t2 can be expressed as a function
of the t1 throughout this proof with t2(t1) = R(D(0) − D(t1)). Herewith, the solution condition
υ(t1) = 0 in Eqn. (4.47) can be derived as follows: For an interior solution with K
∗
1 ,K
∗
2 > 0, KKT
conditions (4.44) and (4.45) have to be satisfied with equality as necessary optimality condition.
Eliminating λ through subtraction of these conditions yields ∂L∂K1 − ∂L∂K2 = 0. For t1 > 0, the latter
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condition may equivalently be written as l3(t1) = r3(t1) defined by
l3(t1) := P(s0)A
(
Q1|s0
(
Var[z˜|s0] + P(s1)E[z˜|s0]2
)− (P(s1)Q1|s1E[z˜|s1] + 1/A)E[z˜|s0])
+
cinv,1 − cinv,2
t1
r3(t1) := P(s0)AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E[z˜|s0]
)
+ P(s1)A
t2
t1
(
QE
(
σ22|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)(c¯2|s1 − c¯2|s0)E[z˜|s1]
)
(B.41)
− (Var[z˜|s1] + P(s0)E[z˜|s1]2)Q1|s1 + (P(s0)E[z˜|s0]Q1|s0 + 1/A)E[z˜|s1]) (B.42)
By taking into account the sign of the derivatives as shown in Eqn. (B.34)-(B.36) in the previous
proof, the behavior of l3(t1), r3(t1) can be characterized at the boundaries as follows:
lim
t1↘0
l3(t1) =

+∞ for cinv,1 > cinv,2
0 for cinv,1 = cinv,2
−∞ for cinv,1 < cinv,2
, (B.43)
l3(T ) =
cinv,1 − cinv,2
T
−P(s0)E[z˜|s0], (B.44)
lim
t1↘0
r3(t1) =

+∞ for f1(0) > 0
0 for f1(0) = 0
−∞ for f1(0) < 0
, (B.45)
r3(T ) = P(s0)AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E [z˜|s0]
)
(B.46)
with the definition f1(0) := E[z˜|s1]P(s0)(c¯1|s1 − c¯1|s0) + E[z˜|s1]QEA − σ21|s1 + σ12|s1 .
In case cinv,1 > cinv,2, it can be concluded that
dl3(t1)
dt1
< 0 and hence l3(t1) is monotone
decreasing as shown in Figure B.4. From our initial assumption that the purely cost-minimal
portfolio consists of both technologies, we can further conclude l3(T ) < 0 according to Proposition
4.2.1. Thus, a unique intersection point of l3(t1) and r3(t1) and therewith a unique interior solution
with 0 < t∗1, t
∗
2 < T is obtained if and only if r3(T ) > l3(T ). Given that the variance-minimal
portfolio consists of both technologies satisfying condition (4.42), it can be concluded f(0) ≤ 0.
This implies also f1(0) ≤ and therewith limt1↘0 r3(t1) ≤ 0. Furthermore, it follows r3(T ) > 0
because the purely variance efficient portfolio consists of technology 2 if and only if r3(T ) ≤ 0
according to Proposition 4.2.2.
Assuming cinv,1 < cinv,2 yields again l3(T ) < 0 and with the purely variance-minimal portfolio
consisting of both technologies r3(T ) > 0. Hence a unique intersection point of l3(t1) and r3(t1)
(cf. Figure B.4) and therewith a unique interior solution with 0 < t∗1, t
∗
2 < T is obtained if and
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Fig. B.4: Stationarity conditions for the cost-variance efficient portfolio in the cases cinv,1 > cinv,2 (left) and
cinv,1 < cinv,2 (right). The intersection of l3(t1) (green line) and r3(t1) (blue line) represents the
optimal operating time.
only if
lim
t1↘0
r3(t1)− l3(t1) ≤ 0
⇔ f1(0)− cinv,1 + cinv,2 ≤ 0
⇔ f(0) + E[z˜|s1]
QEA
− cinv,1 + cinv,2 ≤ 0
Notably, the latter inequality is however only satisfied if A is greater than a defined threshold A0.
This is why for cinv,1 > cinv,2, the cost-variance efficient portfolio does not necessarily consist of
both technologies.
Proposition 4.2.4 (Implicit functions). For the implicit function ∂L∂K1 (tˇ1, tˇ2) = 0 with
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) :
[0, T ] × [0, T ] → Z1 ⊆ R+, there exists a unique function ζ1(t2) : (0, T ] → Z1 ⊆ R+ . Similarly,
for the implicit function ∂L∂K2 (tˇ1, tˇ2) = 0 with
∂L
∂K2
(t1, t2) : [0, T ]× [0, T ]→ Z2 ⊆ R+, there exists a
unique function ζ2(t1) : (0, T ]→ Z2 ⊆ R+ .
Proof of Proposition 4.2.4. According to our initial assumptions D(t) is strictly monotone decreas-
ing, the likelihood for a fuel switch is non-negative (i.e. P(s0) ≥ 0) and all individuals act strictly
risk averse (i.e. A > 0). By partial differentiation of Eqs. (4.44), (4.45) we obtain
∂
∂ti
∂L
∂Ki
(t1, t2) = At1t2P(s1)P(s0) · (c1|s0 − c2|s0)(c1|s1 − c2|s1)
dD(ti)
dti
6= 0 ∀ti > 0, (i = 1, 2)
According to the well-known implicit function theorem, the existence of the functions t1 = ζ1(t2)
and t2 = ζ2(t1) is hence given for t2 > 0 and t1 > 0, respectively.
Proposition 4.2.5 (Monotony). For given expected fuel prices c¯1|s0 ≤ c¯2|s0 and c¯2|s1 ≤ c¯1|s1 and
ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1) being functions represented by the implicit functions
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) = 0 from Eqn.
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(4.44), and ∂L∂K2 (t1, t2) = 0 from Eqn. (4.45), respectively, ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1) are both monotone
increasing in t2 and t1, respectively. For c¯1|s0 < c¯2|s0 and c¯2|s1 < c¯1|s1 , it follows strict monotony
of ζ1(t2) and ζ2(t1).
Proof of Proposition 4.2.5. The necessary condition for an interior solution is given by the non-
linear equation system with Eqs. (4.44), ∂L∂K1 = 0, and (4.45),
∂L
∂K2
= 0 with both equations
representing functions of K1,K2, and t1, t2, respectively. By rewriting and applying Q1|si =
QE −Q2|si , (i = 0, 1), we can bring optimality condition from Eqs. (4.44), (4.45) in a form where
t1, t2 are separated to the two sides of the equation, i.e.
∂L
∂K1
(t1, t2) = 0⇔ l1(t1) = r1(t2) and ∂L
∂K2
(t1, t2) = 0⇔ l2(t2) = r2(t1)
Then, we obtain
l1(t1) :=
cinv,1
t1P(s0)
+AQ1|s0
(
Var[z˜|s0] + P(s1)E[z˜|s0]2
)
−AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)E[z˜|s0]
)
(B.47)
r1(t2) := E[z˜|s0]
(
AP(s1)Q1|s1E[z˜|s1] + 1
)
(B.48)
l2(t2) :=
cinv,2
t2P(s1)
−AQ1|s1
(
Var[z˜|s1] + P(s0)E[z˜|s1]2
)
+AQE
(
σ22|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)(c¯2|s1 − c¯2|s0)E[z˜|s1]
)
(B.49)
r2(t1) := −E[z˜|s1]
(
AP(s0)Q1|s0E[z˜|s0] + 1
)
(B.50)
The first derivatives of l1(t1), r1(t2), l2(t2), r2(t1) can be derived as follows:
dl1(t1)
dt1
=
−cinv,1
t21P(s0)
+At1 ·
(
Var[z˜|s0] + P(s1)E[z˜|s0]2
)(dD(t1)
dt1
)
≤ 0 ∀ t1 > 0 (B.51)
dr1(t2)
dt2
= −At2P(s1) ·E[z˜|s1]E[z˜|s0]
(
dD(t2)
dt2
)
≤ 0 ∀ t2 > 0 (B.52)
dl2(t2)
dt2
=
−cinv,2
t22P(s1)
+At2 ·
(
Var[z˜|s1] + P(s0)E[z˜|s1]2
)(dD(t2)
dt2
)
≤ 0 ∀ t2 > 0 (B.53)
dr2(t1)
dt1
= −At1P(s0) ·E[z˜|s0]E[z˜|s1]
(
dD(t1)
dt1
)
≤ 0 ∀ t1 > 0 (B.54)
Since it holds for all feasible parameter sets dl1dt1 ≤ 0 and dr1dt2 ≤ 0, it follows for the equation
l1(t1) − r1(t2) = 0 that t1 must (strictly) monotone increase (decrease) for (strictly) monotone
increasing (decreasing) variable t2. Consequently, the corresponding (explicit) function ζ1(t2) is
(strictly) monotone increasing in t2. In the same way, it can be concluded from
dl2
dt1
≤ 0 and dr2dt2 ≤ 0
that ζ2(t1) is strictly monotone increasing in t1.
Proposition 4.2.6 (Existence and uniqueness of an interior solution for the case λ = 0). If the
technology parameters satisfy
cinv,1
TP(s0)
−E[z˜|s0]−AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)E[z˜|s0](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0 (4.48)
and
cinv,2
TP(s1)
+ E[z˜|s1]−AQE
(
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)E[z˜|s1](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0, (4.49)
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then the cost-variance efficient portfolios with A > 0 corresponding to problem (4.9)-(4.12) consist
of a unique combination of both technologies. The total installed generation capacity of the cost-risk
efficient portfolio may exceed total demand, implying λ = 0 in constraint (4.12).
Proof of Proposition 4.2.6. Necessary prerequisite for an interior solution is the existence of at least
one stationary tuple (to1, t
o
2) ∈ (0;T )× (0;T ) with ζ1(to2) = to1 and ζ2(to1) = to2. This tuple represents
graphically the intersection point of ζ2(t2) and ζ1(t2). The existence of a unique stationary point
(to1, t
o
2) can be shown in two steps: (a) At first, it can be proved that it holds ζ1(t2 = 0) > 0 and
ζ2(t1 = 0) > 0. (b) Secondly, it can be shown that it is ζ1(t2 = T ) < T and ζ2(t1 = T ) < T for
a defined set of parameters. Taking into account the monotony of ζ1(t2), ζ2(t1) (cf. Proposition
4.2.5), this consequently implies the existence of a unique intersection point. Therefore, we next
consider the limits of the local functions ζ1(t2), ζ2(t1):
a) First, ζ2(t1 = 0) > 0 can be concluded from
lim
t2→0
l2(t2) =∞ and lim
t1→ξ
r2(t1) <∞ ∀ ξ ∈ [0, T ]
Similarly, ζ1(t2 = 0) > 0 can be concluded since it holds
lim
t1→0
l1(t1) =∞ and lim
t2→ξ
r1(t2) <∞ ∀ ξ ∈ [0, T ].
b) Next, we will derive a condition which is sufficient for ζ1(t2 = T ) < T and ζ2(t1 = T ) < T :
Note that t1 = T implies Q1|s0 = 0, Q2|s0 = QE , and similar t2 = T implies Q2|s1 = 0, Q1|s1 =
QE . Since l1(t1) is monotone decreasing, it can then be concluded that ζ1(t2 = T ) < T if
and only if
l1(t1 = T )− r1(t2 = T ) < 0
⇔ cinv,1
TP(s0)
−E[z˜|s0]−AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + P(s1)E[z˜|s0](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0. (B.55)
Similarly, it follows due to the monotony of r2(t1) that ζ2(t1 = T ) < T if and only if
l2(t2 = T )− r2(t1 = T ) < 0
⇔ cinv,2
TP(s1)
+ E[z˜|s1]−AQE
(
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1 + P(s0)E[z˜|s1](c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
)
< 0. (B.56)
Therewith, it must exist a stationary point (to1, t
o
2) ∈ (0;T )×(0;T ) with ζ1(to2) = to1 and ζ2(to1) = to2.
Finally, it can be verified that the identified stationary point (to1, t
o
2) ∈ (0;T ) × (0;T ) satisfying
(B.55) and (B.56) represents a local minimum of the optimization problem. Utilizing the mean
value theorem, Lv has a local minimum at to1 it there exists a r ∈ R+ such that for every tuple
(to1, t
o
2) ∈ (to1−r, to1]×(to2−r, to2] it is ∂L∂K1 ≤ 0, ∂L∂K2 ≤ 0, and for every (to1, to2) ∈ [to1, to1 +r)×[to2, to2 +r)
it is ∂L∂K1 ≥ 0, ∂L∂K2 ≥ 0. By inserting, it can be verified
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∂L
∂K1
(D(0),K2) = cinv,1 > 0
∂L
∂K1
(0,K2) = cinv,1 −P(s0)TE[z˜|s0]−
−P(s0)TA
(
E[z˜|s0]P(s1)
(
Q1|s1E[z˜|s1] +QE(c¯2|s0 − c¯2|s1)
)
+QE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0
))
< cinv,1 −P(s0)T
(
E[z˜|s0] +AQE
(
σ22|s0 − σ12|s0 + E[z˜|s0]P(s1)(c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
))
< 0
∂L
∂K2
(K1,D(0)) = cinv,2 > 0
∂L
∂K2
(K1, 0) = cinv,2 + P(s1)TE[z˜|s1]−
−P(s1)TA
(
E[z˜|s1]P(s0)
(
QE(c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)−Q1|s0E[z˜|s0]
)
+QE
(
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1
))
< cinv,2 + P(s1)T
(
E[z˜|s1]−AQE
(
σ21|s1 − σ12|s1 + E[z˜|s1]P(s0)(c¯2|s0 − c¯1|s1)
))
< 0
Consequently, condition (B.55)-(B.56) is sufficient for an interior local optimum with λ = 0. Due to
the convexity of the Lagrangian L in λ, the obtained local minimum is also a global minimum.
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C.1 Symbols and model notation
Indices
u Plant technology
j Electricity market company
t Time step during analysis period [0;T ]
Operators
Var[ · ] Variance operator
E[ · ] Expected value operator
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Parameters and variables
Ah 1/e Households’ coefficient of risk aversion
Aj 1/e Market agents’ coefficient of risk aversion
αj market agents’ profit share
rel,j Rate of return of electricity company j
rm Rate of return of the market portfolio j
r0 Risk-free rate of return
D(t) MW Total system demand at time t
tu hours Minimal operating duration of u
pel(t) Electricity market price at time t
B e Investment budget
X0 e Total investment into the risk-free asset
Xm e Total investment into the market portfolio
Xel e Total investment into the electricity market
xel,j e Investment into the electricity market company j
Ku MW Total installed capacity of plant technology u
ku,j MW Installed capacity of plant technology u of company j
QE MWh Total energy produced (incl loss of load) in period [0;T ]
Qu MWh Total energy produced of plant technology u in period [0;T ]
Qd MWh Total loss of demand (c.f. backstop technology) in period [0;T ]
qu,j MWh Energy produced by plant technology u of company j in [0;T ]
yu,j(t) MW Output level by plant u of company j at time t
yd(t) MW Loss of demand (load of the backstop technology) at time t
cinv,u e/MWe Annuity of specific investment costs of plant u per capacity Ku
cop,u(t) e/MWhe Specific operating costs of plant u in period t per output yu,t
cd e/MWhe Specific value of lost load (operating costs backstop technology)
c¯u e/MWhe Mean operation costs of plant u
σu e/MWhe Standard deviation of total operation costs of plant u
σm e/MWhe Standard deviation of the market portfolio return
σuv e2/MWh2e Covariance of total operation costs of plant u and v
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C.2 Mathematical Appendix
C.2.1 Optimality conditions to the market equilibrium under perfect
competition
Proposition 5.3.1. [Market equilibrium under perfect competition] Let be a stylized economy and
as defined in Section 5.2 and an electricity market with two generation technologies. Furthermore,
a strictly positive societal risk aversion, i.e. A > 0 is assumed. If an interior solution to problem
(5.5)-(5.8) exists with K1,K2, Xm > 0, and under the assumption that Xm 
∑
u cinv,uKu and
Xm 
∑
uQu, the optimal investments into the market portfolio and the risk-free security are
given by
Xm =
1
A
r¯m − r0
σ2m
, (5.9)
X0 = B −Xm −
∑
u∈U
cinv,uKu. (5.10)
The optimal capacity structure within the generation portfolio is characterized by the following
optimality conditions, which are only dependent on the decision variables K1,K2 (or equivalently
on t1(K1), t2(K1,K2), and Q1(K1), Q2(K1,K2)):
(1 + r0) (cinv,1 − cinv,2)
t1
= c¯op,2 − c¯op,1 + r¯m − r0
σ2m
(σ1m − σ2m), (5.11)
(1 + r0)cinv,2
t2
= cd − c¯op,2 + r¯m − r0
σ2m
σ2m. (5.12)
Proof of Proposition 5.3.1. For the welfare optimal solution discussed in Section 5.3, the La-
grangian can be obtained as follows:
LW := r¯mXm + r0X0 −
2∑
u=1
(cinv,uKu + c¯op,uQu)− cdQd − µ
(
Xm +X0 +
2∑
u=1
cinv,uKu −B
)
− 1
2
A
(
σ2mX
2
m +
2∑
u=1
σ2uQ
2
u − 2σ1mXmQ1 − 2σ2,mXmQ2 + 2σ12Q1Q2
)
(C.1)
Taking into account the following (partial) derivatives for the energy produced by the respective
technologies
dQ1(K1)
dK1
=t1
∂Q2(K1,K2)
∂K1
=t2 − t1 dQd(K1,K2)
dK1
=− t2
dQ1(K1)
dK2
=0
∂Q2(K1,K2)
∂K2
=t2
dQd(K1,K2)
dK2
=− t2,
we obtain for the derivatives of the Lagrangian:
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∂LW
∂K1
= − (1 + µ)cinv,1 −
(
∂Q2
∂K1
)
·
(
c¯op,2 +
1
2
A
(
2σ22Q2 + 2σ12Q1 − 2σ2,mXm
))
−
(
dQ1
dK1
)
·
(
c¯op,1 +
1
2
A
(
2σ21Q1 + 2σ12Q2 − 2σ1mXm
))− cd(dQd
dK2
)
,
= (t1 − t2)
(
c¯op,2 − c¯op,1 −A
(
(σ2m − σ1m)Xm − (σ22 − σ12)Q2 + (σ21 − σ12)Q1
))
+ cdt2 − (1 + µ)cinv,1
= (t1 − t2)
(
2∑
u=1
(−1)u (c¯op,u −A (σu,mXm − (σ2u − σ12)Qu))
)
+ cdt2 − (1 + µ)cinv,1,
(C.2)
∂LW
∂K2
= − (1 + µ)cinv,2 −
(
∂Q2
∂K2
)
·
(
c¯op,2 +
1
2
A
(−2σ2,mXm + 2σ22Q2 + 2σ12Q1))− cd(dQddK2
)
= t2
(
cd − c¯op,2 −A
(−σ2,mXm + σ22Q2 + σ12Q1))− (1 + µ)cinv,2, (C.3)
∂LW
∂Xm
= r¯m − µ−A
(
σ2mXm − σ2,mQ2 − σ1mQ1
)
(C.4)
∂LW
∂X0
=r0 − µ (C.5)
∂LW
∂µ
=X0 +Xm +
2∑
u=1
cinv,uKu −B (C.6)
For K1,K2, Xm > 0, it follows that
∂LW
∂Kc1
, ∂LW∂Kc2 ,
∂LW
∂X0
, ∂LW∂Xm , ν1, ν2 must equal zero. Furthermore,
it is µ = r0. Xm can be eliminated by solving
∂LW
∂Xm
= 0 for Xm, yielding:
Xm =
r¯m − r0
Aσ2m
+
Q2σm2 +Q1σm1
σ2m
. (C.7)
By inserting Xm into Eqs. (C.2) and (C.4), we obtain the following first order conditions:
(1 + r0)cinv,2 = t2
(
cd − c¯2 +A
(
σm2
(
r¯m − r0
Aσ2m
+
Q2σm2 +Q1σm1
σ2m
)
+ σ22Q2 + σ12Q1
))
(C.8)
(1 + r0)(cinv,2 − cinv,1) =
− t1
(
c¯2 − c¯1 −A
(
(σm2 − σm1)
(
r¯m − r0
Aσ2m
+
Q2σm2 +Q1σm1
σ2m
)
− (σ22 − σ12)Q2 + (σ21 − σ12)Q1
))
(C.9)
Assuming that the total investment in the economy is sufficiently large compared to the electricity
market, i.e. Xm 
∑
u cinv,uKu and Xm 
∑
uQu, we can neglect all terms with Q1 and Q2.
Consequently, we obtain optimality conditions (5.11) and (5.12).
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C.2.2 Proof of price formation at the second stage of the model
Proposition 5.4.1. Let be a stylized economy as defined in Section 5.2. Then, the wholesale
electricity price is given by the function:
pel(t, ζ˜) =

c˜op,1, if t > D
−1(K1)
c˜op,2, if D
−1(K1) ≥ t > D−1(K2 +K1)
cd, if D
−1(K2 +K1) ≥ t
(5.26)
Proof of Proposition 5.4.1. For the proof, we derive the KKT conditions of the household’s and the
electricity company’s optimization problem at the second stage. The Lagrangian of the household’s
optimization problem (5.15)-(5.18) can be stated as
Lh(t, ζ˜) = E
[
Vh(ζ˜)
]
− Ah
2
Var
[
Vh(ζ˜)
]
− µh(X0 +Xm +
∑
j
xel,j −B) (C.10)
At the second stage, the realization of all risk factors is ζ known and the Lagrangian simplifies to
Lˆh(t, ζ) = r0X0 + r˜m(ζ)Xm +
∑
j∈J
(1− αj) · rel,j(ζ)xel,j−
∫ T
0
pel(t, ζ)D(t)dt+
∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ)− cd) · yd(t, ζ)dt− µh ·
Xm +X0 +∑
j∈J
xel,j −B
 (C.11)
For the electricity market agents, the Lagrangian referring to optimization problem (5.19)-(5.23)
writes:
Lel,j(t, ζ˜) = E
[
Πel,j(ζ˜)
]
− Aj
2
Var
[
Πel,j(ζ˜)
]
−
∫∫ T
0
λu,j(t, ζ˜)
(
yu,j(t, ζ˜)− ku,j
)
dtdζ˜−
µj
(∑
u
cinv,uku,j−xel,j
) (C.12)
Given the deterministic realization of ζ at the second stage of the model, the Lagrangian simplifies
to
Lˆel,j(t,ζ) = Πel,j −
∫ T
0
λu,j(t, ζ) · (yu,j(t, ζ)− ku,j) dt− µj
(∑
u
cinv,uku,j−xel,j
)
(C.13)
with Πel,j := αj
∑
u
(∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ)− cop,u)yu,j(t, ζ)dt− cinv,uku,j
)
(C.14)
We can now straightforwardly derive the KKT conditions for the (decision) variables at the sec-
ond stage of the model. The KKT conditions derived from the Lagrangian (C.13) of the suppliers’
problem at the second stage have to be satisfied for each company j and each generation technology
u are:
∂Lˆel,j
∂yu,j
(t, ζ) = αj(pel(t, ζ)− cop,u)− λu,j(t, ζ) ≤ 0 ⊥ yu,j(t, ζ) ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ζ (C.15)
∂Lˆel,j
∂λu,j
(t, ζ) = yu,j(t, ζ)− ku,j ≤ 0 ⊥ λu,j(t, ζ) ≥ 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∀ζ (C.16)
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In addition, the KKT condition for the households’ optimization problem for the only decision
variable at the second stage, yd, is:
∂Lˆh
∂yd
(t, ζ) = pel(t, ζ)− cd ≤ 0 ⊥ yd(t, ζ˜) ≥ 0 (C.17)
Therefore it holds pel(t, ζ˜) = cd at all points in time where yd(t, ζ˜) > 0. Hence, the upper bound
of the electricity price pel(t, ζ˜) is the value of lost load cd and it equals this value if and only if
yd(t, ζ˜) > 0.
It becomes visible in condition (C.16) that the shadow price of capacity is zero whenever pro-
duction is beneath the corresponding capacity, i.e. λu,j(t, ζ) = 0 ∀{t ∈ [0, T ]|yu,j(t, ζ) < ku,j}.
Equation (C.15) implies that the shadow price of capacity λu,j(t, ζ) must equal company’s share
of the operational margin αj(pel(t, ζ)− cop,u). Hence, the electricity price equals the marginal pro-
duction costs whenever production of the respective technology is beneath its installed capacity,
i.e. pel(t, ζ) = cop,u ∀{t ∈ [0, T ] | 0 < yu,j(t, ζ) < ku,j},∀ζ. It can also be concluded that at time
of operation of technology u with costs cop,u > 0, the electricity price must always be positive. If
yd(t, ζ) > 0, it is known from (C.17) that pel(t, ζ) = cd. When yd(t, ζ) = 0, the market clearing
condition (5.25) requires that at least one technology is operating since D(t) > 0 ∀ t ∈ [0, T ].
For this technology, equation (C.15) requires that pel(t, ζ˜) = cop,u + 1/αjλu,j(t, ζ˜) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]
implying pel(t, ζ˜) > 0 due to the non-negativity of the Lagrange multiplier λu,j(t, ζ˜) ≥ 0. Fur-
thermore, the market clearing condition (5.25) holds with equality, i.e.
∑
u∈U
∑
j∈Ju yu,j(t, ζ˜) =
D(t)− yd(t, ζ˜) ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] (but only if cop,u > 0, u ∈ U).
Proposition 5.4.2. The profits of the individual technologies Πu,j(ζ˜) as defined in (5.21) can be
rewritten as:
Π1,j(ζ˜) = (t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1) + t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,1)k1,j (5.28)
Π2,j(ζ˜) = (t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,2)k2,j (5.29)
Proof of Proposition (5.4.2). Starting with the definition of Πu,j ,
Πu,j(ζ˜) =
∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,u) · yu,j(t, ζ˜)dt− cinv,uku,j (C.18)
, and with prices as derived in Equation (5.26) we can argue:
For t > t1, it holds pel(t, ζ˜) = c1 and consequently
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,1)y1,j(t, ζ˜) = (c˜op,1 − c˜op,1)yu,j(t, ζ˜) = 0 (C.19)
for technology 1 and
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,2)y2,j(t, ζ˜) = (pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,1) · 0 = 0 (C.20)
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for technology 2, i.e. neither technology earns any contribution margin for all t ∈ (t1, T ]. Anal-
ogously, one can conclude that technology 2 does not earn any margin for all t ∈ (t2, t1].
Hence, it follows that one can write tu as the upper bound of the integral describing the to-
tal operational margin,
∫ T
0
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,u)yu,j(t, ζ˜)dt =
∫ tu
0
(pel(t, ζ˜)− c˜op,u)yu,j(t, ζ˜)dt. For the
points in time t with t < tu, we have shown that the prices are constant within the intervals [0, t1]
and (t2, T ] as given in Eqn.(5.26). With the given definitions of q12,j , q13,j and q23,j we can then
rewrite the operational margins Π1,j and Π2,j as:
Π1,j(ζ˜) = q12,j · (c˜op,2 − c˜op,1) + q13,j · (c˜d − c˜op,1) (C.21)
Π2,j(ζ˜) = q23,j · (c˜d − c˜op,2) (C.22)
Replacing q12,j , q13,j and q23,j as in Eqn.(5.27) immediately delivers the proof of Proposition
(5.4.2).
Proposition 5.4.3. The return rel,j(ζ˜) as defined in (5.13) can be specified as:
rel,j(ζ˜) =
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)k1,j + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(k1,j + k2,j)
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
− 1 (5.30)
Proof of Proposition (5.4.3). rel,j(ζ˜) is defined by: rel,j(ζ˜) :=
∑
u Πu,j
xel,j
(cp. Eqn.5.13). Putting the
expressions for Π1,j and Π2,j from Proposition (5.4.2) into this definition yields the new term for
rel,j as given in Eqn.(5.30).
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C.2.3 Proof of Market Agent Optimality Condition
Proposition 5.4.4. [Electricity market agents’ optimality condition] Let be a stylized economy
as defined in Section 5.2 and Definition 5.4.1.
Under the assumption of homogeneous market agents with identical risk aversion Aj ∀j ∈ J the
necessary optimality condition for an interior solution with k1, k2 > 0 for the optimization problem
of the electricity agents as stated in Eqn. (5.19)-(5.23) is given by:
t2
(
cd − c˜op,2
cinv,2
− Ajαj
Ncinv,2
(
t1K1(σ12 − σ22) + t2(K1 +K2)σ22
))
=t1
(
c˜op,2 − c˜op,1
cinv,1 − cinv,2 −
Ajαj
N(cinv,1 − cinv,2)
(
t1K1(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12) + t2(K1 +K2)(σ12 − σ22)
))
(5.31)
Proof of Proposition 5.4.4. Starting from the Lagrangian of the market agents’ optimization prob-
lem,
Lel,j(t, ζ˜) = E
[
Πel,j(ζ˜)
]
− Aj
2
Var
[
Πel,j(ζ˜)
]
−
∫∫ T
0
λu,j(t, ζ˜)
(
yu,j(t, ζ˜)− ku,j
)
dtdζ˜−
µj
(∑
u
cinv,uku,j−xel,j
) (C.23)
The first order condition with respect to xel,j yields
∂Lel,j
∂xel,j
= −(1− αj)E [
∑
u Πu,j ]
xel,j
+Aj(1− αj)αj 1
xel,j
Var
[∑
u
Πu,j
]
+ µj = 0. (C.24)
After substituting
∑
u Πu,j/xel,j with rel,j , a defining equation for the shadow price of the invest-
ment capital from the market agent’s perspective is given by
⇔ µj = (1− αj)(E
[
rel,j(ζ˜)
]
−Ajαjxel,j(ζ˜)Var
[
rel,j(ζ˜)
]
) (C.25)
From Proposition 5.4.2, we know that rel,j(ζ˜) can be written directly in terms of ti and ki,j , i.e.
instead of Eqn. (C.25), we can write:
(1− αj)
(
t1k1,jE[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1] + t2(k1,j + k2,j)E[cd − c˜op,2]
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
− 1−Ajαj
(
t21k
2
1,jVar[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1]
cinv,1k1,j
+
t22(k1,j + k2,j)
2Var[cd − c˜op,2]
cinv,1k1,j
+
2t1t2k1,j(k1,j + k2,j)Cov[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1, cd − c˜op,2]
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
))
= µj
(C.26)
Additionally, equations (5.28) and (5.29) enable us to express the condition for the shadow price
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of investment also as a function of ti and ki,j :
(1 + µj)cinv,2 =t2E[cd − c˜op,2]−Ajαj(t2t1k1,jCov[(cd − c˜op,2), (c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)]
+ t22(k1,j + k2,j)Var[cd − c˜op,2]) (C.27)
(1 + µj)cinv,1 =t2E[cd − c˜op,2] + t1E[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1]−Ajαj
(
t2t1k1,jCov[(cd − c˜op,2), (c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)]
+ t22(k1,j + k2,j)Var[cd − c˜op,2] + t21k1,jVar[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1]
+ t2t1(k1,j + k2,j)Cov[(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1), (cd − c˜op,2)]
)
(C.28)
We can equate these two by dividing them by cinv,1 and cinv,2, respectively. At the same time,
we can replace the invidivual capacities ki,j by Ki/N and use simplified expressions to write the
variances and covariances, σ2i := Var[c˜op,i] und σi,j := Cov[c˜op,i, c˜op,j ] and under consideration of
Cov[(cd − c˜op,2), c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)] = (σ12 − σ22),Var[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1] = (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12), we obtain:
1
cinv,1
(
t2E[cd − c˜op,2] + t1E[c˜op,2 − c˜op,1]
−
(
Ajαj
(
t2t1
K1
N
(σ12 − σ22) + t22
K1 +K2
N
σ22 + t
2
1
K1
N
(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12) + t2t1
K1 +K2
N
(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12)
)))
=
1
cinv,2
(
t2E[cd − c˜op,2]−
(
Ajαj
(
t2t1
K1
N
(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12) + t22
K1 +K2
N
σ22
)))
(C.29)
Finally, some simple rearrangements (in particular, separating the parts related to the investment
costs of the peak technology cinv,2 and to the extra investment costs cinv,1− cinv,2 for the baseload
technology) lead us to the condition of Proposition 5.4.4:
t2
(
cd − c˜op,2
cinv,2
− Ajαj
Ncinv,2
(
t1K1(σ12 − σ22) + t2(K1 +K2)σ22
))
=
t1
(
c˜op,2 − c˜op,1
cinv,1 − cinv,2 −
Ajαj
N(cinv,1 − cinv,2)
(
t1K1(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 − 2σ12) + t2(K1 +K2)(σ12 − σ22)
))
(C.30)
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C.2.4 Proof of Households’ Optimality Condition
Proposition 5.4.5. [Households’ optimality condition] Let be a stylized economy as defined in
Section 5.2 and Definition 5.4.1. We assume a neglectable managerial profit share, i.e. 1−αj ≈ 1,
and total investments in the economy being sufficiently large compared to the electricity market, i.e.
Xm  Xel. Then, the necessary optimality condition for an interior solution with xel,j >, ∀j ∈ J
to the optimization problem of the households as stated in Eqn. (5.15)-(5.18), is given by:
t2(K1 +K2)(cd − c˜op,2) + t1K1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
= 1 + r0 +Xm
r¯m − r0
σ2m
· t1K1σm,1 − ((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)σm,2
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
(5.32)
Proof of Proposition 5.4.5. Starting point is the Lagrangian Lh of the households’ optimization
problem:
Lh(t, ζ˜) = E
[
Vh(ζ˜)
]
− Ah
2
Var
[
Vh(ζ˜)
]
− µh(X0 +Xm +
∑
j
xel,j −B) (C.31)
Before deriving the first order conditions, we first compute the derivatives of Var[Vh] with respect
to xel,j . Thereby we use
Var[Vh(ζ˜)] = Var
r0X0 + rm(ζ˜)Xm +∑
j
(1− αj)rel,j − Cel(ζ˜)

=
∫
(r0X0 + rm(ζ˜)Xm +
∑
j
(1− αj)rel,j − Cel(ζ˜)−E[Vh(ζ˜)])2dζ˜
=
∫
((rm(ζ˜)−E[rm])Xm +
∑
j
(1− αj)(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])xel,j − (Cel(ζ˜)−E[Cel]))2dζ˜
= X2m
∫
(rm(ζ˜)−E[rm])2dζ˜ +
∫
(
∑
j
(1− αj)(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])xel,j)2dζ˜
+
∫
(Cel(ζ˜)−E[Cel])2dζ˜ + 2Xm
∫
(rm(ζ˜)−E[rm])(
∑
j
(1− αj)(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])xel,j)dζ˜
− 2Xm
∫
(rm(ζ˜)−E[rm])(Cel(ζ˜)−E[Cel])dζ˜
− 2
∫
(
∑
j
(1− αj)(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])xel,j)(Cel(ζ˜)−E[Cel])dζ˜
(C.32)
Thus, we get for the derivative
∂Var[Vh(ζ˜)]
∂xel,j
= 2(1− αj)2
∫
(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])(
∑
j′
(rel,j′(ζ˜)−E[rel,j′ ])xel,j′)dζ˜
+ 2Xm(1− αj)
∫
(rm(ζ˜)−E[rm])(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])dζ˜
− 2(1− αj)
∫
(rel,j(ζ˜)−E[rel,j ])(Cel(ζ˜)−E[Cel])dζ˜
(C.33)
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Under the premise of symmetric market agents it follows
∂Var[Vh(ζ˜)]
∂xel,j
= 2(1− αj)((1− αj)XelVar[rel,j(ζ˜)] +XmCov[rel,j(ζ˜), rm(ζ˜)]− Cov[rel,j(ζ˜), Cel(ζ˜)])
(C.34)
Based on these pre-considerations, the first order conditions with repect to xel,j , X0, Xm can be
derived as:
∂Lh
∂xel,j
= E[rel,j ]−Ah((1− αj)XelVar[rel,j ] +XmCov[rel,jrm]− Cov[rel,jCel])− 1
(1− αj)µh = 0
(C.35)
∂Lh
∂X0
= r0 − µh = 0 (C.36)
∂Lh
∂Xm
= r0 −AhXmVar[r˜m]− µh (C.37)
From (C.35), the expected portfolio return of company j is given by:
E[rel,j ] =
1
(1− αj)r0 +Ah((1− αj)XelVar[rel,j ] +XmCov[rel,jrm]− Cov[rel,jCel]). (C.38)
Likewise, the expected portfolio return of company j as defined in (5.13) can be specified with the
price formation at the second stage according to Proposition 5.4.1
rel,j(ζ˜) =
(t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1) + t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,1)k1,j + (t2(cd − c˜op,2)− cinv,2)k2,j
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
(C.39)
=
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)k1,j + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(k1,j + k2,j)
cinv,1k1,j + cinv,2k2,j
− 1 (C.40)
Equating (C.38) and (C.40) and with Cel = cd
∫ t2
0
yd(t)dt + c˜op,2
∫ t1
t2
yd(t)dt + c˜op,1
∫ T
t1
yd(t)dt =
cdQd(t2) + c˜op,2Q2 + c˜op,1Q1(t1) we obtain:
E
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1
]
=
1
1− αj r0+
Ah
(
(1− αj)(cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2)Var
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1
]
+
XmCov
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1, rm
]
−
Cov
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1, cdQd + c˜op,2Q2 + c˜op,1Q1(t1)
])
(C.41)
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With 1− αj ≈ 1 and some transformations we obtain:
E
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1− r0
]
=
Ah
(
(cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2)Var
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
]
+
XmCov
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
, rm
]
−
Cov
[
t1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1)K1 + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
, cdQd + c˜op,2Q2 + c˜op,1Q1(t1)
])
(C.42)
In knowledge of the propoerties for variance of sums this equation can be written as
t2(K1 +K2)cd + ((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)E[c˜op,2]− t1K1E[c˜op,1]
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
− 1− r0 =
Ah
cinv,1K1,j + cinv,2K2,j
((
((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)2Var[c˜op,2]− 2((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)t1K1Cov[c˜op,1, c˜op,2]
+(t1K1)
2Var[c˜op,1]
)
+Xm
(
((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)Cov[c˜op,2, rm]− t1K1Cov[c˜op,1, rm]
)−
Cov
[
t1K1(c˜op,2 − c˜op,1) + t2(cd − c˜op,2)(K1 +K2), cdQd(t2) + c˜op,2Q2(t2, t1) + c˜op,1Q1(t1)
])
(C.43)
For Xm  Xel, all summands without Xm on the right side of the equation can be neglected and
the optimality condition can be simplified to:
t2(K1 +K2)cd + ((t1 − t2)K1 − t2K2)(E[c˜op,2]−AhXmσm,2 − t1K1(E[c˜op,1]−AhXmσm,1)
cinv,1K1 + cinv,2K2
= 1 + r0
(C.44)
After some transformations we obtain Equation (5.32).
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D.1 Sample company overview
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Lehrstuhl für Energiewirtschaft
Prof Dr Christoph Weber
Backup
. .  
Technologiemix und Aktienrenditen der 19 größten börsennotierten 
Europäischen Stromerzeuger untersucht (Phase I)
SM 09.Sep.11:
neu
       
DGdf Suez [GDZ]1 208
EON AG [EON] 241
EDF [EDF] 628
International Power Plc [IPR] 79
Iberdrola S.A. [IBE] 99
Endesa [ELE] 185
Enel SpA [ENEL] 137
RWE AG [RWE] 220
Edison SpA [EDN] 50
Public Power Corp. S.A. [PPC] 50
Fortum Oyj [FOT] 52
CEZ A.S. [CEZ] 68
EnBW AG [ENBW] 66
Centrica Plc [CNA] 15
Drax Group Plc. [DRX] 24
Verbund [VER] 28
Scottish & Southern Energy [SSE] 42
Energias de Portugal S.A. [EDP] 47 Coal
Gas
Lignite
Nuclear
650600250200150100500
Alpiq Holding [ALPH] 17
5
MVV Energie AG [MVV] 4
Hafslund Energie [HAF]
Oil, misc.
Renewables
21
Annual avg. production [TWh] 2005‐2007
Note: Only publically listed energy companies considered; 
1.  GDF Suez listed since July 2008 - stock price calculated between July 2005 and June 2008 as weighted average of Gdf and Suez shares
Source: Annual reports 2005-2009, own analysisFig. D.1: Annual average power production and generation fuel mix of the sample companies 2005–2007
Lehrstuhl für Energiewirtschaft
Prof Dr Christoph Weber. .  
Technologiemix und Aktienrenditen der 19 größten börsennotierten 
Europäischen Stromerzeuger untersucht (Phase II)
SM 09.Sep.11:
neu
       
DGdf Suez [GDZ]1 258
EON AG [EON] 298
EDF [EDF] 620
E BW AG [ENBW] 67
International Power Plc [IPR] 86
Iberdrola S.A. [IBE] 146
Endesa [ELE] 139
Enel SpA [ENEL] 265
RWE AG [RWE] 212
Energias de Portugal S A [EDP] 54
Edison SpA [EDN] 45
Public Power Corp. S.A. [PPC] 49
Fortum Oyj [FOT] 52
CEZ A.S. [CEZ] 67
n    
Alpiq Holding [ALPH] 20
Centrica Plc [CNA] 27
Drax Group Plc. [DRX] 25
Verbund [VER] 30
Scottish & Southern Energy [SSE] 45
      . . 
Coal
Gas
Lignite
Nuclear
650600550300250200150100500
Iberdrola Renovables [IBR]
Hafslund Energie [HAF]
MVV Energie AG [MVV]
15
5
4
Oil, misc.
Renewables
22
Annual avg. production [TWh] 2008‐2010
Note: Only publically listed energy companies considered; 
1.  GDF Suez listed since July 2008 - stock price calculated between July 2005 and June 2008 as weighted average of Gdf and Suez shares
Source: Annual reports 2005-2009, own analysisFig. D.2: Annual average power production and generation fuel mix of the sample companies 2008–2010
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Tab. D.1: This table provides company names, respective stock exchange, summary statistics for the share price return ri, and debt to equity rations (D/E) for the
sample companies in the relevant analysis periods.
Combined period (2005-2010) Period I (2005-2007) Period II (2008-2010)
Name Symbol Market r¯i σi D/E r¯i σi D/E r¯i σi D/E
EDF EDF Paris 0.004 0.091 2.30 0.042 0.076 1.73 -0.023 0.092 2.86
EON AG EON Xetra 0.003 0.071 1.66 0.023 0.044 1.12 -0.017 0.086 2.20
Gdf Suez GDZ Paris 0.003 0.067 1.23 0.019 0.052 0.83 -0.008 0.075 1.62
RWE AG RWE Xetra 0.005 0.061 2.17 0.025 0.048 1.91 -0.016 0.066 2.43
Enel SpA ENEL Milan -0.006 0.053 2.68 0.004 0.028 1.57 -0.015 0.069 3.78
Endesa ELE Madrid 0.006 0.096 1.39 0.023 0.071 1.23 -0.011 0.114 1.54
Iberdrola S.A. IBE Madrid 0.007 0.076 1.44 0.024 0.062 0.93 -0.011 0.086 1.95
International Power Plc IPR London 0.019 0.090 1.74 0.032 0.056 1.35 0.006 0.114 2.13
EnBW AG ENBW Xetra 0.007 0.062 2.34 0.022 0.066 1.81 -0.009 0.054 2.87
CEZ A.S. CEZ Prague 0.015 0.083 0.50 0.042 0.080 0.28 -0.012 0.076 0.72
Fortum Oyj FOT Helsinki 0.010 0.079 0.59 0.025 0.070 0.45 -0.005 0.086 0.74
DEI (Public Power Corporation) DEI Athens -0.004 0.095 2.45 0.018 0.071 1.49 -0.027 0.110 3.41
Edison SpA EDN Milan -0.005 0.080 1.27 0.010 0.045 0.95 -0.020 0.102 1.59
Energias de Portugal S.A. EDP Lisbon 0.003 0.059 2.25 0.020 0.043 1.58 -0.014 0.067 2.91
Scottish & Southern Energy SSE London 0.006 0.048 1.06 0.018 0.040 0.68 -0.007 0.052 1.43
Verbund VER Vienna 0.011 0.089 0.51 0.033 0.075 0.36 -0.010 0.097 0.66
Drax Group Plc DRX London -0.002 0.093 0.63 0.009 0.100 0.49 -0.010 0.088 0.77
Centrica Plc CNA London 0.008 0.057 1.01 0.013 0.044 1.07 0.003 0.068 0.96
Alpiq Holding ALPH Zurich 0.012 0.084 1.09 0.035 0.083 1.26 -0.011 0.080 0.91
MVV Energie AG MVV Xetra 0.010 0.051 1.62 0.022 0.063 1.96 -0.003 0.030 1.28
Hafslund Energie HNA Oslo 0.013 0.101 1.04 0.044 0.095 0.72 -0.017 0.098 1.36
Iberdrola Renovables S.A. IBR Madrid -0.014 0.104 0.89 NA NA NA -0.014 0.104 0.89
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D.2 Univariate regression results
Tab. D.2: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βm,i for the
standard CAPM model with DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index as the relevant market portfolio. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company αˆi βˆm,i R
2
EDF 0.002 (0.009) 1.195∗∗∗ (0.199) 0.38
EON -0.001 (0.007) 0.8∗∗∗ (0.162) 0.26
GDZ 0.002 (0.008) 0.522∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.13
RWE 0.001 (0.006) 0.633∗∗∗ (0.142) 0.22
ENEL -0.01∗ (0.005) 0.696∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.35
ELE 0.002 (0.011) 0.752∗∗∗ (0.238) 0.12
IBE 0.002 (0.008) 0.762∗∗∗ (0.180) 0.20
IPR 0.013 (0.008) 1.378∗∗∗ (0.174) 0.47
ENBW 0.003 (0.007) 0.415∗∗ (0.158) 0.09
CEZ 0.01 (0.009) 0.909∗∗∗ (0.190) 0.25
FOT 0.006 (0.008) 0.929∗∗∗ (0.179) 0.28
DEI -0.009 (0.010) 0.795∗∗∗ (0.232) 0.14
EDN -0.009 (0.009) 0.784∗∗∗ (0.190) 0.20
EDP 0 (0.006) 0.619∗∗∗ (0.137) 0.23
SSE 0.003 (0.005) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.19
VER 0.006 (0.009) 0.962∗∗∗ (0.206) 0.24
DRX -0.004 (0.011) 0.733∗∗∗ (0.236) 0.14
CNA 0.005 (0.007) 0.36∗∗ (0.146) 0.08
ALPH 0.007 (0.009) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.194) 0.24
MVV 0.016∗∗ (0.007) 0.444∗∗∗ (0.115) 0.21
HNA 0.008 (0.010) 1.267∗∗∗ (0.220) 0.32
IBR -0.006 (0.017) 0.827∗∗ (0.319) 0.17
Mean 0.002 (0.008) 0.780 (0.183) 0.22
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Tab. D.3: 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βm,i for the standard CAPM model with DJ Euro
Stoxx Utilities index as the relevant market portfolio. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the
1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Period I (2005-2007) Period II (2008-2010) Chow test
Company αˆi βˆm,i R
2 αˆi βˆm,i R
2 t-stat (p-value)
EDF 0.015 (0.017) 1.242∗∗ (0.443) 0.26 -0.01 (0.013) 0.369∗∗∗ (0.247) 0.33 0.14 (0.868)
EON 0.012 (0.009) 0.435∗ (0.243) 0.09 -0.007 (0.013) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.248) 0.23 0.97 (0.385)
GDZ 0.004 (0.011) 0.738∗∗ (0.303) 0.21 -0.004 (0.013) 0.199∗ (0.239) 0.05 0.23 (0.799)
RWE 0.011 (0.009) 0.601∗∗ (0.256) 0.14 -0.01 (0.011) 0.193∗∗ (0.199) 0.14 1.44 (0.245)
ENEL -0.006 (0.005) 0.363∗∗ (0.148) 0.15 -0.005 (0.009) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.179) 0.38 1.70 (0.190)
ELE 0.015 (0.014) 0.311 (0.408) 0.02 -0.001 (0.018) 0.408∗∗ (0.349) 0.12 0.51 (0.603)
IBE 0.009 (0.012) 0.644∗ (0.338) 0.10 -0.002 (0.013) 0.315∗∗∗ (0.255) 0.18 0.20 (0.817)
IPR 0.011 (0.010) 0.934∗∗∗ (0.285) 0.24 0.027∗∗ (0.013) 0.653∗∗∗ (0.250) 0.55 2.66 (0.077)
ENBW 0.006 (0.013) 0.716∗ (0.363) 0.10 -0.008 (0.009) 0.069 (0.179) 0.01 1.79 (0.174)
CEZ 0.018 (0.015) 1.129∗∗ (0.422) 0.17 -0.004 (0.012) 0.439∗∗∗ (0.226) 0.19 1.65 (0.199)
FOT 0.006 (0.013) 0.848∗∗ (0.376) 0.13 0.007 (0.012) 0.624∗∗∗ (0.235) 0.31 0.04 (0.961)
DEI 0.007 (0.014) 0.446 (0.404) 0.03 -0.017 (0.018) 0.225∗∗ (0.339) 0.12 0.62 (0.543)
EDN 0 (0.009) 0.356 (0.253) 0.06 -0.009 (0.016) 0.433∗∗∗ (0.301) 0.19 0.73 (0.487)
EDP 0.005 (0.008) 0.658∗∗∗ (0.225) 0.20 -0.008 (0.011) 0.167∗∗ (0.204) 0.14 0.73 (0.484)
SSE 0.01 (0.008) 0.308 (0.228) 0.05 -0.002 (0.008) 0.221∗∗∗ (0.154) 0.18 0.60 (0.552)
VER 0.009 (0.014) 1.082∗∗∗ (0.395) 0.18 0 (0.015) 0.572∗∗∗ (0.285) 0.19 0.29 (0.746)
DRX -0.006 (0.024) 0.589 (0.652) 0.04 0 (0.014) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.257) 0.20 0.32 (0.729)
CNA 0.005 (0.009) 0.246 (0.254) 0.03 0.008 (0.011) 0.249∗ (0.215) 0.07 0.16 (0.848)
ALPH 0.014 (0.016) 0.98∗∗ (0.451) 0.12 -0.002 (0.012) 0.465∗∗∗ (0.226) 0.25 0.51 (0.601)
MVV 0 (0.011) 1.031∗∗∗ (0.320) 0.23 -0.003 (0.005) 0.04 (0.097) -0.01 6.32 (0.003)
HNA 0.013 (0.017) 1.446∗∗∗ (0.493) 0.20 -0.004 (0.014) 0.553∗∗∗ (0.266) 0.31 0.73 (0.484)
IBR NA NA NA NA NA -0.006 (0.017) 0.523∗∗ (0.319) 0.14 NA NA
Mean 0.007 (0.012) 0.719 (0.346) 0.13 -0.003 (0.013) 0.355 (0.240) 0.19
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Tab. D.4: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βel,i with returns
of EEX Phelix base front year futures (EEX, 2011) as considered risk factor. Standard errors are provided
in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level
and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company αˆi βˆel,i R
2
EDF 0.001∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.309∗ (0.165) 0.06
EON -0.001∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.299∗∗ (0.121) 0.08
GDZ 0.001∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.173 (0.123) 0.03
RWE 0.001∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.242∗∗ (0.104) 0.07
ENEL -0.008∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.036 (0.095) 0.00
ELE 0.004∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.07 (0.171) 0.00
IBE 0.004∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.069 (0.136) 0.00
IPR 0.015∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.287∗ (0.157) 0.05
ENBW 0.004∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.101 (0.111) 0.01
CEZ 0.009∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.575∗∗∗ (0.130) 0.22
FOT 0.004∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.593∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.25
DEI -0.006∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.021 (0.169) 0.00
EDN -0.008∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.204 (0.140) 0.03
EDP 0.002∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.089 (0.104) 0.01
SSE 0.003∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.167∗∗ (0.083) 0.05
VER 0.005∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.698∗∗∗ (0.135) 0.28
DRX -0.005∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.535∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.17
CNA 0.006∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.01 (0.102) 0.00
ALPH 0.008∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.303∗∗ (0.146) 0.06
MVV 0.007∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.081 (0.089) 0.01
HNA 0.009∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.419∗∗ (0.173) 0.08
IBR -0.016∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.167 (0.213) 0.02
Mean 0.002 (0.009) 0.238 (0.134) 0.07
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Tab. D.5: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βoil,i with returns
of WTI crude oil futures with four months to delivery (EIA, 2011) as considered risk factor. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company αˆi βˆoil,i R
2
EDF 0 (0.012) 0.225 (0.148) 0.04
EON -0.002 (0.008) 0.218∗∗ (0.104) 0.06
GDZ 0.002 (0.009) -0.049 (0.111) 0.00
RWE 0.001 (0.007) 0.122 (0.090) 0.03
ENEL -0.008 (0.006) 0.066 (0.080) 0.01
ELE 0.007 (0.011) -0.247∗ (0.142) 0.04
IBE 0.005 (0.009) -0.045 (0.115) 0.00
IPR 0.014 (0.011) 0.265∗∗ (0.133) 0.05
ENBW 0.003 (0.007) 0.106 (0.094) 0.02
CEZ 0.009 (0.009) 0.304∗∗ (0.119) 0.08
FOT 0.003 (0.009) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.18
DEI -0.007 (0.011) 0.064 (0.143) 0.00
EDN -0.01 (0.009) 0.257∗∗ (0.117) 0.06
EDP 0.001 (0.007) 0.059 (0.089) 0.01
SSE 0.003 (0.006) 0.045 (0.072) 0.01
VER 0.005 (0.010) 0.349∗∗∗ (0.128) 0.10
DRX -0.006 (0.012) 0.353∗∗ (0.144) 0.09
CNA 0.007 (0.007) -0.072 (0.086) 0.01
ALPH 0.008 (0.010) 0.138 (0.126) 0.02
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.043 (0.076) 0.00
HNA 0.008 (0.012) 0.307∗∗ (0.148) 0.06
IBR -0.016 (0.018) -0.033 (0.189) 0.00
Mean 0.002 (0.009) 0.132 (0.116) 0.04
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Tab. D.6: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βes,i with monthly
returns of the IFO Business Climate Index for Germany (IFO, 2011) as considered risk factor. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level,
∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company αˆi βˆes,i R
2
EDF 0.002 (0.012) 1.205∗ (0.615) 0.06
EON 0.001 (0.008) 1.124∗∗ (0.449) 0.08
GDZ 0.002 (0.009) 0.4 (0.464) 0.01
RWE 0.003 (0.007) 0.611 (0.393) 0.03
ENEL -0.008 (0.006) 1.028∗∗∗ (0.329) 0.12
ELE 0.004 (0.011) 0.96 (0.622) 0.03
IBE 0.005 (0.009) 0.862∗ (0.492) 0.04
IPR 0.017∗ (0.010) 1.644∗∗∗ (0.563) 0.11
ENBW 0.005 (0.007) 0.796∗ (0.401) 0.05
CEZ 0.013 (0.009) 1.26∗∗ (0.524) 0.08
FOT 0.008 (0.009) 1.812∗∗∗ (0.479) 0.17
DEI -0.006 (0.011) 0.753 (0.619) 0.02
EDN -0.007 (0.009) 1.194∗∗ (0.507) 0.07
EDP 0.001 (0.007) 0.788∗∗ (0.376) 0.06
SSE 0.004 (0.006) 0.517∗ (0.309) 0.04
VER 0.009 (0.010) 1.13∗ (0.571) 0.05
DRX -0.004 (0.012) 0.555 (0.635) 0.01
CNA 0.006 (0.007) 0.649∗ (0.372) 0.04
ALPH 0.01 (0.010) 0.558 (0.552) 0.01
MVV 0.008 (0.006) 0.489 (0.328) 0.03
HNA 0.012 (0.012) 1.043 (0.654) 0.04
IBR -0.016 (0.018) 0.648 (0.769) 0.02
Mean 0.003 (0.009) 0.910 (0.501) 0.05
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Tab. D.7: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βeua,i with returns
of EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011) as considered risk factor. Standard errors are provided in
parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and
∗ at the 10% level.
Company αˆi βˆeua,i R
2
EDF 0.002 (0.011) 0.392∗∗∗ (0.098) 0.22
EON 0 (0.008) 0.349∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.25
GDZ 0.002 (0.008) 0.257∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.17
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.223∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.15
ENEL -0.007 (0.007) 0.105 (0.067) 0.04
ELE 0.002 (0.013) 0.011 (0.118) 0.00
IBE 0.003 (0.010) 0.181∗ (0.093) 0.06
IPR 0.014 (0.012) 0.234∗∗ (0.110) 0.07
ENBW -0.002 (0.006) 0.161∗∗∗ (0.060) 0.11
CEZ 0.005 (0.008) 0.375∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.30
FOT 0.008 (0.008) 0.351∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.25
DEI -0.004 (0.013) 0.122 (0.119) 0.02
EDN -0.009 (0.010) 0.216∗∗ (0.096) 0.08
EDP 0.001 (0.008) 0.136∗ (0.073) 0.06
SSE 0.003 (0.006) 0.092 (0.058) 0.04
VER 0.004 (0.010) 0.446∗∗∗ (0.093) 0.28
DRX -0.004 (0.012) 0.185∗ (0.108) 0.05
CNA 0.007 (0.008) 0.055 (0.072) 0.01
ALPH 0.009 (0.010) 0.245∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.11
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.169∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.15
HNA 0.007 (0.012) 0.247∗∗ (0.113) 0.07
IBR -0.016 (0.018) -0.034 (0.187) 0.00
Mean 0.001 (0.010) 0.205 (0.090) 0.11
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Tab. D.8: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients αi and βgas,i with German
gas import prices (BAFA, 2010) as considered risk factor. Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10%
level.
Company αˆi βˆgas,i R
2
EDF 0.002 (0.012) -0.476 (0.288) 0.04
EON 0.004 (0.008) -0.522∗∗ (0.200) 0.09
GDZ 0.002 (0.009) -0.229 (0.215) 0.02
RWE 0.003 (0.007) -0.091 (0.178) 0.00
ENEL -0.005 (0.006) -0.438∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.11
ELE 0.007 (0.011) -0.421 (0.278) 0.03
IBE 0.009 (0.009) -0.591∗∗∗ (0.213) 0.10
IPR 0.02∗ (0.011) -0.478∗ (0.260) 0.05
ENBW 0.007 (0.007) -0.369∗∗ (0.179) 0.06
CEZ 0.017∗ (0.010) -0.544∗∗ (0.234) 0.07
FOT 0.01 (0.009) -0.307 (0.232) 0.02
DEI -0.003 (0.011) -0.481∗ (0.273) 0.04
EDN -0.003 (0.009) -0.611∗∗∗ (0.223) 0.10
EDP 0.003 (0.007) -0.236 (0.171) 0.03
SSE 0.005 (0.006) -0.123 (0.140) 0.01
VER 0.011 (0.011) -0.263 (0.260) 0.01
DRX -0.005 (0.012) 0.152 (0.296) 0.00
CNA 0.007 (0.007) -0.127 (0.169) 0.01
ALPH 0.011 (0.010) -0.174 (0.247) 0.01
MVV 0.008 (0.006) 0.015 (0.149) 0.00
HNA 0.015 (0.012) -0.519∗ (0.290) 0.04
IBR -0.016 (0.017) -0.527 (0.357) 0.06
Mean 0.005 (0.009) -0.335 (0.227) 0.04
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Tab. D.9: Two-factor model: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients λ0,i,
λm,i and λeua,i with excess returns of the DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index (ECB, 2011) and EUA front year
futures (EEX, 2011) as considered risk factors. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby,
∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company λˆ0,i λˆ
∗
m,i λˆ
∗
eua,i R
2
adj
EDF 0.002 (0.009) 1.007∗∗∗ (0.191) 0.263∗∗∗ (0.084) 0.47
EON -0.001 (0.008) 0.642∗∗∗ (0.168) 0.267∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.40
GDZ 0.001 (0.008) 0.357∗∗ (0.168) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.23
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.508∗∗∗ (0.152) 0.158∗∗ (0.067) 0.28
ENEL -0.008 (0.006) 0.712∗∗∗ (0.130) 0.014 (0.057) 0.36
ELE 0.001 (0.012) 0.775∗∗∗ (0.263) -0.087 (0.116) 0.13
IBE 0.002 (0.009) 0.684∗∗∗ (0.205) 0.094 (0.090) 0.21
IPR 0.012 (0.009) 1.32∗∗∗ (0.199) 0.067 (0.088) 0.47
ENBW -0.003 (0.006) 0.212 (0.142) 0.134∗∗ (0.062) 0.14
CEZ 0.004 (0.007) 0.541∗∗∗ (0.162) 0.306∗∗∗ (0.071) 0.41
FOT 0.008 (0.007) 0.751∗∗∗ (0.163) 0.256∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.45
DEI -0.005 (0.012) 0.801∗∗∗ (0.265) 0.02 (0.117) 0.15
EDN -0.01 (0.010) 0.699∗∗∗ (0.211) 0.127 (0.093) 0.22
EDP 0 (0.007) 0.607∗∗∗ (0.155) 0.059 (0.068) 0.25
SSE 0.002 (0.006) 0.427∗∗∗ (0.128) 0.038 (0.056) 0.19
VER 0.003 (0.009) 0.654∗∗∗ (0.205) 0.362∗∗∗ (0.090) 0.39
DRX -0.004 (0.011) 0.665∗∗∗ (0.248) 0.1 (0.108) 0.15
CNA 0.007 (0.008) 0.361∗∗ (0.167) 0.009 (0.073) 0.08
ALPH 0.008 (0.009) 0.774∗∗∗ (0.191) 0.146∗ (0.084) 0.30
MVV 0.006 (0.006) 0.204 (0.124) 0.143∗∗ (0.054) 0.18
HNA 0.005 (0.010) 1.12∗∗∗ (0.227) 0.104 (0.100) 0.34
IBR -0.006 (0.017) 0.892∗∗ (0.329) -0.147 (0.176) 0.19
Mean 0.001 (0.009) 0.669 (0.191) 0.120 (0.085) 0.27
167
Appendix D Appendix to Chapter 6
Tab. D.10: Three-factor model: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients
λ0,i, λm,i, λeua,i, and λel,i with excess returns of the DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index (ECB, 2011),
EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011), and Phelix base front year futures (EEX, 2011) as considered
risk factors. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the
coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company λˆ0,i λˆ
∗
m,i λˆ
∗
eua,i λˆ
∗
el,i R
2
adj
EDF 0.002 (0.009) 1.033∗∗∗ (0.195) 0.289∗∗∗ (0.092) -0.099 (0.142) 0.48
EON -0.001 (0.008) 0.644∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.269∗∗∗ (0.081) -0.007 (0.124) 0.40
GDZ 0.001 (0.008) 0.374∗∗ (0.173) 0.226∗∗∗ (0.081) -0.062 (0.124) 0.23
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.498∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.149∗∗ (0.073) 0.034 (0.112) 0.28
ENEL -0.008 (0.006) 0.754∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.054 (0.061) -0.154 (0.094) 0.39
ELE 0.001 (0.012) 0.796∗∗∗ (0.270) -0.068 (0.127) -0.076 (0.194) 0.13
IBE 0.003 (0.009) 0.738∗∗∗ (0.208) 0.145 (0.097) -0.196 (0.149) 0.23
IPR 0.012 (0.009) 1.328∗∗∗ (0.205) 0.075 (0.096) -0.031 (0.148) 0.47
ENBW -0.003 (0.006) 0.224 (0.146) 0.145∗∗ (0.068) -0.041 (0.105) 0.14
CEZ 0.003 (0.007) 0.45∗∗∗ (0.156) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.073) 0.329∗∗∗ (0.112) 0.49
FOT 0.006 (0.007) 0.641∗∗∗ (0.151) 0.152∗∗ (0.071) 0.401∗∗∗ (0.109) 0.55
DEI -0.005 (0.012) 0.864∗∗∗ (0.270) 0.079 (0.127) -0.229 (0.194) 0.17
EDN -0.01 (0.010) 0.711∗∗∗ (0.217) 0.138 (0.102) -0.044 (0.156) 0.22
EDP 0.002 (0.007) 0.695∗∗∗ (0.149) 0.141∗∗ (0.070) -0.318∗∗∗ (0.107) 0.35
SSE 0.002 (0.006) 0.411∗∗∗ (0.131) 0.023 (0.062) 0.057 (0.094) 0.20
VER 0.001 (0.009) 0.54∗∗∗ (0.197) 0.256∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.413∗∗∗ (0.141) 0.46
DRX -0.005 (0.011) 0.55∗∗ (0.241) -0.014 (0.113) 0.437∗∗ (0.173) 0.24
CNA 0.007 (0.008) 0.384∗∗ (0.171) 0.03 (0.080) -0.081 (0.123) 0.09
ALPH 0.007 (0.009) 0.748∗∗∗ (0.196) 0.122 (0.092) 0.096 (0.141) 0.31
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.216∗ (0.127) 0.154∗∗ (0.060) -0.042 (0.091) 0.19
HNA 0.005 (0.010) 1.087∗∗∗ (0.233) 0.073 (0.109) 0.119 (0.167) 0.35
IBR -0.007 (0.017) 0.847∗∗ (0.336) -0.255 (0.222) 0.209 (0.258) 0.20
Mean 0.001 (0.009) 0.661 (0.192) 0.109 (0.093) 0.033 (0.139) 0.30
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Tab. D.11: Four-factor model: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients λ0,i, λm,i, λeua,i, λel,i, λes,i with excess returns of the
DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index (ECB, 2011), EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011), Phelix base front year futures (EEX, 2011), and ifo Business Climate
Index (IFO, 2011) as considered risk factors. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1%
level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company λˆ0,i λˆ
∗
m,i λˆ
∗
eua,i λˆ
∗
el,i λˆ
∗
es,i R
2
adj
EDF 0.002 (0.009) 1.081∗∗∗ (0.216) 0.292∗∗∗ (0.094) -0.094 (0.150) -0.289 (0.570) 0.48
EON -0.001 (0.008) 0.616∗∗∗ (0.192) 0.267∗∗∗ (0.084) -0.009 (0.132) 0.171 (0.506) 0.40
GDZ 0.001 (0.008) 0.435∗∗ (0.182) 0.231∗∗∗ (0.079) -0.057 (0.125) -0.368 (0.480) 0.24
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.514∗∗∗ (0.171) 0.15∗∗ (0.075) 0.036 (0.118) -0.096 (0.452) 0.28
ENEL -0.007 (0.006) 0.675∗∗∗ (0.140) 0.048 (0.061) -0.16 (0.096) 0.48∗ (0.369) 0.41
ELE 0.001 (0.012) 0.754∗∗∗ (0.263) -0.071 (0.114) -0.08 (0.181) 0.259∗∗ (0.693) 0.13
IBE 0.003 (0.009) 0.719∗∗∗ (0.219) 0.143 (0.095) -0.198 (0.151) 0.112 (0.578) 0.23
IPR 0.012 (0.009) 1.275∗∗∗ (0.227) 0.071 (0.099) -0.035 (0.156) 0.322 (0.598) 0.47
ENBW -0.002 (0.006) 0.127 (0.155) 0.138∗∗ (0.068) -0.049 (0.107) 0.58∗∗ (0.410) 0.18
CEZ 0.003 (0.007) 0.39∗∗ (0.169) 0.217∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.324∗∗∗ (0.117) 0.366 (0.447) 0.49
FOT 0.006 (0.006) 0.51∗∗∗ (0.162) 0.143∗∗ (0.070) 0.391∗∗∗ (0.112) 0.786∗ (0.427) 0.58
DEI -0.005 (0.012) 0.877∗∗∗ (0.299) 0.08 (0.130) -0.228 (0.206) -0.073 (0.790) 0.17
EDN -0.009 (0.010) 0.615∗∗ (0.239) 0.131 (0.104) -0.052 (0.164) 0.581 (0.630) 0.24
EDP 0.002 (0.007) 0.691∗∗∗ (0.166) 0.14∗ (0.072) -0.318∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.022 (0.437) 0.35
SSE 0.002 (0.006) 0.392∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.022 (0.062) 0.055 (0.099) 0.118 (0.378) 0.20
VER 0.001 (0.009) 0.533∗∗ (0.218) 0.256∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.412∗∗∗ (0.150) 0.041 (0.576) 0.46
DRX -0.005 (0.011) 0.627∗∗ (0.263) -0.009 (0.114) 0.445∗∗ (0.182) -0.478 (0.695) 0.25
CNA 0.007 (0.008) 0.321∗ (0.182) 0.026 (0.079) -0.086 (0.125) 0.379 (0.479) 0.10
ALPH 0.007 (0.009) 0.839∗∗∗ (0.212) 0.128 (0.092) 0.104 (0.146) -0.553 (0.559) 0.32
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.215 (0.141) 0.154∗∗ (0.061) -0.042 (0.097) 0.007 (0.371) 0.19
HNA 0.005 (0.010) 1.151∗∗∗ (0.258) 0.078 (0.112) 0.125 (0.178) -0.388 (0.680) 0.35
IBR -0.005 (0.018) 0.963∗∗ (0.395) -0.247 (0.226) 0.215 (0.268) -0.493 (0.976) 0.21
Mean 0.001 (0.009) 0.651 (0.209) 0.109 (0.094) 0.032 (0.144) 0.068 (0.550) 0.31
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Tab. D.12: Five-factor model: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients λ0,i, λm,i, λeua,i, λel,i, λes,i, and λoil,i with excess
returns of the DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index (ECB, 2011), EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011), Phelix base front year futures (EEX, 2011), ifo Business
Climate Index (IFO, 2011), and WTI oil futures (EIA, 2011) as considered risk factors. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company λˆ0,i λˆ
∗
m,i λˆ
∗
eua,i λˆ
∗
el,i λˆ
∗
es,i λˆ
∗
oil,i R
2
adj
EDF 0.002 (0.009) 1.085∗∗∗ (0.216) 0.3∗∗∗ (0.094) -0.067 (0.150) -0.152 (0.570) -0.085 (0.140) 0.48
EON -0.001 (0.008) 0.617∗∗∗ (0.192) 0.27∗∗∗ (0.084) 0 (0.132) 0.218 (0.506) -0.029 (0.124) 0.40
GDZ 0.003 (0.007) 0.445∗∗ (0.182) 0.259∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.031 (0.125) 0.096 (0.480) -0.283∗∗ (0.118) 0.31
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.519∗∗∗ (0.171) 0.164∗∗ (0.075) 0.078 (0.118) 0.127 (0.452) -0.136 (0.111) 0.30
ENEL -0.007 (0.006) 0.68∗∗∗ (0.140) 0.063 (0.061) -0.115 (0.096) 0.719∗ (0.369) -0.146 (0.090) 0.44
ELE 0.005 (0.011) 0.779∗∗∗ (0.263) 0.001 (0.114) 0.138 (0.181) 1.414∗∗ (0.693) -0.704∗∗∗ (0.170) 0.34
IBE 0.005 (0.009) 0.732∗∗∗ (0.219) 0.179∗ (0.095) -0.088 (0.151) 0.693 (0.578) -0.354∗∗ (0.142) 0.31
IPR 0.013 (0.009) 1.278∗∗∗ (0.227) 0.079 (0.099) -0.009 (0.156) 0.462 (0.598) -0.085 (0.147) 0.47
ENBW -0.002 (0.006) 0.133 (0.155) 0.153∗∗ (0.068) -0.002 (0.107) 0.827∗∗ (0.410) -0.15 (0.101) 0.21
CEZ 0.004 (0.007) 0.395∗∗ (0.169) 0.232∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.369∗∗∗ (0.117) 0.609 (0.447) -0.148 (0.110) 0.51
FOT 0.006 (0.007) 0.509∗∗∗ (0.162) 0.14∗ (0.070) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.112) 0.731∗ (0.427) 0.034 (0.105) 0.58
DEI -0.004 (0.012) 0.88∗∗∗ (0.299) 0.089 (0.130) -0.2 (0.206) 0.074 (0.790) -0.09 (0.194) 0.17
EDN -0.01 (0.010) 0.611∗∗ (0.239) 0.121 (0.104) -0.081 (0.164) 0.424 (0.630) 0.096 (0.154) 0.24
EDP 0.002 (0.007) 0.692∗∗∗ (0.166) 0.143∗ (0.072) -0.31∗∗∗ (0.114) 0.063 (0.437) -0.025 (0.107) 0.35
SSE 0.003 (0.006) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.036 (0.062) 0.096 (0.099) 0.337 (0.378) -0.134 (0.093) 0.23
VER 0.002 (0.009) 0.535∗∗ (0.218) 0.261∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.43∗∗∗ (0.150) 0.132 (0.576) -0.056 (0.141) 0.47
DRX -0.006 (0.011) 0.617∗∗ (0.263) -0.028 (0.114) 0.384∗∗ (0.182) -0.791 (0.695) 0.191 (0.170) 0.27
CNA 0.008 (0.007) 0.33∗ (0.182) 0.052 (0.079) -0.007 (0.125) 0.798 (0.479) -0.255∗∗ (0.117) 0.17
ALPH 0.008 (0.009) 0.847∗∗∗ (0.212) 0.149 (0.092) 0.167 (0.146) -0.216 (0.559) -0.205 (0.137) 0.35
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.217 (0.141) 0.16∗∗ (0.061) -0.024 (0.097) 0.103 (0.371) -0.058 (0.091) 0.19
HNA 0.005 (0.010) 1.152∗∗∗ (0.258) 0.081 (0.112) 0.133 (0.178) -0.341 (0.680) -0.029 (0.167) 0.35
IBR -0.003 (0.017) 0.983∗∗ (0.395) -0.204 (0.226) 0.297 (0.268) 0.04 (0.976) -0.284 (0.237) 0.25
Mean 0.002 (0.009) 0.656 (0.209) 0.123 (0.094) 0.073 (0.144) 0.289 (0.550) -0.133 (0.135) 0.34
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Tab. D.13: Six-factor model: 2005–2010 regression results with estimates for firm-specific equity coefficients λ0,i, λm,i, λeua,i, λel,i, λes,i, λoil,i, and λgas,i with excess
returns of the DJ Euro Stoxx Utilities index (ECB, 2011), EUA front year futures (EEX, 2011), Phelix base front year futures (EEX, 2011), ifo Business
Climate Index (IFO, 2011), WTI oil futures (EIA, 2011), and German gas import prices (BAFA, 2010) as considered risk factors. Standard errors are
provided in parentheses. Thereby, ∗∗∗ denotes significance of the coefficient at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level and ∗ at the 10% level.
Company λˆ0,i λˆ
∗
m,i λˆ
∗
eua,i λˆ
∗
el,i λˆ
∗
es,i λˆ
∗
oil,i λˆ
∗
gas,i R
2
adj
EDF 0.003 (0.009) 1.08∗∗∗ (0.217) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.097) -0.061 (0.151) -0.222 (0.580) -0.074 (0.141) 0.286∗∗∗ (0.097) 0.49
EON 0 (0.008) 0.608∗∗∗ (0.187) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.018 (0.129) 0.05 (0.499) -0.005 (0.121) 0.235∗∗∗ (0.083) 0.44
GDZ 0.003 (0.007) 0.444∗∗ (0.184) 0.255∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.033 (0.127) 0.075 (0.491) -0.28∗∗ (0.119) 0.255∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.31
RWE -0.001 (0.007) 0.52∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.166∗∗ (0.077) 0.077 (0.119) 0.135 (0.463) -0.137 (0.112) 0.166∗∗ (0.077) 0.30
ENEL -0.006 (0.006) 0.673∗∗∗ (0.136) 0.037 (0.060) -0.102 (0.094) 0.596 (0.363) -0.129 (0.088) 0.037 (0.060) 0.48
ELE 0.005 (0.011) 0.773∗∗∗ (0.263) -0.024 (0.117) 0.151 (0.181) 1.296∗ (0.703) -0.687∗∗∗ (0.171) -0.024 (0.117) 0.35
IBE 0.006 (0.009) 0.722∗∗∗ (0.213) 0.139 (0.095) -0.067 (0.147) 0.498 (0.569) -0.327∗∗ (0.138) 0.139 (0.095) 0.36
IPR 0.013 (0.009) 1.271∗∗∗ (0.226) 0.054 (0.100) 0.004 (0.156) 0.34 (0.604) -0.068 (0.147) 0.054 (0.100) 0.49
ENBW -0.001 (0.006) 0.127 (0.154) 0.132∗ (0.068) 0.009 (0.106) 0.723∗ (0.411) -0.136 (0.100) 0.132∗ (0.068) 0.24
CEZ 0.004 (0.007) 0.386∗∗ (0.163) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.073) 0.387∗∗∗ (0.113) 0.442 (0.436) -0.125 (0.106) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.073) 0.55
FOT 0.006 (0.007) 0.508∗∗∗ (0.163) 0.134∗ (0.073) 0.383∗∗∗ (0.113) 0.705 (0.436) 0.037 (0.106) 0.134∗ (0.073) 0.58
DEI -0.003 (0.012) 0.87∗∗∗ (0.296) 0.051 (0.132) -0.181 (0.205) -0.113 (0.793) -0.064 (0.193) 0.051 (0.132) 0.20
EDN -0.009 (0.009) 0.6∗∗ (0.233) 0.079 (0.104) -0.06 (0.161) 0.221 (0.623) 0.124 (0.151) 0.079 (0.104) 0.29
EDP 0.002 (0.007) 0.688∗∗∗ (0.166) 0.129∗ (0.074) -0.303∗∗ (0.115) -0.003 (0.444) -0.016 (0.108) 0.129∗ (0.074) 0.36
SSE 0.003 (0.006) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.144) 0.036 (0.064) 0.096 (0.100) 0.338 (0.387) -0.134 (0.094) 0.036 (0.064) 0.23
VER 0.002 (0.009) 0.535∗∗ (0.220) 0.258∗∗ (0.098) 0.431∗∗∗ (0.152) 0.117 (0.589) -0.054 (0.143) 0.258∗∗ (0.098) 0.47
DRX -0.007 (0.011) 0.627∗∗ (0.264) -0.008 (0.117) 0.377∗∗ (0.183) -0.687 (0.708) 0.175 (0.171) -0.008 (0.117) 0.28
CNA 0.008 (0.007) 0.331∗ (0.183) 0.056 (0.081) -0.009 (0.127) 0.817 (0.490) -0.258∗∗ (0.119) 0.056 (0.081) 0.17
ALPH 0.009 (0.009) 0.844∗∗∗ (0.213) 0.138 (0.095) 0.173 (0.147) -0.267 (0.570) -0.198 (0.138) 0.138 (0.095) 0.35
MVV 0.007 (0.006) 0.219 (0.141) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.063) -0.029 (0.098) 0.151 (0.378) -0.065 (0.092) 0.17∗∗∗ (0.063) 0.20
HNA 0.006 (0.010) 1.145∗∗∗ (0.257) 0.052 (0.114) 0.148 (0.177) -0.479 (0.687) -0.009 (0.167) 0.052 (0.114) 0.37
IBR -0.004 (0.017) 0.943∗∗ (0.389) -0.319 (0.236) 0.354 (0.266) -0.302 (0.988) -0.219 (0.237) -0.319 (0.236) 0.30
Mean 0.002 (0.009) 0.651 (0.208) 0.102 (0.095) 0.083 (0.143) 0.201 (0.554) -0.120 (0.134) 0.102 (0.095) 0.36
171

Bibliography
Acerbi, C., Tasche, D., 2002. On the coherence of expected shortfall. Journal of Banking and
Finance.
Alexander, C., 1999. Correlation and cointegration in energy markets. In: Managing energy price
risk. Risk publications.
Anderson, D., 1972. Models for determining least-cost investments in electricity supply. The Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science 3 (1), 267–299.
Arrow, K., 1971. The theory of risk aversion. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing, 90–120.
Arrow, K., Debreu, G., 1954. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society 22 (3), 265–290.
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J., Heath, D., 1999. Coherent measures of risk. Mathematical
Finance 9 (3), 203–228.
Awerbuch, S., 2004. Towards a finance-oriented valuation of conventional and renewable energy
sources in Ireland. Report, Sustainable Energy Ireland.
Awerbuch, S., 2006. Portfolio-based electricity generation planning: Policy implications for re-
newables and energy security. Mitigation and adaptation strategies for global change 11 (3),
693–710.
Awerbuch, S., Berger, M., 2003. Applying portfolio theory to EU electricity planning and policy-
making. Report number EET/2003/03, IEA.
BAFA, 2009. Bafa energy statistics. Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (German
Federal Office of Economics and Export Control), retrieved on 1 Jan 2010, last accessed on 12
Dec 2012.
URL http://www.bafa.de/
BAFA, 2010. Bafa energy statistics. Bundesamt fu¨r Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (German
Federal Office of Economics and Export Control), retrieved on 11 July 2011, last accessed on 12
Dec 2012.
URL http://www.bafa.de/
173
Bibliography
Bar-Lev, D., Katz, S., 1976. A portfolio approach to fossil fuel procurement in the electric utility
industry. The Journal of Finance 31 (3), 933–47.
Bartram, S. M., 2000. Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation.
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 9 (5), 279–324.
Bernoulli, D., 1938. Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis. Translated by L. Sommer (1954):
”Exposition of a new theory on the measurement of risk”. Econometrica 22, 23–36.
Boiteux, M., 1960. Peak load pricing. Journal of Business 33, 157–179.
Bolle, F., 1992. Supply function equilibria and the danger of tacit collusion: the case of spot
markets for electricity. Energy Economics 14 (2), 94–102.
Bonilla, R., 2010. Cost-effective solutions to the world-wide acetonitrile shortage. PharmPro -
PharmPro News, Views, & Technology for the Industry.
Boquist, J., Moore, W., 1983. Estimating the systematic risk of an industry segment: A mathe-
matical programming approach. Financial Management 12 (4), 11–18.
Botterud, A., Ilic, M., Wangensteen, I., 2003. Optimization of Generation Investments Under
Uncertainty in Restructured Power Markets. In: Proceedings of Intelligent System Application
to Power System. Lemnos, Greece.
Bower, D., Bower, R., Logue, D., 1984. Arbitrage Pricing Theory and utility stock returns. Journal
of Finance 39 (4), 1041–1054.
Boyer, M., Filion, D., 2007. Common and fundamental factors in stock returns of Canadian oil and
gas companies. Energy Economics 29 (3), 428–453.
Bubnys, E., 2005. Simulating and forecasting utility stock returns: Arbitrage pricing theory vs.
capital asset pricing model. Financial Review 25 (1), 1–23.
Bunn, D. W., Day, C. J., February 2009. Computational modelling of price formation in the
electricity pool of england and wales. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (2), 363–
376.
Chow, G., 1960. Tests of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions. Economet-
rica: Journal of the Econometric Society 28 (3), 591–605.
Chuang, A., Wu, F., Varaiya, P., Nov. 2001. A game-theoretic model for generation expansion
planning: problem formulation and numerical comparisons. IEEE Journal on Power Systems
16 (4), 885–891.
Cochrane, J., 2001. Asset Pricing. Vol. e. Princeton University Press.
174
Bibliography
Cramer, G., 1728. Letter from Cramer to Nicholas Bernoulli. Translated by L. Sommer in Bernoulli,
Daniel (1954) ” Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk,”. Econometrica 22,
23–36.
Crew, M. A., Fernando, C. S., Kleindorfer, P. R., 1995. The theory of peak-load pricing: A survey.
Journal of Regulatory Economics 8 (3), 215–248.
Crew, M. A., Kleindorfer, P. R., 1986. The economics of public utility regulation. Macmillan.
Day, C., Hobbs, B., Pang, J.-S., 2002. Oligopolistic competition in power networks: a conjectured
supply function approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 17 (3), 597–607.
DB, 2011. Money market rates. Deutsche Bundesbank statistics, retrieved on 10 Sep 2012, last
accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Statistiken/statistiken.html?nsc=
true
Debreu, G., 1959. Theory of value: an axiomatic analysis of economic equilibrium. John Wiley &
Sons.
Delarue, E., De Jonghe, C., Belmans, R., D’haeseleer, W., 2011. Applying portfolio theory on the
electricity sector: Energy versus power. Energy Economic 33 (1), 12–23.
Denton, M., Palmer, A., Masiello, R., Skantze, P., 2003. Managing market risk in energy. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems 18 (2), 494–502.
Deutscher Bundestag, 2011. Dreizehntes Gesetz zur A¨nderung des Atomgesetzes. Bundesgeset-
zblatt Jahrgang 2011, Teil I Nr. 43, published on 5 August 2011, 1704–1705.
Dimson, E., Marsh, P., Staunton, M., 2006. The Worldwide Equity Premium: A Smaller Puzzle.
SSRN eLibrary.
Domschke, W., Scholl, A., 2003. Grundlagen der Betriebswirtschaftslehre. Vol. 3. Springer.
ECB, 2011. ECB data warehouse. European Central Bank, retrieved on 11 July 2012, last accessed
on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/
ECX, 2009. ECX historical data. European Climate Exchange, retrieved on 11 Feb 2011, last
accessed on 18 Dec 2011.
URL http://www.ecx.eu/
ECX, 2010. ECX historical data. European Climate Exchange, retrieved on 11 Feb 2011, last
accessed on 18 Dec 2011.
URL http://www.ecx.eu/
175
Bibliography
EEX, 2011. EEX historical data. European Energy Exchange, retrieved on 18 Aug 2012.
URL http://www.eex.com/
Ehrhardt, M., Bhagwat, Y., 1991. A full-information approach for estimating divisional betas.
Financial Management 20 (2), 60–69.
EIA, 2009. Petroleum data. Energy Information Administration, retrieved on 28 Mar 2011, last
accessed on 12 Dec 2012.
URL http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/petroleum.html
EIA, 2011. Petroleum data. Energy Information Administration, retrieved on 13 Jan 2012, last
accessed on 12 Dec 2012.
URL http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/petroleum.html
Elishakoff, I., 1999. Probabilistic Theory of Structures. Dover Publications.
Ellersdorfer, I., 2005. A multi-regional two-stage cournot model for analyzing competition in the
german electricity market. In: Proceedings of the 7th European Energy Conference. Retrieved
on 14 Apr 2009, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://elib.uni-stuttgart.de/opus/volltexte/2005/2450/pdf/IAEE_
Ellersdorfer.pdf
ENTSO-E, 2009. Consumption data, hourly load values Germany. European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity, retrieved on 26 Jan 2009, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL https://www.entsoe.eu/data/data-portal/consumption/
Eurostat, 2009. Energy statistics - prices. Retrieved on 8 May 2009, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/
Fama, E., MacBeth, J., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of political
economy 81 (3), 607.
Fan, L., Hobbs, B. F., Norman, C. S., 2010. Risk aversion and CO2 regulatory uncertainty in power
generation investment: Policy and modeling implications. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 60 (3), 193–208.
Fleten, S., Maribu, K., Wangensteen, I., 2007. Optimal investment strategies in decentralized
renewable power generation under uncertainty. Energy 32 (5), 803–815.
Geman, H., 2007. Mean reversion versus random walk in oil and natural gas prices. Advances in
Mathematical Finance, 219–228.
Gibbons, M., Ross, S., Shanken, J., 1989. A test of the efficiency of a given portfolio. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society 57 (5), 1121–1152.
176
Bibliography
Gilmore, E., Adams, P., Lave, L., 2010. Using backup generators for meeting peak electricity
demand: A sensitivity analysis on emission controls, location, and health endpoints. Journal of
the Air & Waste Management Association 60 (5), 523–531.
Gnansounou, E., Dong, J., Pierre, S., Quintero, A., 2004. Market oriented planning of power
generation expansion using agent-based model. In: Proc. IEEE PES Power Systems Conference
and Exposition. Vol. 3. pp. 1306–1311.
Gollier, C., 1999. The Economics of Risk and Time.
Gossy, G., 2008. A Stakeholder Rationale for Risk Management: Implications for Corporate Fi-
nance Decisions. Gabler.
Gotham, D., Muthuraman, K., Preckel, P., Rardin, R., Ruangpattana, S., 2009. A load factor
based mean-variance analysis for fuel diversification. Energy Economics 31, 249–256.
Green, R. J., Newbery, D. M., 1992. Competition in the british electricity spot market. Journal of
political economy, 929–953.
Greene, W., Zhang, C., 2003. Econometric analysis, 5th Edition. Prentice hall New Jersey.
Haas, R., Glachant, J., Auer, H., Keseric, N., Perez, Y., 2006. Electricity market reform – an inter-
national perspective. Elsevier, Ch. Competition in the continental European electricity market:
despair or work in progress?, pp. 265–316.
Hamada, R., 1972. The effect of the firm’s capital structure on the systematic risk of common
stocks. Journal of Finance 27 (2), 435–452.
Henriques, I., Sadorsky, P., 2007. Oil prices and the stock prices of alternative energy companies.
Energy Economics 30, 998–1010.
Hirshleifer, J., 1958. Peak loads and efficient pricing: Comment. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 72, 451–462.
Hobbs, B., 2001. Linear complementarity models of nash-cournot competition in bilateral and
poolco power markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 16 (2), 194–202.
Hobbs, B., Metzler, C., Pang, J., 2000. Calculating equilibria in imperfectly competitive power
markets: An mpec approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 15 (2), 638–645.
Horn, R. A., Johnson, C. R., 1985. Matrix Analysis.
IEA, 2008. World energy outlook. International Energy Agency, OECD.
IEA, 2010. World energy outlook. International Energy Agency, OECD.
IFO, 2011. The ifo business climate for germany. Retrieved on 12 Jan 2012.
URL http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-winfo/
d6zeitreihen/15reihen/_reihenkt
177
Bibliography
Jansen, J. C., Beurskens, L. W. M., Tilburg, X., 2008. Application of portfolio analysis to the
Dutch generating mix. Reference case and two renewables cases. In: Bazilian, M., Roques, F.
(Eds.), Analytic Methods for Energy Diversity and Security. Elsevier.
Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2007. Reliability and competitive electricity markets. The Rand Journal of
Economics 38 (1), 60–84.
Kaplan, P., Peterson, J., 1998. Full-information industry betas. Financial Management 27 (2),
85–93.
Kleindorfer, P., Wu, D., Fernando, C., 2001. Strategic gaming in electric power markets. European
Journal of Operational Research 130 (1), 156–168.
Knight, F., 1921. Risk, uncertainty and profit. Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Konstantin, P., 2009. Praxisbuch Energiewirtschaft: Energieumwandlung, -transport und -
beschaffung im liberalisierten Markt. Springer.
KPMG, 2008. KPMG’s corporate and indirect tax rate survey 2008. Tech. rep., KPMG, retrieved
on 5 Mar 2010, last accessed on 14 Dec 2011.
URL http://www.kpmg.com.om/PDF/Corporate%20and%20Indirect%20Tax%20Rate%
20Survey%202008.pdf
Lange, O., 1942. The foundations of welfare economics. Econometrica 10, 215–228.
Leahy, J., Whited, T., 1996. The effect of uncertainty on investment: Some stylized facts. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 64–83.
Levy, H., Markowitz, H. M., 1979. Approximating expected utility by a function of mean and
variance. American Economic Review 69 (3), 308–317.
Lintner, J., 1965. The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock
portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics 47 (1), 13–37.
Markowitz, H. M., 1952. Portfolio selection. The Journal of Finance 7 (1), 77–91.
Markowitz, H. M., 1959. Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments, Cowles Foun-
dation Monography 16. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
Meunier, G., 2012. Risk aversion and technology portfolios. Ecole Polytechnique, Centre National
de la Recherce Scientifique Working Paper 2012-39, retrieved on 13 Feb 2013, last accessed on
18 Jul 2013.
URL http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/76/33/58/PDF/2012-39.pdf
Meyer, J., 1987. Two-moment decision models and expected utility maximization. The American
Economic Review 77, 421–430.
178
Bibliography
Mohammadi, H., 2009. Electricity prices and fuel costs: Long-run relations and short-run dynamics.
Energy Economics 31, 503–509.
Moitre, D., 2002. Nash equilibria in competitive electric energy markets. Electric power systems
Research 60 (3), 153–160.
Mossin, J., 1966. Equilibrium in a capital asset market. Econometrica 34 (4), 768–783.
Mu¨sgens, F., 2006. Quantifying market power in the german wholesale electricity market using a
dynamic multi-regional dispatch model. Journal of Industrial Economics 54 (4), 471–498.
Oren, S., Smith, S., Wilson, R., 1985. Capacity pricing. Econometrica 53, 545–566.
Pigou, A. C., 1932. Economics of welfare. Macmillan, London.
Pindyck, R., 1999. The long-run evolution of energy prices. The Energy Journal 20 (2), 1–27.
Pindyck, R., 2001. The dynamics of commodity spot and futures markets: a primer. Energy Journal
22 (3), 1–30.
Pratt, J., Jan-Apr 1964. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society 32 (1-2), 122–136.
Roques, F. A., Newbery, D. M., Nuttall, W. J., 2008. Fuel mix diversification incentives in liberal-
ized electricity markets: A mean-variance portfolio theory approach. Energy Economics 30 (4),
1831–1849.
Roques, F. A., Nuttall, W. J., Newbery, D. M., 2006a. Using probabilistic analysis to value power
generation investments under uncertainty. EPRG Working Paper 065, retrieved on 27 Aug 2008,
last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/category/publications/
working-paper-series/
Roques, F. A., Nuttall, W. J., Newbery, D. M., de Neufville, R., 2006b. Nuclear power: a hedge
against uncertain gas and carbon prices? The Energy Journal 27 (4), 1–23.
Ross, S., 1976. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic Theory 13 (3),
341–60.
Sadorsky, P., 2001. Risk factors in stock returns of Canadian oil and gas companies. Energy Eco-
nomics 23 (1), 17–28.
Savage, L. J., 1954. The foundations of statistics. Dover publications.
Schneeweiss, H., 1965. Konsequenzen des Bernoulli-Prinzips fu¨r die Pra¨ferenzstruktur von Nor-
malverteilungen. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 9 (4), 238–249.
179
Bibliography
Schwartz, E., 1997. The stochastic behavior of commodity prices: Implications for valuation and
hedging. The Journal of Finance 52 (3), 923–973.
Schwartz, E., Smith, J., 2000. Short-term variations and long-term dynamics in commodity prices.
Management Science 46 (7), 893–911.
Sharpe, W. F., 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk.
Journal of Finance 19 (3), 425–442.
Smith, C., Stulz, R., 1985. The determinants of firms’ hedging policies. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 20 (4), 391–405.
StaBu, 2009. Data on energy price trends - long-time series from January 2000 to December 2008.
Statistisches Bundesamt – German Federal Statistical Office, retrieved on 31 Mar 2009, last
accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://www.destatis.de/
StaBu, 2010. Genesis-online database, time series 61411-0006. Statistisches Bundesamt – German
Federal Statistical Office, retrieved on 13 Feb 2010, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL https://www-genesis.destatis.de
Statistisches Bundesamt, September 2012. Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Beiheft Investi-
tionen.
Steffen, B., Weber, C., 2011. Efficient storage capacity in power systems with thermal and renew-
able generation. EWL Working paper.
Steiner, P., 1957. Peak loads and efficient pricing. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 71, 585–610.
Stirling, A., 1994. Diversity and ignorance in electricity supply investment – addressing the solution
rather than the problem. Energy Policy 22 (3), 195–216.
Stulz, R., 1984. Optimal hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19 (2),
127–140.
Stulz, R., 1996. Rethinking risk management. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 (3), 8–25.
Sunderko¨tter, M., 2011. Fuel mix characteristics and expected stock returns of european power
companies. EWL working paper 06/2011, Retrieved on 13 Sep 2011, last accessed on 18 Jul
2013.
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/dui/wpaper/1106.html
Sunderko¨tter, M., Weber, C., 2011. Mean-variance optimization of power generation portfolios
under uncertainty in the merit order. EWL working paper 05/2011, Retrieved on 26 Aug 2011,
last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/dui/wpaper/1105.html
180
Bibliography
Sunderko¨tter, M., Weber, C., 2012. Valuing fuel diversification in power generation capacity plan-
ning. Energy Economics 34 (5), 1664–1674, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2012.02.003
Sunderko¨tter, M., Weber, C., Ziegler, D., 2013. Perfect competition versus riskaverse agents: Tech-
nology portfolio choice in electricity markets. EWL working paper 02/2013, Retrieved on 16 Apr
2013, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/dui/wpaper/1303.html
Tobin, J., 1958. Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk. Review of Economic Studies 25 (2),
65–86.
Trautmann, S., 2006. Investitionen - Bewertung, Auswahl und Risikomanagement. Springer.
Tsiang, S., 1972. The rationale of the mean-standard deviation analysis, skewness preference, and
the demand for money. The American Economic Review 62, 354–371.
UxC, 2009. Historical ux month-end spot prices. The Ux Consulting Company, LLC, retrieved on
13 Feb 2009.
URL http://www.uxc.com/
Vogel, P., Weber, C., 2009. Mean-variance portfolio theory and wind power risk. In: Proceedings
of the 3rd Trans-Atlantic Infraday Conference on Applied Infrastructure Modeling and Policy
Analysis. Washington, 13. November 2009.
von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1944. Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton
University Press.
Weber, C., 2005. Uncertainty in the Electric Power Industry: Methods and Models for Decision
Support. Springer.
Westner, G., Madlener, R., 2009. Development of Cogeneration in Germany: A Dynamic Portfolio
Analysis Based on the New Regulatory Framework. FCN Working Paper No. 4/2009.
Ziegler, D., Weber, C., Sunderko¨tter, M., 2010. Welfare-optimal risk diversification versus indi-
vidual portfolio selection: Insights from electricity markets. In: Trans-Atlantic INFRADAY -
Conference on Applied Infrastructure Modeling and Policy Analysis, 5 November 2010, Wash-
ington DC.
Zo¨ttl, G., June 2008. On investment decisions in liberalized electricity markets: the impact of price
caps at the spot market. CORE Discussion Paper 2008/37, Universite´ catholique de Louvain,
retrieved on 10 Mar 2009, last accessed on 18 Jul 2013.
URL http://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2008_37.pdf
181
Declaration
Erkla¨rung (gem. § 10, Abs. 2 der Promotionsordnung)
Hiermit erkla¨re ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbststa¨ndig und ohne Verwendung anderer
als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Alle Stellen, die wo¨rtlich oder sinngema¨ß aus
vero¨ffentlichten oder unvero¨ffentlichten Schriften entnommen wurden, sind als solche kenntlich
gemacht. Die Arbeit ist in gleicher Form oder auszugsweise noch nicht im Rahmen anderer
Pru¨fungen vorgelegt worden.
Essen, 15. August 2013
(Malte Sunderko¨tter)
Erkla¨rung (gem. § 9, Abs. 7 der Promotionsordnung)
Die Artikel in Kapitel 3 und 4 dieser Arbeit sind in gemeinsamer Autorenschaft mit Prof. Dr.
Christoph Weber entstanden. Die wissenschaftliche Einzelleistung von Malte Sunderko¨tter umfasst
insbesondere die Grundidee und Konzeption der Artikel, die Literaturrecherche, die analytische
Konzeption und Modellierung inkl. Entwicklung und Umsetzung der Beweise, die Entwicklung und
quantitative Analyse der Beispiele inkl. Datenrecherche und Programmierung sowie die Auswer-
tung und Ergebnisdiskussion. Ferner liegt die Erstellung und U¨berarbeitung der Manuskripte
inkl. aller grafischen Darstellungen sowie die Kommunikation mit den Reviewern im Rahmen
des Vero¨ffentlichungsprozesses bei Malte Sunderko¨tter. Christoph Weber trug zur Konzeption
der Artikel, der Formulierung der mathematischen Modelle und Beweise sowie der Ausgestaltung
und Darstellung der Anwendungsbeispiele bei. Er beteiligte sich auch an der Texterstellung und
u¨bernahm das Korrekturlesen.
Der Artikel in Kapitel 5 dieser Arbeit ist in gemeinsamer Autorenschaft von Malte Sunderko¨tter,
Prof. Dr. C. Weber und Daniel Ziegler entstanden. Die grundlegende Idee und Konzeption ist
in der gemeinsamen Diskussion der Autoren entstanden. Die wissenschaftliche Einzelleistung von
Malte Sunderko¨tter umfasst dabei insbesondere:
 die Einleitung und Literaturrecherche im Abschnitt 5.1,
 die analytische Konzeption und Modellierung des Marktgleichgewichts im perfekten Wettbe-
werb im Abschnitt 5.3,
182
Declaration
 die Konzeption und Ausarbeitung wesentlicher Teile des numerischen Beispiels im Abschnitt
5.5, insbesondere die Teilabschnitte Modellkalibrierung und Parameterscha¨tzung (5.5.1), die
Programmierung in Maple und die Berechnung der Portfoliostrukturen (5.5.2), die Auswer-
tung des numerischen Beispiels (5.5.3)-(5.5.4), sowie
 die Auswertung und Ergebnisdiskussion in Abschnitt 5.6.
Die wissenschaftliche Einzelleistung von Daniel Ziegler umfasst insbesondere:
 die Konzeption und Formulierung der allgemeinen Modellannahmen in Abschnitt 5.2,
 die analytische Konzeption und Modellierung des Marktgleichgewichts mit risiko-aversen
Agenten im Abschnitt 5.4, sowie
 den Ansatz zur Bestimmung des Risikoaversionsparameters und dessen Berechnung im Ab-
schnitt 5.5.1
Christoph Weber trug zur Konzeption des Artikels, zur Formulierung der mathematischen Mod-
elle und Beweise sowie zur Ausgestaltung und Darstellung des Anwendungsbeispiels bei.
Die Pru¨fung der Berechnungen und Ergebnisse in den einzelnen Abschnitten erfolgte gegenseitig
durch die drei Autoren. Die redaktionelle Verantwortung fu¨r die U¨berarbeitung des Manuskripts
und die Kommunikation mit den Gutachtern im Rahmen des Vero¨ffentlichungsprozesses tra¨gt
Daniel Ziegler in Abstimmung mit den Co-Autoren.
Essen, 15. August 2013
(Malte Sunderko¨tter) (Prof. Dr. Christoph Weber) (Daniel Ziegler)
183
